

By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

Qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur
Pro rex regum et heredes'

Bill of Petition and Grievance

EMERGENCY

FILE, PRESENT and PLACE UPON THE FLOOR IMMEDIATELY

Filed into the Original Jurisdiction, Venue and Law Form Congress of the United States of America by, under and through the authority of the Blackstone Commentary which is the Foundation of Article 3 section 2 of the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, the Supreme Law of the Land

To bring a bill into the house, if the relief sought by it is of a private nature, it is first necessary to prefer a petition; which must be presented by a member, and usually sets forth the grievance desired to be remedied. This petition (when founded on facts that may be in their nature disputed) is referred to a committee of members, who examine the matter alleged, and accordingly report it to the house; and then (or otherwise, upon the mere petition) leave is given to bring in the bill. In public matters the bill is brought in upon motion made to the house, without any petition at all. Formerly, all bills were drawn in the form of petitions,⁵⁹ which were entered upon the *parliament rolls*, with the king's answer thereunto subjoined; not in any settled forms of words, but *

as the circumstances of the case required:(f) and, at the end of each parliament, the judges drew them into the form of a statute, which was entered on the *statute rolls*. In the reign of Henry V., to prevent mistakes and abuses, the statutes were drawn up by the judges before the end of the parliament; and, in the reign of Henry VI., bills in the form of acts, according to the modern customs, were first introduced.

The persons directed to bring in the bill present it in a competent time to the house, drawn out on paper, with a multitude of blanks, or void spaces, where any thing occurs that is dubious, or necessary to be settled by the parliament itself; (such, especially, as the precise date of times, the nature and quantity of penalties, or of any sums of money to be raised,) being indeed only the skeleton of the bill. In the house of lords, if the bill begins there, it is (when of a private nature) referred to two of the judges, to examine and report the state of the facts alleged, to see that all necessary parties consent, and to settle all points of technical propriety. This is read a first time, and at a convenient distance a second time; and, after each reading, the speaker opens to the house the substance of the bill, and puts the question whether it shall proceed any further. The introduction of the bill may be originally opposed, as the bill itself may at either of the readings; and, if the opposition succeeds, the bill must be dropped for that session; as it must also if opposed with success in any of the subsequent stages.

After the second reading it is committed, that is, referred to a committee; which is either selected by the house in matters of small importance, or else, upon a bill of consequence, the house resolves itself into a committee of the whole house. A committee of the whole house is composed of every member; and, to form it, the speaker quits the chair, (another member being appointed chairman,) and may sit and debate as a private member. In these committees the bill is debated clause by clause, (Online Library of Liberty: Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, vol. 1 PLL v6.0 (generated September, 2011) 127 <http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/2140>)

*183]

[*184

amendments made, the blanks filled up, and sometimes the bill entirely newmodelled.

After it *

has gone through the committee, the chairman reports it to the house, with such amendments as the committee have made; and then the house reconsiders the whole bill again, and the question is repeatedly put upon every clause and amendment. When the house hath agreed or disagreed to the amendments of the committee, and sometimes added new amendments of its own, the bill is then ordered to be engrossed, or written in a strong gross hand, on one or more long rolls (or presses) of parchment sewed together. When this is finished it is read a third time, and amendments are sometimes then made to it; and, if a new clause be added, it is done by tacking a separate piece of parchment on the bill, which is called a rider.(g) The speaker then again opens the contents; and, holding it up in his hands, puts the question whether the bill shall pass. If this is agreed to, the title to it is then settled, which used to be a general one for all the acts passed in the session, till, in the first year of Henry VIII., distinct titles were introduced for each chapter. After this, one of the members is directed to carry it to the lords, and desire their concurrence; who, attended by several more, carries it to the bar of the house of peers, and there delivers it to their speaker, who comes down from his woosack to receive it.

It there passes through the same forms as in the other house, (except engrossing, which is already done,) and, if rejected, no more notice is taken, but it passes *sub*



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

silentio, to prevent unbecoming altercations. But, if it is agreed to, the lords send a message by two masters in chancery, (or, upon matters of high dignity or importance, by two of the judges,) that they have agreed to the same; and the bill remains with the lords, if they have made no amendment to it. But, if any amendments are made, such amendments are sent down with the bill to receive the concurrence of the commons. If the commons disagree to the amendments, a conference usually follows between members deputed from each house, who, for the most part, settle and adjust the difference; but, if both houses remain inflexible, the bill is dropped. If the commons agree to the amendments, the bill is sent back to the lords by one of the members, * with a message to acquaint them therewith. The same forms are observed, *mutatis mutandis*, when the bill begins in the house of lords. But, when an act of grace or pardon is passed, it is first signed by his majesty, and then read once only in each of the houses, without any new engrossing or amendment.(h) And when both houses have done with any bill, it always is deposited in the house of peers, to wait the royal assent; except in the case of a bill of supply, which, after receiving the concurrence of the lords, is sent back to the house of commons.(i)

Equitable, Extraordinary and other Remedy as Required and Necessary

By, under and through the absolute authority of Necessity and Emergency
Notice to Agent is Notice to Principal, Notice to Principal is Notice to Agent

MAY NOT BE CONSTRUED OR ALTERED

alleged matter #'s 15-0491, 11-F-101, 15-M54F-00463, 15-B-328, 16-F-25

Phillip Hudok 15958 Seneca Trail, Huttonsville, West Virginia
Gene Stalnaker P.O. Box 408, Daniels, West Virginia
Thomas David house of Deegan 317 Locust Drive, Mineralwells, West Virginia

Whereas, the entire un/non Constitutional STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, by and through its LEGISLATURE and WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT, have become belligerent and/or un/non-responsive to the men and women of West Virginia and their actual and factual irreparable harm and injury caused daily without Lawful authority;

Whereas, these alleged matters have been addressed properly by and through the aforementioned constructs;

Whereas, Justice delayed is Justice denied and Let Justice be done though the Heavens fall are in fact and truth Principles upon which all rests;

Therefore, these alleged matters are brought forth and laid upon this alleged Superior Jurisdiction and Venue for duly perfected, due and owing Remedy and Relief.

There is some confusion as we believe someone or some groups are attempting to simulate Lawful and Constitutional processes, procedures and lawful government with the foundation of those being the ancient customs of man on Earth, absent false and fraudulent constructs however formed and formatted by, under and through most recently the ROMAN CURIA, and previous to that the BABYLONIAN SLAVE DRIVER TECHNIQUES in conjunction with BABYLONIAN BLACK MAGIC MONIES. It appears to the naked eye and the unsuspecting man that there is a claim that men were/are under Lawful and Constitutional contracts, and that somehow the alleged contracts were/are breached, and that somehow these alleged contracts could equate to a criminal liability. We on behalf of all men object and demand, without recourse, without prejudice, by, under and through Plenary Immunity and Indemnification, actual and factual proof be made to appear on the Creation-wide Public Record as to such validity of an erroneous and fraudulent presumption/assumption.

We being of plenary capacity, character, condition, standing, status and responsibility, sui juris, under full liability and complete transparency, do by these Presents, Aver, Affirm, Declare, Notice, Proclaim and Publish the following, to wit:

We assert, declare and aver that we are the Real-Parties-in-Interest, Holders-in-Due-Course, Secured Parties, Grantors, Bailors, Administrators, Original Creditors, Custodians and Beneficiaries to, and for, any and all alleged political and other powers administered by legitimate, lawful and other governments constructed and effectuated by real-men including, but not limited to, services and goods providers in the nature of government, trusts, systems, networks, regimes, hierarchies and any and all other limits and constructs of any nature, kind and construction; We hereby knowingly, willingly, intelligently, intentionally and absolutely cancel, extinguish and correct all presumptions and assumptions to the contrary.

The Defendants have agreed to, accepted and acknowledged the alleged Original Contracts as passed and enacted by the People, by, under and pursuant to the intent of the People, by, under and pursuant to the Oaths and/or Affirmations taken and subscribed by the defendants and/or the taking of any form and format of compensation and consideration.

If these purported governments, State of West Virginia aka/dba STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA and United States of America aka/dba UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, exist and operate Lawfully and Constitutionally and not as mere fictions of law, by, under and pursuant to the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, then the same must absolutely comply to the explicit and limited written directives and authorities contained therein; Any action or inaction outside the explicitly written limits of the Declaration of Independence c1776 and Constitution for the United States of America c1819 would be Ultra Vires, thereby voiding and forfeiting, by an operation of law, the very same Contracts aka Constitutions, and the ability to maintain, enforce and/or claim any and/or all interactions, standings, status, characters, conditions, capacities, authorities, jurisdictions, venues, law forms and/or existence in Law, at Law and otherwise.

First let us examine a Chain of Title, or lack thereof. By, under and through the Declaration of Independence c1776 the entity formed was to be known and operate as either States of America or united States of America. The entities forming such entity were operating as, for example, New York. Common sense dictates that this



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

document is what may give the authority to effectuate and maintain an entity in the absence of rejection and/or war declared and prosecuted by the entity(ies) claiming and exercising authority and control over the same.

Next up are the Articles of Confederation c1781. By, under and through the Articles of Confederation a new entity was formed it appears by the styling thereof as The United States of America. There was not an explicit and direct importation of the Declaration of Independence c1776 therein and thereby exists a defect and first break in Chain of Title.

The Treaty of Peace agreed upon in 1783 and ratified in 1784 raises several serious issues in, and of, itself. The first paragraph, which exposes capacities, characters, conditions, status and standings of the parties thereto, creates very serious implications, conflicts and breaks in the Chain of Title. Prince George the Third "agreed, accepted and acknowledged" this document as arch-treasurer and prince elector of the Holy Roman Empire etc. and of the United States of America. This Treaty was supposed to be between the United States of America and Prince George the Third. But by the words contained therein in explicit and clear language it is not. The same party was present as both sides. That in, and of, itself would void the document under even the loosest interpretations under contract law. Article 1 recognizes the entities we know as states, but not as State of ..., but for example just New York. It recognizes these entities as free sovereign and independent states, not the men, and would appear to be a conflict of, and with, the Declaration of Independence c 1776. Further breaks in Chain of Title.

The Constitution for the United States of America c1787 clearly voids the Articles of Confederation by the employment of the words "to form a more perfect union." There is also a change in the style of the entity to United States of America. Once again the Declaration of Independence c1776 was in no way referenced or incorporated therein, thereby creating another break in the Chain of Title. With this many breaks in any chain it could no longer be called a chain. Presently this entity also masquerades in un/non Constitutional interactions against real-men under an assumed identity, most frequently STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and UNITED STATES, without explicit and clear authority. An Ultra Vires act voids the contract. The first Act of alleged Congress would appear to the common man to be outright fraud in the execution and/or fraud in the inducement as the document the Oath is being sworn to, or affirmed, is not the name of the document allegedly approved by the People. An Ultra Vires act or acts, another break in the Chain of Title, fraud in the inducement and/or fraud in the execution would thereby render all void, ab initio.

It would therefore appear that the alleged CONSTITUTION currently and allegedly utilized as the source of the STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA's alleged authorities, actions and inactions is not, and has not been, approved and certified by the alleged Congress as being Republican in form in absolute violation and contempt of alleged Article 4 Section 4. The implication thereof is that an overthrow of the alleged original Republican form of Government in "West Virginia" occurred in 1872 by nefarious and fraudulent means. These nefarious, fraudulent and lawless actions and inactions are causing extreme and irreparable harm daily and continuously and have led to various other schemes to defraud continued and implemented to this present day with a widespread conspiracy visible across all alleged branches thereof. Alleged Congressional approval and certification has been authenticated by the alleged Congress on December 31, 1862, with the formation of this entity being officially recognized as West Virginia in specificity, not State of West Virginia nor STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA. This overthrow has been effectuated, maintained and enlarged and would constitute crimes as contained within the alleged Federal Crimes Act of 1790 as a codification of Creator's law crimes, among others without limitation. Therefore, in regards to the aforementioned and latter alleged matters, common-sense, facts and truths dictates that a Chain of Title has been broken, for not only the Principal entities currently in operation, STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA and/or THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and all emanating therefrom, including but not limited to alleged COURTS and JUDGES/JUSTICES, but also all previous entities regardless of style. Without an un-broken Chain of Title all is void, ab initio. Notwithstanding the aforementioned valid causes, the mere fact that an alleged Congress has permitted, at minimum, the overthrow of the alleged Original and Republican West Virginia in 1872, in absolute violation of alleged Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, the same being, at minimum, a dereliction of duty and responsibility required and necessary by their individual voluntary commercial indenture otherwise known as an Oath of Office.

To simply sum up the predicament of the modern implications of the aforementioned let us put forward the following self-evident Declarations. There has been a quite apparent nefarious scheme by men, hiding behind fictions of law and other constructs, operating by and through the perversion of words to defraud and enslave the men, women and children and placing them upon a BOOK OF THE DEAD.

As any alleged CONGRESS in fact, truth and Law had no authority, standing, status, character, condition and/or capacity to operate in any form or format, it could not therefore sanction anything else to operate. There would then be a conspiracy amongst many men and constructs spanning centuries to unlawfully and fraudulently convert men, woman, children, property and assets and repeatedly violate and breach the most basic gift of life, free-will choice, that in and of itself being the most egregious crime possible in this dominion.

Any alleged entity that assisted in the construction of the alleged United States of America, for example New York, evidently was wholly involved in the nefarious scheme to cause equitable and other harm and injury to the innocent and peaceful men, women and children sojourning during the course of their Creator granted life.

There is no valid conceivable, lawful and valid defense to any of these actions and inactions.

It is fact that the alleged construct claiming to be government is one that utilizes the men and women and their Sovereignty at Birth as the source of their authority to exist by, under and through a limited delegation of the authority of each, and no man or woman can delegate or transfer more authority than they may possess. With these facts at hand no man or woman on Earth has the authority to, including but not limited to, interfere with another's peaceful enjoyment of their journey, nor to kidnap, or steal any assets, or falsely imprison, or enter private property, therefore, men and women could not transfer or authorize those same authorities to another.

The aforementioned and latter ultra vires act(s) and/or broken Chain of Title renders the forfeiture of the CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA c1872 and the Constitution for the United States of America, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, and any and all other alleged foundational documents, by an operation of law, and/or for the aforementioned and latter reasons, thereby revoking and extinguishing, in their entirety without limitation, any and all powers, authorities, prerogatives, procedures, processes, interactions, jurisdictions, venues, law forms, et cetera, enacted, effectuated, enforced and utilized to the detriment, equitable and otherwise, of the real-man Living Soul Heirs to/of the Creator currently sojourning on Earth.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

The aforementioned and latter ultra vires act(s) and/or Broken Chain of Title, by an operation of law, render the Defendants unable to enact, effectuate, enforce, utilize and maintain any and all capacities, characters, conditions, status, standings, jurisdictions, venues, law forms, authorities, processes, procedures, prerogatives, interactions, et cetera, which "may" have authorized proceeding and interfering against ours[assets] and ourselves at any place and at any time.

The following documents and tangible mediums, in specificity, continue the de-construction of the ultra-vires act(s) and/or broken Chain of Title.

The following un-rebutted and un-rebuttable Creation-Wide Public Records, are absolute fact and truth, ab initio, nunc pro tunc, in perpetuity, and are hereby restated in their entirety, and incorporated herein, as if set forth in full, as an integral part of these matters and Creation-wide Public Record, to wit:

- Affidavit of Truth, Book 2 pages 62-71 COUNTY OF WOOD
- Affidavit cm# 7009 3410 0001 5503 4947
- Judicial Notice of Acceptance of Constitution and Oaths of Office cm# 7009 3410 0001 5503 6088
- Refusal for Cause, Challenge to Jurisdiction, Public Law Demand cm# 7009 3410 0001 5502 0155
- Precept cm# 7009 3410 0001 5502 5075
- Administrative Notice and Demand, Writ of Error Coram Nobis, Memorandum of Law cm# 7011 1570 0003 5497 3162
- Affidavit of Negative Averment cm# 7011 1570 0003 5497 3162
- Declaration of Independence, Affidavit of Expatriation/Repatriation, Affidavit of Denial cm# 7011 1570 0003 5497 3162
- Objection to Jurisdiction cm# 7011 1570 0003 5497 3162
- Notice of Lack of Jurisdiction, Affidavit of Truth cm# 7011 1570 0003 5497 3162
- Courtesy Notice, thirtieth day of March, in the Year of my Creator two thousand thirteen
- Demand and Order of Cease and Desist, Notice of Commercial Default and Dishonor, Second and Final Courtesy Notice, seventeenth day of July, in the Year of my Creator two thousand thirteen
- Public and Private Notice of Expatriation, Public and Private Notice of Repatriation, Order of Cease and Desist, nineteenth day of September, in the Year of my Creator two thousand thirteen
- UCC perpetuity filing # 2000043135 and all amendments thereto
- Rebuttal of Silent Presumptions, seventeenth day of August, in the Year of my Creator two thousand fourteen
- Affidavit of Thomas David house of Deegan, twenty first day of August, in the Year of my Creator two thousand fourteen
- Refusal for Cause, Without Dishonor, Challenge of Jurisdiction, thirteenth day of October, in the Year of my Creator two thousand fifteen
- Points and Authorities in Support of Affidavit for non-corporate status
- Affidavit for non-corporate Status
- Declaration and Notice of Abatement in Law and Equity
- Declaration and Notice of Non-Appearance
- Declaration and Notice of Divine Visitation under Divine Authority
- Abatement Nul-Tiel
- Declaration, Notice and Affidavit of Stipulation and Agreement
- Declaration and Notice of Appointment and/or Confirmation of Trustee and Fiduciary Trustee status and capacity, all served in purported open court on Robin Waters and Jason Wharton on the fifteenth day of October, in the Year of my Creator two thousand fifteen
- Mandatory Administrative and Judicial Notice, Cognizance and Action Required
- Points and Authorities in Support of Affidavit for non-corporate status
- Declaration and Notice of Abatement in Law and Equity
- Declaration and Notice of Non-Appearance
- Declaration and Notice of Divine Visitation under Divine Authority
- Nul-Tiel Corporation
- Declaration and Notice of Appointment and Confirmation of Trustee and Fiduciary Trustee status and capacity
- Declaration and Affidavit of Negative Averment
- Principles and Authorities
- Declaration, Notice and Affidavit of Stipulation and Agreement
- Mandatory Administrative and Judicial Notice, Cognizance and Action Required, all mailed on the twenty ninth and thirtieth day of October, in the Year of my Creator two thousand Fifteen
- Mandatory Administrative and Judicial Notice, Cognizance and Action Required
- Notice and Declaration of non-acceptance and no consent
- Declaration and Notice of non-allowance of presentation and Demand for Documents
- Notice and Demand for witness/victim subpoenas and production thereof
- Notice and Demand for my presence at any/all grand jury proceedings
- Notice of crimes committed in your imaginary, corporate, military, commercial jurisdiction, venue and law form, all served upon Jason Wharton, John D. Beane, Carole Jones on the thirtieth day of December, in the Year of my Creator two thousand fifteen, various cm#
- Declaration and Notice of Acceptance, Acknowledgement, Claim and Continuance, on the twenty fifth day of October, in the Year of My Creator two thousand fifteen
- Refusal for Cause, without Dishonor, Challenge of Jurisdiction, on the second day of November, in the Year of my Creator two thousand fifteen
- Declaration and Notice of Commercial Default and Dishonor
- Declaration and Notice of Demand for Production
- Demand and Order of Cease and Desist, on the third day of November, in the Year of my Creator two thousand fifteen
- Mandatory Administrative and Judicial Notice
- Declaration and Notice of the Rebuttals of the Silent Presumptions of Law, on the fourth day of November, in the Year of my Creator two thousand fifteen
- Habeas Corpus to Provost Marshal, Coast Guard Commandant and Metropolitane, on the twenty eighth day of November, in the Year of my Creator two thousand fifteen
- Challenge to all facets of jurisdiction, venue and law form
- Order from the Tribunal of the Court of Record, on the twenty fifth day of December, in the Year of my Creator two thousand fifteen
- Cross-complaint, counterclaim, criminal complaint and Bill of True Accounting of a Trust, on the twentieth day of January, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

- Precept of the Tribunal of the Court of Record

Amendment to the cross-complaint, True bill of Accounting, on the twenty sixth day of January, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Amendment to cross-complaint,

Declaration, Affidavit and Notice of Non-Understanding, Non-Disclosure, Non-Notice and Negative Averment

Declaration, Affidavit and Notice of Rebuttals of Assumptions, Presumptions and Statements, on the twenty eighth day of January, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Declaration, Affidavit and Notice of Non-Representation and No Contract

Final Notice and Demand for Production thereof, Opportunity to Cure

Demand and Notice for witness/victims subpoenas, service thereof and the production of those therein, on the twenty ninth day of January, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Mandatory Notice, customer receipt WCSO, DEPT. OF MILITARY AFFAIRS NCRJ, envelope from WVSCOA, 2 orders from WVSCOA 6-05-2015/8-25-2015, on the thirtieth day of January, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Challenge to use of privileged assistance of counsel calls and communications of any nature and kind

Notice and Demand for Discovery

Authorities and Principles

Notice, Declaration and further Challenge

Notice and Demand in Limine

Notice and Demand to Dismiss Alleged Revocation, Alleged Commercial Indictment, on the third day of February, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Notice and Demand for Dismissal of Alleged Motion for Revocation and Refused for Cause without Dishonor, Alleged Indictment, on the fifth day of February, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Notice of Conflict of Jurisdiction, Venue and Law Form, on the sixth day of February, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Refusals of 2 Motions, 1 DODDRIDGE, 1 WOOD

Refusal for Cause, without Dishonor, Challenge of Jurisdiction

Public Expatriation/Repatriation, on the eleventh day of February, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Notice and Declaration of Conflict of Jurisdiction, Venue and Law Form

Notice and Declaration of Refusal for Cause without Dishonor

Notice and Declaration of Non-Response

Mandatory Notice, Cognizance and Action Required, on the twelfth day of February, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Notice of Demand For immediate Recusal

Notice of Demand for filing/re-filing Documents, on the thirteenth day of February, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Notice and Declaration of a real-man created in the image of my Heavenly Father, on the nineteenth day of February, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Affidavit and Declaration of Negative Averment

Mandatory Notice, Declaration and Affidavit of a real-man, on the twenty fourth day of February, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Notice, Declaration of Political Affiliation, jurisdiction, venue, et et cetera, Demand for Dismissal, on the third day of March, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Jury Instructions aka Jury Tampering

Notice and Demand, Declaration, on the fifth day of March, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Notice and Refusal for Cause, without Dishonor, Notice, Demand, Declaration and Affidavit, on the eighth day of March, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Allocution and Declaration, on the thirteenth day of April, in the Year of my Creator two thousand sixteen

- Any and all filings, documents and digital data, filed into Case # 15-0491 in the alleged WV SUPREME COURT

- Any and all filings, documents and digital data, filed into alleged Case # 11-F-101 in the alleged CIRCUIT COURT COUNTY OF WOOD aka/dba WOOD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT aka/dba HONORABLE JB REED

- Any and all filings, documents and digital data, filed into alleged Case # 15-M54F-00463 in the alleged MAGISTRATE COURT COUNTY OF WOOD aka/dba COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT aka/dba MAGISTRATE ROBIN WATERS aka/dba HONORABLE ROBIN WATERS

- Any and all filings, document and digital data, filed into alleged Case # 15-B-328 in the alleged CIRCUIT COURT COUNTY OF WOOD aka/dba WOOD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT aka/dba HONORABLE JD BEANE

- Any and all filings, document and digital data, filed into alleged Case # 16-F-25 in the alleged CIRCUIT COURT COUNTY OF WOOD aka/dba WOOD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT aka/dba HONORABLE JB REED

Any and all things, items, and tangible mediums emanating from the aforementioned, including but not limited to, negotiable instruments, are hereby restated in their entirety, as if set forth in full as an integral part of these matters and Creation-wide Public Record.

Demand for all Required and Necessary Proofs of Claims, Without Dishonor, Without Prejudice, Without Recourse

1. PROOFS OF CLAIM, whereas the concept behind a law implies a command; in order for a private man to be bound to obey and follow some law/command, there must not of necessity be an authority created and established within a specific source for said law/command to exist; and must not come only from the source which has the authority to issue and enact said law/command.

2. PROOF OF CLAIM, in order for the law of a specific source to have any binding force or effect over and upon a private man, a relationship, which acts to subject, in some manner or degree, said private man to said source, is not necessary and does not need to exist, between said parties in order to create and establish the authority within said source to issue and enact law.

3. PROOF OF CLAIM, it is not relationship, between a source of law and a private man bound thereby, which creates and establishes the authority of a source to issue and enact law of a binding force, affect or effect over and upon said man, and this authority to so act is not solely dependent upon relationship for its existence and binding force, affect or effect over and upon said man.

4. PROOF OF CLAIM, in the absence/want of relationship between a private man and a specific source of authority for law, there does exist the authority within said source to issue and enact law of binding force or effect over, and upon, said man.

5. PROOF OF CLAIM, a child being a product of a parent and entirely dependent thereon, which creates, and establishes, a relationship between same, and in turn generates and establishes the authority within said parent to act over, and upon, said child as a source of authority, this same authority does, and would, extend over, and upon, a child which is not said parent's own due to lack/want of authority created and established by relationship existing between the parties.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

6. PROOF OF CLAIM, the law of Jehovah the Living God (YHWH/JHVH) does not stand, and has not always stood, in pre-eminence in relation to man's law.
7. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Law making authority of Jehovah the Living God (YHWH/JHVH), does not rest solidly and soundly upon the foundation of the relationship existing between Him and man, as man's Creator and Provider. [See: 1 Blackstone Commentaries, § 38, p. 39, wherein Sir William Blackstone states; "Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his Creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any other, has no rule to pursue, but such as he prescribes to himself; but a state of dependence will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him on whom he depends as the rule of his conduct; not, indeed, in every particular, but in all those points wherein his dependence consists. This principle, therefore, has [39] more or less extent and effect, in proportion as the superiority of the one and the dependence of the other is greater or less, absolute or limited. And consequently, as man depends absolutely upon his Maker for every thing, it is necessary that he should, in all points, conform to his Maker's will."]
8. PROOF OF CLAIM, there is not a higher loyalty of man, and specifically the Undersigned, owed in this world than loyalty to his country, which is to say, loyalty to Jehovah the Living God (YHWH/JHVH).
9. PROOF OF CLAIM, in accordance with the principle of "authority and law" set-forth herein above, the fact does not emerge that true Lawful authority is derived from a relationship existent and established between the parties and not power, force, or wealth.
10. PROOF OF CLAIM, a state of despotism and/or tyranny does not exist in which authoritative law is sacrificed and abolished when law exists because of, and through, force and power.
11. PROOF OF CLAIM, the fundamental concept of American Government, i.e. a Government, which is both de jure (Lawful), and de facto (Present/Established), is not that ALL political power which exists, resides in The People. [See: Constitution for the United States of America c1819; Preamble; Art. I, § 2, cl. 1; Art. I, § 3, cl. 1.]...in pari materia to all other state constitutions.]
12. PROOF OF CLAIM, The sovereign political power of The People (The People- Common Community not individual) did not create a "Constitutional Entity" within their written (expressed) Constitution (contract), i.e. originally, in which they created, established, and ordained the general assembly, to which they delegated a "specific" portion of their political power thereto, and thereby, and therein, constituting the general assembly as the sole legislative power (authority) for the Government. [See: Constitution for the United States of America c1819 Preamble; Art. I, § 1] [...in pari materia to all other state constitutions.]
13. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Declarations of the sovereign will of The People, as expressed within their written Constitution originally creating a Government for the several united States in the exercise of their political power does not reveal the relationship between The People and those in Government service to be that the latter are the substitutes, agents, or servants of the former, ensuing from a contractual relationship created, ordained, and instituted through, and by, the instrument (Constitution) for the Government's creation and existence.
14. PROOF OF CLAIM, a codification, i.e. the process of collecting and arranging the laws of a country or state into a Code (a compilation of existing laws, systematic arrangement into chapters, subheads, table of contents, and index, and a revision to harmonize conflicts, supply omissions, and generally clarify and make complete a body of laws to regulate completely subjects to which they relate, i.e. into a complete system of positive law, scientifically ordered, and promulgated (i.e. to publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory by legislative authority of the statutes/laws of a State and/or the United States of America; and specifically the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof as employed and used within the above referenced alleged matter, is not a redrafting and simplification of the entire body of a statute which effects a revision, and a complete restatement of the law which is then substituted, i.e. put in place of the former, exchanged, serving in lieu of, and displaces and repeals the former law as it stood relating to the subjects within its purview; and is not drastically different in nature and scope than a mere compilation.
15. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "bill" passed by the general assembly/General Assembly/Congress of the United States of America, hereinafter "General Assembly", in order to be in accord with and pursuant to constitutional provisions, must not be presented to the President for signature; or if returned by him with objections, must not be passed by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, in order for the "bill" to become law; or if the President fails to return said "bill" within ten (10) days it thereby becomes law. [See: Constitution for the United States of America c1819, Art. 1, § 7, cl. 1, 2, 3] [...in pari materia to all other state constitutions.]
16. PROOF OF CLAIM, these codifications/codes, and specifically the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, employed and used upon the alleged warrant of arrest, alleged charging document/instrument (Indictment) and alleged affidavits in support thereof in the above referenced alleged matter, are not the products of some department, bureau, commission, committee, council, or some sub-whatever thereof, which represents in nature an entity created and established by the General Assembly, and therefore is not a "un/non-constitutional legislative entity" created by statute, and therefore is bound by constitutional provisions and prohibitions; and is not operating, functioning, and laboring outside, and foreign to, the Constitution; and any semblance/appearance of constitutional restraint is not by virtue of statutory constraint; and is not legislating and promulgating foreign law which is then passed off as that of the sole provided legislative power created, established, and ordained by express constitutional provisions provided by the sovereign political will of The People.
17. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas the General Assembly's approval of a corporation's by-laws does not make nor constitute said by-laws those of the General Assembly, its approval of the laws of a "un/non-constitutional legislative entity" (corporation/quasi corporation) is different from approving a corporation's by-laws, and therefore does make and constitute these laws as those of the General Assembly.
18. PROOF OF CLAIM, the enactment, by the General Assembly, of these "complete restatements of the law;" and specifically the UNITED STATES CODE, and STATE OF... and LOCAL equivalents, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, employed, used, and cited within the above referenced alleged matter, written, drafted, redrafted, revised, promulgated, and the like by a "un/non-constitutional legislative entity" is not an act of adoption - i.e. to accept, appropriate, to make that ones own (property or act) which was not so originally - of said law; and is in accordance with, i.e. complete accord with the spirit, substance, essence, object and law, and pursuant to, i.e. in compliance with the "forms" of law (legal) - the expressed sovereign political will of The People whom in the exercise thereof, created, established, and ordained the Government for the United States of America by their act evidenced by the Constitution.
19. PROOF OF CLAIM, these codifications/codes, and specifically the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, as employed/used and cited within the above referenced alleged matter, are not enacted (approved) into law by the General Assembly by a "single statute bill"; and whereas, the 1789, as amended 1819, Constitution expressly provides for every "bill" to be read at length on three (3) different days in each House before a final vote is taken on the 'bill,' and the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, where or was it revised to strike the reading at length requirement to read that every "bill" is to be considered, i.e. to fix the mind on, with a view to careful examination - on three different days in each House, a reading of the "single statute bill" employed/used to enact these codifications/codes into law, and specifically the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, would not be a mandatory requirement, not just a mere option, in order to actually, and substantially accomplish the inherent meaning of the term/word "considered," and thereby meet and comply with this official duty and obligation imposed upon the members of the General Assembly as expressly provided for within this revised provision of their employment contract. [See: Constitution for the United States of America c1819 Art. I, § 7, cl. 1, 2, 3; [...in pari materia to all other state constitutions.]



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

20. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 was revised at Article I, § 7, cl. 1, Form of bills, revised to allow the use of a "bill" embracing more than one subject and title to be enrolled as a single statute "bill," and at Article I, § 7, cl. 2, Consideration of bills, revised to remove the requirement that "Every bill shall be read at length on three different days in each House;" in part because of the sheer enormity, difficulty, and impossibility of complying with such prior provisions in enacting (approving/adopting) these codifications/codes; and specifically the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, into law; and this practice does not constitute and equate to mere "convenience"; and these prior constitutional provisions do not tacitly, if not expressly, Declare and Affirm that neither this present day practice, mode, NOR basic concept employed/used by the General Assembly in enacting these codifications/codes into law, and specifically the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and /or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, is in accordance with and pursuant to proven, acceptable, traditional, and customary usages, NOR constitutional methods of law making.

21. PROOF OF CLAIM, these "revision committees" or "code commissions" or by whatever name known, operating, and functioning as "un/non-constitutional legislative entities," which may be composed of some legislative members, as well as attorneys, judges, and non-Governmental types are not exercising legislative power in drafting, redrafting, revising, amending, promulgating, and the like the law they produced; and where there is a lack/want of nexus creating/establishing a relationship therewith, and thereto, such laws do have a binding force or effect over and upon a private man, e.g. the Undersigned, as such relates to, and bears upon, the above referenced alleged matter.

22. PROOF OF CLAIM, a title, enacting clause, and a body are not essentials to the form and style of all valid law, whether by express constitutional provisions, or by fundamental concepts, requisites, solemnities, and proven usages from tradition and custom as practiced by Lawful societies in ALL centuries.

23. PROOF OF CLAIM, the enacting clause, and necessity for it, is not to give it jurisdictional identity and constitutional authenticity, ensuing from the sole legislative power as constitutionally created and provided for through express constitutional provisions reflecting the sovereign political will of The People, whether prescribed therein or not; and is not to establish the act; and is not to give it permanence, uniformity and certainty; and is not to provide evidence of its legislative nature; and is not to prevent in adventure, possible mistake, and fraud.

24. PROOF OF CLAIM, an enacting clause is not mandatory for a law to have authority behind it.

25. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas, the employment and usage of an enacting clause has an ancient and time honored history of usage in law making, its employment and use upon the face of each and every law validly enacted by the General Assembly of the United States of America, and then made law in accordance with, and pursuant to, Constitutional provisions, is not absolutely necessary and mandatory for a law to have any binding force, affect or effect over, and upon, a man subject to the source of authority for the laws existence.

26. PROOF OF CLAIM, a motion by a member of either House of the General Assembly to strike out the enacting clause of a "bill" is not the most common method adopted to kill a "bill" and prevent its becoming law, and as such, does not reveal the necessity, importance, and value of an enacting clause in relation to what is able to become law, is considered law, and is law.

27. PROOF OF CLAIM, the enacting clause does not go to the substance, i.e. essence, the material or essential part of a thing, as distinguished from mere "form", its spirit, worth, and value of a law; and therefore does not have substantial, i.e. importance, considerable value, real as opposed to imaginary, solid, true, not merely nominal validity creating, enacting, and promulgating law.

28. PROOF OF CLAIM resolutions, and specifically as this matter may pertain to the actual method employed/used in "enacting" the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, into law, do have any force or effect as law; and are not merely expressions of opinion; and alteration of the rules; or a vote of thanks or of censure as to a given matter, the subject-matter of which would not properly constitute a statute, and which has only a temporary effect on such matters, whereas a law, is intended to permanently direct and control matters.

29. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Judicial Branch of the national and/or State of ... Governments, working from the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 and State of ... equivalents, which contains no express provision for the use and employment of an enacting clause in the form of its "bills/laws", nevertheless, did not determine, hold, and forever establish the necessity for, and mandatory employment and use of an enacting clause upon the face of each and every law in the matter of "In re Seat of Government," wherein the Supreme Court for Washington Territory in considering an Act to move the seat of Government, which contained no enacting clause, and said territory having no Constitution of its own, and therefore generally governed by that for the United States of America held said Act invalid for want of an enacting clause.

30. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas, and specifically as this relates to and bear upon the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, only "bills" exist within the General Assembly; and no "bill" shall become "law" except by a vote of a majority; and every "bill" which passes both Houses of the General Assembly shall be presented to the President for signature (authentication); and every "bill" he approves shall become "law" and, whereas the Maxim of Law states: "A law is not obligatory unless it be promulgated," the usage and employment of an enacting "upon the face" of every law is not mandatory, and does not apply to "bills" as they make their way through the General Assembly; and are not required "upon the face" of every law when and as published; and can be removed from laws in their published/promulgated form as is the case with laws appearing within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof; and 'on its face' does not mean to be in the same plain view; and this requirement of an enacting clause to be on the face of all laws, from conception and gestation as "bills," to birth in published/promulgated form as laws, is not made clear by authorities of law.

31. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas a law if 'promulgated' by its being printed, published and made available or accessible by a public document such as an official Statute and/or CODE Book as, e.g. the United States Statutes at Large and/or the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, the removal and absence of this essential, necessary, and, mandatory requisite for the enacting clause to be "on its face" of the law in its promulgated/published form does not apply to its appearance within said "official books"; and can be in some other record book; and its removal or otherwise mysterious absence from said book as in the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, is therefore a valid and lawful publication/promulgation of the law of the United States of America, and State of ... and local equivalents.

32. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas enacting clauses are required in the promulgation of law; and to be on the face of each and every law; and a law is not obligatory until promulgated; and the legislative will cannot be ascertained in the absence of an enacting clause, nor the authority, nor the nature of the law by those to be bound thereby; such goals, aims, and purposes of an enacting clause in its removal or otherwise apparent absence, as well as all titles, on the face of the laws/statutes contained within the published form known as the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, are met, achieved, and accomplished; and are in full accordance with and pursuant to the fundamental requirements, requisites, solemnities, concepts, and proven usages of tradition and custom, and fundamental constitutional law-making; and are the valid and lawful laws/statutes of the United States of America, and State of ... and local equivalents.

33. PROOF OF CLAIM, the publication/promulgation of a statute/law within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, which remove and or otherwise omit the

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By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

enacting clause(s), as well as all titles, and are then cited within and upon the face of the alleged warrant of arrest, alleged charging document/instrument (Indictment), and the alleged affidavits in support thereof, for a criminal/public offense, that said statute/law is not void for lack/want of said clause, and title, and thereby, are therein, representing an invalid and un-lawful publication/promulgation of said statute/law; and said documents therefore, do charge a valid and lawful offense.

34. PROOF OF CLAIM, the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, is not only "prima facie evidence" of the law of the United States of America, and State of ... and local equivalents.

35. PROOF OF CLAIM, an act of the General Assembly to enact the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, into "positive law," i.e. a general designation for a law that is actually ordained or established sanctions, as distinguished from the law of nature or natural law.

36. PROOF OF CLAIM, the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, were not already "positive law" in accordance with and pursuant to the definition from Bouvier's Law Dictionary cited supra; and any such enactment of such on the part of the General Assembly does raise said statutes contained therein to the level of acts of the General Assembly as would occur with a validly enacted "bill" as "law."

37. PROOF OF CLAIM, any enactment of the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, into "positive law" is not solely a designation which declares and translates to the contents therein having undergone extra proofreading and checking to remove the errors, inconsistencies ("jokers"), and unwise provisions.

38. PROOF OF CLAIM, "legal evidence" is not a general term for most types of evidence which includes "prima facie evidence," "circumstantial evidence," and even "hearsay evidence" when relevant to an issue.

39. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "greatest evidence" of a true law is not one which contains and carries upon its face a valid enacting clause.

40. PROOF OF CLAIM, the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, was in fact validly enacted as a statute(s)/law(s), and can be construed as such.

41. PROOF OF CLAIM, the drafting of a "bill", or a "resolution" by the General Assembly to enact the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, into law, or 'positive law,' does factually and substantially render the same, law, simply because the General Assembly says it is; and that the General Assembly did in fact draft a "bill" for such purpose, and did not rather draft and employ/use resolution for such a purpose.

42. PROOF OF CLAIM, a single enacting clause employed in the publication/promulgation of the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, is sufficient for the entire text of this multi-volume, multi-subject, and diverse Code; and such, if not cited from the "Session/Pamphlet Laws", can be called and considered valid law.

43. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas all "bills" of the General Assembly must be presented to the President for signature for them to become laws, ALL of the single statute "bills" employed/used for the enactment into law, or 'positive law,' of the "Codification/Code" published/promulgated as the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, were in fact so presented to any President; and were signed (authenticated) by any President, and therefore, were validly, and lawfully, ordained and established as law(s).

44. PROOF OF CLAIM, there is not a "Code" requirement for the employment and use of an enacting clause to be in evidence upon the face of every law of the United States of America, and State of ... and local equivalents, as allegedly published/promulgated as the United States Statutes, and State of ... and local equivalents.

45. PROOF OF CLAIM, in order for a court, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, to have the jurisdictional right/authority to decide/act in a matter brought before it, and therein proceed to issue/enter order(s), decision(s) judgment(s), and the like, said court does not have to acquire any and all facets of jurisdiction over and in the parties and "thing" (res) involved in the matter/controversy.

46. PROOF OF CLAIM, if a "named" party in a suit, action, proceeding, indictment, complaint, information, and the like, and specifically the "named" alleged party/defendant within the above referenced alleged matter, is absent from court, there does not exist a want of jurisdiction over said "named" party; and the court, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, can proceed with the trial and all related proceedings.

47. PROOF OF CLAIM, a courts' jurisdiction over the person "named" in a matter brought before it, and specifically as this relates to and bears upon the "named" alleged defendant within the above referenced alleged matter, is not conferred upon the court by/through consent, waiver, pleading to the merits, and by the "named" alleged party/defendant/person appearing through counsel.

48. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, and specifically that of the alleged court of record within the above referenced matter, involves the actual thing involved in the controversy, e.g. property, money, tort or wrong one committed against another, a contract, marriage, bankruptcy, lien, or the crime or public offense that is allegedly committed, subject-matter jurisdiction would exist if the "thing" involved in the controversy does not, and never did exist.


49. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas the courts subject matter jurisdiction, and specifically that of the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, is dependent upon and acquired by the subject-matter, whether by constitutional grant or valid statute, and the subject-matter of an alleged criminal case/cause being the actual crime or offense alleged/charged against the "named" alleged defendant itself, a court does not still lack subject-matter jurisdiction if the crime/offense alleged/charged as a violation(s) of law(s) within, and upon, the face of the alleged warrant of arrest, alleged charging document/instrument (Indictment) and alleged affidavits in support thereof is/are invalid, void, and a nullity by reason the violations of law complained of are unconstitutional, or un/non-constitutional for lack/want of nexus (contract), and therefore non-existent and alleging/charging no crime/offense.

50. PROOF OF CLAIM, a law which is invalid and void for being unconstitutional or un/non-constitutional for lack/want of nexus (contract), does not fail in creating and establishing a subject-matter within which a court; and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, can exercise jurisdiction due to said alleged statute/law failing to create and establish an actual crime, or thing (res), which is itself the subject-matter of a criminal proceeding.

51. PROOF OF CLAIM, a law that is unconstitutional or a un/non-constitutional law employed/used without nexus (contract) between the authority and the man alleged to be bound thereby, is not void; and a conviction under such can be a lawful/legal cause of imprisonment and/or even sanction; and a conviction and imprisonment imposed/ordered therein under such law is not void.

52. PROOF OF CLAIM, subject-matter jurisdiction, and specifically within the above referenced alleged matter, which is the most critical aspect of the courts authority to act, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, can be waived, or can be conferred by consent, or cannot be objected to at any time, even after judgment for the first time; and there is anything that Undersigned can do, or fail to do, which would cause the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction to be lost, not even a guilty plea or verdict in the alleged matter, which is only a record admission to whatever is well alleged in the indictment.

53. PROOF OF CLAIM, if a law is invalid and void for being unconstitutional, ie containing no enacting clause and or title, or un/non-constitutional when employed/used where there exists a lack/want of nexus, e.g. contract, creating and establishing a relationship between the authority for the un/non-constitutional law and a man bound thereby, and said law is employed/used in alleging/charging a criminal/public offense by citing such law/statute within and upon the face of the alleged warrant of arrest, alleged charging document/instrument (Indictment), and alleged affidavits in support thereof, and specifically within the above referenced alleged matter which alleges/charges criminal/public offences cited from the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, within and upon the face of said alleged warrant, alleged charging document/instrument (Indictment), and alleged affidavits in support thereof therein, such employment/use, and citing of said laws(s)/statute(s) does not effect and affect the validity, sufficiency, and lawfulness of said alleged documents/instruments, and such do in fact charge an actual crime/offense; and such



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

law/statutes do not render all such alleged warrants, alleged charging documents/instruments, and alleged affidavits in support thereof insufficient and "fatally defective," and therefore VOID; and such law(s)/statute(s) cited within and upon the face of said alleged warrants, alleged charging documents, alleged instruments, and alleged affidavits in support thereof does create a legal, or lawful, cause of punishment for a conviction thereunder; and such law(s)/statute(s) cited within and upon the face of said alleged warrants, alleged charging documents/instruments does not fail to establish/confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon the court; and the employment/use and citing of such law(s)/statutes within and upon the face of such alleged warrants, alleged charging documents/instruments, and alleged affidavits in support thereof does not therefore render ALL proceedings prior to filing of a proper instrument (if it's possible) void ab initio.

54. PROOF OF CLAIM, the term/word "may" as employed by the judge handing down the decision of the court does not mean "SHALL" or "MUST" to the end that justice may not be the slave of grammar.

55. PROOF OF CLAIM, a court, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, which has proper jurisdiction within and over the subject-matter and the "person(s)" in a criminal proceeding, and therefore, has the right to decide in the matter and decide wrongly in its judgment, which would only be found upon appeal as "error," a court lacking/wanting subject-matter jurisdiction for lack/want of a "sufficient" alleged warrant of arrest, alleged charging instrument/document, e.g. an Indictment, and alleged affidavits in support thereof, which allege/charge a violation(s) of a non-existent criminal/public offense(s) for lack/want of a valid, lawful, constitutional, and existing law(s), or which allege/charge a violation(s) of a un/non-constitutional criminal/public offense(s) lacking/wanting nexus, e.g. contract, between the parties, does not in such circumstances, therefore, render ANY AND ALL orders, decisions, and judgments of said court VOID, unenforceable, and without any force, affect or effect whatsoever ab initio.

56. PROOF OF CLAIM, the court's "plenary power", i.e. entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified inherent authority to, inter alia, not only decide, but to make binding orders and judgments, and specifically the "plenary powers" of the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, are not resident in the "office of a/the judge," which upon "perfection of title" thereto by a judge taking and subscribing a valid and lawful "oath of office" secured by a "fidelity bond" (or however termed/styled) thereupon are then conferred upon the judge; and in the absence of such acts to "perfect title" to said "office" by a judge, said powers are conferred; and said office is not vacant and, all orders, decisions, and judgments rendered by the judge having so failed to "perfect title" to the office s/he holds are not Void ab initio, therefore, unenforceable, and without force, affect or effect.

57. PROOF OF CLAIM, a judge, without having perfected title to his "office" and, therefore, without right to exercise/use the "plenary powers" resident therein, and specifically the judge within the above referenced alleged matter, is not committing thereby, and therein, acts of "False Personation," "Usurpation," "Fraud," "False Pretenses," "Deceptive and Fraudulent Business Practices", and operating, alone or in concert, a "Confidence Game", for which any or all such acts would not operate to render void ab initio, unenforceable, and of no binding force, affect or effect ALL decisions, orders, and judgments of such a judge.

58. PROOF OF CLAIM, a judge who has failed to "perfect title" to his/her "office" and thereby, and therein, has no lawful NOR legal right to exercise/use the "plenary powers" resident therein, and specifically as this matter relates to and bears upon the judge within the above referenced alleged matter, is not therein acting and holding said "office" in the character thus un-lawfully assumed to deceive others, and thereby, and therein, gain some profit or advantage and/or some right or privilege belonging to the one so falsely personated, and is not thereby, and therein, acting and holding the "office of a judge" under "color-of-law" i.e., an appearance, semblance as distinguished from that which is real, valid, and lawful, a prima facie or apparent authority (not actual authority, but that which a Principal holds out as possessing) and is not therefore operating and functioning as a "judge de facto", i.e. having no authority and right thereto by lawful title, and would not render all decisions, orders, and judgments of such a judge void ab initio, unenforceable, and of no force, affect or effect.

59. PROOF OF CLAIM, a judge who has failed to "perfect title" to his "office" and thereby, and therein, has no right to exercise/use the "plenary powers" resident within the "office of a/the judge," and specifically as this relates to and bears upon the judge and said "office" within the above referenced alleged matter, is not operating and functioning in the capacity of a judge through trespass of title and "usurpation" of powers; and such acts of "usurpation" and trespass do not constitute acts of fraud (extrinsic and/or collateral) by an "agent" of a principal and power appearing of a foreign nature and character, acting to gain an undue or unconscientious advantage over another, and specifically the Undersigned as this matter relates to and bears upon the above referenced alleged matter, for which said acts of "fraud" do not vitiate and render void, ab initio, unenforceable, and of no force, affect or effect ALL decisions, orders, and judgments of such a trespassing, usurping, and de facto judge.

60. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "presiding judge" within the above referenced alleged matter was not acting therein without having "perfected titled" to his/her office; and thereby, and therein, was not "trespassing upon title" to said "office"; and thereby, and therein, was not "usurping" the right of, and right to, exercise/use (falsely holding out possession coupled with use) the "plenary powers" resident within said "office"; and did possess lawful title to said "office", and the right of, and right to, exercise/use of said powers, and was not therefore acting under "color-of-law," "False Personation," "False Pretenses," "Usurpation," "Fraud," "Deceptive and Fraudulent Business Practices," and operating alone, or in concert, a "Confidence Game"; and did not thereby, and therein, commit "constitutional impermissible acts", or "ultra vires" acts, or "illegal" acts upon, and against, the Undersigned within the above referenced alleged matter; and all decisions, orders, and the judgment entered/rendered within said alleged matter are valid, enforceable, and of binding force, affect or effect. NOTE: Response to this Proof of Claim will require the Defendants to provide "CERTIFIED" true, correct, and complete copies of those documents and "Credentials" which Defendants may be relying on to support any and all claims that Defendants brings forth to include but not limited to Oath(s) of office and bonding of the "presiding judge" within the above referenced alleged matter.

61. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "void judgment" is not an absolute and complete nullity from the beginning (ab initio) even before reversal; and acts performed under it are not also nullities; and it is in law a judgment at all; and is entitled to any respect whatsoever, as it does affect, effect, impair, or create legal rights; and is not mere waste paper; and it does have binding force, affect or effect; and does bind anybody or anyone; and is good anywhere; and is not bad everywhere; and is capable therefore of enforcement in any manner or to any degree.

62. PROOF OF CLAIM, "laches" and "lapses in time" are applicable to void judgments; and such do create any form of estoppel which operates/functions to prevent/bar a party bound under a void judgment from obtaining relief and remedy therefrom; and void judgments are capable of confirmation or ratification, specifically as this matter relates to, and bears upon, the above referenced alleged matter.

63. PROOF OF CLAIM that "void judgments" cannot be attacked collaterally (i.e. an attempt to impeach, i.e. to dispute, disparage, deny, or contradict; as to impeach a judgment or decree) the judgment by matters dehors, i.e. out of, without, beyond, foreign to, foreign to the record [See: 3 Bl. Comm. 38] in an action other than that in which it was rendered; an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force and effect in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it, and specifically as this relates to, and bears upon, the above referenced alleged matter.

64. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "collateral attack" against/upon a "void judgment" is not any proceeding or "procedure" out of /foreign to the record, and specifically the record of the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, in an action/process other than that in which the void judgment was rendered, in an attempt to avoid, defeat, evade, or deny the force, affect and effect of the void judgment.

65. PROOF OF CLAIM, "procedure" is not defined as a "Series of Symbolic Actions, generally accompanied by words, and in developed societies, by the Exhibition of Written Documents, by means of which Rights or Liberties guaranteed by a society are reasserted by its individual members. Reassertion is the Essence of Procedure, for in the sense in which we shall use the term, it assumes an already violated right.

66. PROOF OF CLAIM, there is a specific or set procedure for a "collateral attack" against/upon, and in relation/regards to a "void judgment", and specifically within the above referenced alleged matter.



67. PROOF OF CLAIM, this, as a "Private Administrative Procedure" in the nature of Bill of Discovery and Validation of Debt, cannot be utilized/employed/used, and the like by the Undersigned as a "collateral attack" against/upon, and in relation/regards to, a "void judgment" to "set the agreement" of the "parties", i.e. the Defendants and the Undersigned, specifically in application to/with the above referenced alleged matter, and thereby, and therein, avoid, defeat, evade, and deny the validity, lawfulness, procedural legality, enforceability, and force, affect and effect of said judgment entered/rendered in said alleged matter; and thereby, and therein, acquire relief and "remedy", which includes "rights;" and thereby, and therein, reassert a Right already violated to obtain relief and remedy through the "personal repleving" of the corpus, Liberty, and all property of the Undersigned's un-lawfully (and illegally) taken, seized, distrained, and the like resulting from the "void judgment" of said court within said alleged matter and currently warehoused within the "field warehouse", also known by any and all derivatives and variations in the spelling of said name, operating/functioning as an instrument/arm/unit of the alleged "Bonded" "FEDERAL" warehousing agency, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, foreign to the United States of America body, State of ... and Local equivalents/instrumentalities, a Private Corporation, Military Based Operation, also known by all derivatives and variations in the spelling of said name.

68. PROOF OF CLAIM, the jurisdiction, and specifically that of the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, of the court, i.e. in personam, territorial, political and subject-matter jurisdiction and other, does not have to be proven; and all jurisdictional facts related to the jurisdiction asserted does not have to be proven upon the record; and once jurisdiction is raised, the burden does not shift to the court, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, to prove jurisdiction; and the court, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, does have any discretion to ignore lack of jurisdiction; and the court, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, can proceed once jurisdiction is raised; and the court, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, does have authority to reach merits, and should not rather dismiss the cause of action; and jurisdiction can be assumed, and does not have to be proven to exist and decided.

69. PROOF OF CLAIM, the court and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, does not have the power and duty to vacate a "void judgment"; and relief from a "void judgment" is a discretionary matter and is not mandatory; and principles of res judicata and the concomitant/subsequent consequences thereof will be applied to a "void judgment"; and a "void judgment cannot be vacated any time."

70. PROOF OF CLAIM, it is necessary for one to take any steps to have a "void judgment" reversed/vacated/set aside.

71. PROOF OF CLAIM, a judgment of a court, and specifically the judgment of the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, is not void as long as there is an arguable basis for subject-matter jurisdiction.

72. PROOF OF CLAIM, that "judgments and other documents" of a court, and specifically the judgment of the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, is not a form of "bond," i.e. a negotiable instrument evidencing debt, and then sold for raising revenue.

73. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas the "test of jurisdiction" of a court is its right to decide; the judgment of a court, and specifically the judgment of the alleged court of record within the above referenced matter, which had no jurisdiction at the time the judgment was entered/rendered, is not therefore absolutely void and subject to defeat collaterally, as in this.

74. PROOF OF CLAIM, even if a "void judgment" is affirmed on appeal, it is thereby rendered valid.

75. PROOF OF CLAIM, when jurisdiction, i.e. in personam, territorial, political, subject-matter jurisdiction and other, is lacking/wanting by a court, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, the court does not have to dismiss the cause of action; and its neglect or refusal to do so is not usurpation.

76. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas the parties involved within the above referenced alleged matter may be in a "legal" sense immune from any claims that they are guilty of corruption due to their "proper" exercise of jurisdiction, this same immunity does hold and shield said parties, and Defendants, for their acts, whether of commission or omission, wherein they lack/want jurisdiction, perfection of title to "office," right to exercise/use the "plenary powers" resident therein, and in fact without Lawful/legal authority, once this lack/want of right/power/authority, and the like has been raised through NOTICE and WARNING as within this, relating to and bearing upon the above referenced alleged matter; and said parties or Defendants, therein choose to ignore said Notice and Warning, and essentially proceed as if the said judgment is valid by refusing to perform their duty/obligation to vacate said judgment upon agreement, whether expressed or tacit, with the Undersigned that judgment is in fact VOID ab initio, unenforceable, and of no binding force or effect; and would not thereby establish and demonstrate Defendants failure to perform in accordance with, and pursuant to, the terms and conditions of their voluntary commercial indenture through failure, of duty and obligation, to vacate the judgment in the above referenced alleged matter, issue an "Order of Release" (termination statement) which would not constitute, and establish acts of, "usurpation," and conspiracy therein, and thereto.

77. PROOF OF CLAIM, courts, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, will not, and did/do not, make use of a concept/rule known as "Constitutional Avoidance" in deciding matters to avoid conflict with the Constitution or Bill of Rights; and will not, and do not, always adopt the interpretation of the alleged statute/law (or matter under consideration before the court) which avoids a conflict with the Constitution; or will not dispose of matters by some other means which avoids the Constitution altogether if possible.

78. PROOF OF CLAIM, a court, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, when confronted with a case/cause brought before it which appears "on its face" to be founded upon unconstitutional statute/law, will not tacitly, if not expressly, look to a "contract" or "quasi contract," real or presumed, expressed or implied, revealed or unrevealed which will act as a nexus (relationship) between the parties from which the court can assume its right to decide and thereby, and therein, bind the "named" alleged defendant to the "un/non-constitutional" source of authority for the existence of the statute/law acting as the terms/conditions of said contract, in which the "named" alleged defendant is alleged/charged as violating or being in breach thereof, and thereby, and therein, avoid the constitutional conflict/question altogether.

79. PROOF OF CLAIM, the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter did not look to, and rely thereupon, an alleged charging document/instrument (Indictment), and alleged affidavit in support thereof, by which, and through which, said court assumed its right to decide which was not "fatally defective" for alleging/charging violation(s) of statute(s)/law(s) cited from the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, which on their face contain and exhibit no enacting clause(s) evidencing the will of the General Assembly that such is to exist as Statute(s)/law(s) of the United States of America, State of ... and Local equivalents, NOR any authority for their existence, NOR titles, and thereby, and therein, providing no evidence as to their nature, which in accordance with, and pursuant to, the lex non scripta and fundamental concepts, requisites, essentials, and solemnities of law-making derived from the usages of time honored, proven, and ancient traditions, customs and fundamental constitutional principles of law-making do not render said alleged/charged violation(s) of said statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) VOID, unenforceable, and of no binding force, affect and effect for their failure to create a criminal/public offense for which the "named" alleged defendant can be convicted and punished for, therefore, failing to create a subject-matter (crime) for the allege court of record within the above referenced alleged matter to assume any jurisdiction in, over, upon, and the like. [See: H.R. 3190 (80th Congress, 1947-1948). Pub.L. 80-772; specifically April 24, 1947, H.R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 100 app. (1947); 93 Cong. Rec. 5048-49, 5121; May 12, 1947, 93 Cong. Rec. 5049 (no quorum present, cf. U.S. Cons. Art. I, § 5, cl. 1, Art. I, § 7, cl. 2); S. Con. Res. 33, 93 Cong. Rec. 10522, 10439, July 26, 1947; 94 Cong. Rec. 8075, June 14, 1948; S. Rep. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2430, June 18, 1948; 94 Cong. Rec. 8864; Daily Digest, 94 Cong. Rec. D556-557, 80th Congress, June 18, 1948; 94 Cong. Rec. 8864-65; see S. Rept. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2430 (1948); 94 Cong. Rec. 9158; 94 Cong. Rec. 9354, 9363, 9365, June 19, 1948; and 94 Cong. Rec. 9367, June 25, 1947.]

80. PROOF OF CLAIM, the alleged court of record within the above reference alleged matter did not tacitly determine, and assume, its jurisdiction over, and upon, the alleged parties within said alleged matter based upon some "contract," real or presumed, expressed or implied, revealed or unrevealed as an "un/non-constitutional



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other ground" within, and upon, which it proceeded to exercise its right to decide, render/enter a judgment therein, and thereby avoid the constitutional conflict/question altogether.

81. PROOF OF CLAIM, contracts do not supersede the Constitution, the law therein, and thereof, as well as ALL constraints, prohibitions, and provisions therein expressed, because contracts arise not from the Constitution, but from without the Constitution, based upon a man's unalienable, and unlimited, Right to privately contract which cannot be impaired.

82. PROOF OF CLAIM, the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, did fully disclose in good faith and with clean hands, to the "named" alleged defendant within said alleged matter, or the Undersigned, any contract or quasi-contract, real or presumed, expressed or implied, revealed or unrevealed from which said court formed for itself an "un/non-constitutional other ground" upon which, and within which, it assumed its jurisdiction, i.e. its right to decide, and thereby, and therein, exercise its power to enter/render a judgment therein, and avoid the constitutional conflict/question altogether.

83. PROOF OF CLAIM, the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter by resorting to a contract or quasi-contract, real or presumed, expressed or implied, revealed or unrevealed between the parties, i.e. the "named" alleged defendant and source of authority for the existence of said "un/non-constitutional" Statute(s)/law(s), acting therein, and thereby, to bind the "named" alleged defendant to said source of authority, and thereby to said statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) alleged/charged to have been violated/breached by the "named" alleged defendant, does not thereby, and therein, Declare and Affirm tacitly, if not expressly, the unconstitutional nature of the alleged statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) cited within, and upon the face of, the alleged charging document/instrument (Indictment), and alleged affidavit in support thereof, provided by an alleged party thereto; and does not conversely Declare and Affirm the "un/non-constitutional" nature of said statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) alleged/charged as having been violated or breached.

84. PROOF OF CLAIM, the source of authority for the existence of the statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) alleged/charged as having been violated/breached by the "named" alleged defendant within the above referenced alleged matter as cited within, and upon, the face of the alleged charging document/instrument (Information), and alleged affidavit in support thereof, employed/used by the District Attorney's Office and the alleged court of record within said matter is not, and does not, represent a "foreign source of authority" to the "named" alleged defendant without there existing a contract creating a relationship, and establishing a nexus with/to said source of authority and the "named" alleged defendant in said alleged matter, and the Undersigned's "State-In-Being," and "State-In-Fact."

85. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas a "relationship" must exist and be established between a source of authority for a statute's/law's/code's existence and a man to be bound thereby; and whereas the "relationship" presumed to have been established and existing between the "named" alleged defendant and the Undersigned within the above referenced alleged matter, and the source of authority for the existence of the "un/non-constitutional" statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) as cited within and upon the face of the alleged warrant of arrest, alleged charging document/instrument (Indictment), and alleged affidavits in support thereof within same alleged matter, presumed to have arisen from some "contract" or "quasi contract," real or presumed, expressed or implied, revealed or unrevealed which creates and establishes said "relationship/nexus" as one of contractual obligations between the parties to said contract, such does not define and reveal the nature and cause of said alleged matter, and ALL proceedings therein, as some form of suit/libel in equity/chancery/admiralty, arising from some alleged/charged violation(s) of terms and conditions of said alleged contract for a tort, fault, misconduct or malfeasance arising therefrom on the part of the "named" alleged defendant in said alleged matter, alleged/charged as being in "breach" of duty/obligation arising from said "contract" as an action ex delicto.

86. PROOF OF CLAIM, the actual nature and cause of the above referenced alleged matter and ALL proceedings, procedures, and processes therein, were in fact fully disclosed and explained to the "named" alleged defendant and the Undersigned in said alleged matter by the Presiding Judge, any acting party thereto, and or the alleged court of record appointed Defense Attorney; and such full disclosure does appear upon the face of the record of the alleged court of record, but said facts relating to the actual nature and cause of said alleged matter were not rather actively and purposely concealed and hidden by said "Officer(s)" of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and/or "COURT", or STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, which thereby, and therein, constituted and established acts of fraud against and upon the "named" alleged defendant and the Undersigned within said alleged matters by said "Officers."

87. PROOF OF CLAIM, the legal status of these "un/non-constitutional legislative entities" operating/functioning as sources of authority for these so-called "Revised Codes/Statutes", and specifically the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, is not that of a corporation/quasi corporation, which is also created by statute.

88. PROOF OF CLAIM, that the Legislative Reference Bureau, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, created by Act of April 27, 1909, P.L. 208, and, reorganized by Act of May 7, 1923, P.L. 158, as a legislative "agency" with the primary function to draft and pass upon legislative bills and resolutions for introduction in the General Assembly; and to prepare for "adoption" by the General Assembly, "Codes" by topics, of the existing general statutes for which it was handed over statutory authority in 1974 to publish an "official publication" of the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, is not operating/functioning as a "un/non-constitutional legislative entity"; and is not operating or functioning as a foreign corporate entity representing the source of authority for the existence of statute(s)/law(s) known as the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, in the capacity of an "administrative law agency" administering the corporate affairs, and public of that which created it, by statute.

89. PROOF OF CLAIM, these alleged statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) of this "un/non-constitutional legislative entity", i.e. the Legislative Reference Bureau, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, operating/functioning as a foreign corporate "administrative law agency" are not by nature the private "by-laws" of a "corporation" for the administration of its internal Government and public; and are binding and of force, affect or effect over and upon the private, non-enfranchised, and non-assumpsit's thereto, and therewith, living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man, i.e. a man; and as such, are not ultimately governed by, through, and within the realm of commercial law as adopted and codified within the UNITED STATES CODE, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, thereby, and therein, representing commercial law for operating/functioning in commerce.

90. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 at Article I, Section 8 and 10 clearly prohibits the Congress from printing and issuing Federal Reserve Notes as it is a constitutional entity, or purportedly so, and its actions are limited thereby, and therein, a corporation or trust is not, e.g. the Federal Reserve System, created by Congressional Act in 1913, and as a "un/non-constitutional Congressional entity" without the Constitution, and therefore not bound NOR encumbered by said document/instrument, may proceed to print and issue money (currency) which would be an unconstitutional form of money for Congress, restrained as it is, by the instrument/document of its creation, these "un/non-constitutional legislative entities", e.g. the Legislative Reference Bureau, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and the alleged statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) they create/generate is not a "un/non-constitutional" issue having no nexus with the said Constitution; and the binding force, affect or effect of said statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) is not established/created solely from, or by, contract between the parties, which once silent judicial notice of said contract is taken by the presiding judge, whether real or presumed, expressed or implied, revealed or unrevealed, therein operates/functions to bind the "named" alleged defendant in the alleged matter, and specifically the "named" alleged defendant within the above referenced alleged matter, to the alleged/charged violation(s) of statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) cited within and upon the face of the alleged warrant of arrest, alleged charging document/instrument (Indictment), and alleged affidavits in support thereof, and specifically within the above referenced alleged matter, unless said judicial presumption of a contract is rebutted.

Please note that although it is the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY who prints the so-called Federal Reserve notes, these notes have no value and are not backed by anything-



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"Federal Reserve notes are not redeemable, and receive no backing by anything. This has been the case since 1933. The notes have no value for themselves," this is taken from the official website of the UNITED STATES financial expert, the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY whose job it is to print the money to be utilized by the public, and note how they say that since the government declared bankruptcy in 1933 their notes have had no value.

An official website of the UNITED STATES Government

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Currency/Pages/legal-tender.aspx>

The Federal Reserve issues bookkeeping entry credit, there is no constitutional amendment permitting the Federal Reserve and/or the treasury to create worthless items and declared them to be currency. The Constitution has held that the monies created by Congress must have a value, and this is not a market value but a national currency value. Federal Reserve bookkeeping entry credit is not regulated by Congress, making this process by the Federal Reserve, the issuance of bookkeeping entry credit, unconstitutional. That is, unless and until you can provide facts and conclusions of law, and not opinion, to the contrary.

91. PROOF OF CLAIM, where an American alleged defendant and the Undersigned before an American court, charged with the violation of a statute/law/code of the French Parliament, to which he mounts a defense upon an "unconstitutional" issue of a law violating his alleged 4th and 5th Amendment rights, and its being repugnant to the Constitution, the presiding judge would have committed an "error in judgment" were s/he to hold that said statute/law/code (regardless of how apparently corrupt and fascist this holding may seem to paint said court and judge) is not "unconstitutional"; and such a holding and statement of the judge is not a tacit affirmation on the part of said judge that the matter was improperly presented as an "unconstitutional issue" when it should have been presented as a "un/non-constitutional" issue, i.e. a law/statute/code outside and foreign to the Constitution, which would have acted to focus upon and address the nature of said statute/law/code and the lack/want of relationship (contract or otherwise) existing between said alleged defendant and the Undersigned and the source of authority for the existence of said statute/law/code to which, for said lack/want of relationship, said alleged defendant and the Undersigned has no duty NOR obligation to follow, comply with, NOR obey.

92. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas the issue of a trial or hearing exists when the plaintiff and alleged defendant arrive at some specific matter in which one affirms and the others denies, a court does not create the issue by asking the "named" defendant how he disputes to the charges.

93. PROOF OF CLAIM, if there is a statute/law/code within, and upon, the face of an alleged charging document/instrument which alleges/charges a violation of an unconstitutional statute/law/code, or is from another state, or legal entity, or even a "un/non-constitutional legislative entity," such as those statutes/laws/code cited from the UNITED STATES CODE, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalent, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, within and upon the face of the alleged warrant of arrest, alleged charging document/instrument (Indictment), and alleged affidavits in support thereof within the above referenced alleged matter, an alleged defendant, and specifically the "named" alleged defendant and the Undersigned within the above referenced alleged matter, in the act of entering a plea or verdict thereto, and therein, does not thereby, and therein, admit to the geniuses of said alleged "charging document/instrument (Indictment); and does not admit to the validity of the statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) cited therein; and does not thereby form the issue for trial which would exist even without a plea, and without which there would be anything before the court or jury for trial.

94. PROOF OF CLAIM, it appears within, and upon, the face of the record of the alleged court of record in the above referenced alleged matter, the nature of the statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) cited within, and upon, the face of the alleged warrant of arrest, alleged charging document/instrument (Indictment), and alleged affidavits in support thereof, as relied upon by said court to assume its jurisdiction in the case/cause and over and upon the parties therein; and the consequences of entering a plea, as established supra at Proof of Claim No. 92 and 93, were disclosed to the "named" alleged defendant within the above referenced alleged matter by ANY "officer" of said court and/or THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents; and was not rather actively concealed and hidden from the "named" alleged defendant and the Undersigned by said "officers"; and such concealment does not operate to constitute/establish acts of fraud upon and against the "named" alleged defendant and the Undersigned within the above referenced alleged matter.

95. PROOF OF CLAIM, the proceedings in which the "named" alleged defendant and the Undersigned were subjected to within the above referenced alleged matter, were not in equity/chancery and/or admiralty; and the conflict was not with a "un/non-constitutional" source of authority for the existence of the statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) alleged/charged as violated within, and upon, the face of the alleged warrant of arrest, alleged charging document/instrument (Indictment), and alleged affidavits in support thereof.

96. PROOF OF CLAIM, courts and the legal system today, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, can, and do, recognize and proceed upon common-law crimes/offense, and therefore acts, which are made crimes/offenses, are not made so by statute, or rather "Code."

97. PROOF OF CLAIM, all crimes are not commercial. [See: Constitution for the United States of America c1819, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 and 18; accord specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation; Title 27 CFR § 72.11.]


98. PROOF OF CLAIM, the lack/want of subject-matter jurisdiction, and all other facets as well, cannot stop a court, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, from proceeding; and does not void ALL orders, decisions, judgments, and the like of said court as it cannot be waived, may be asserted at anytime, even after trial for the first time, and is not affected by NOR negated by the act of entering a plea, not even a guilty plea, as such would confess nothing; and this lack/want of subject-matter jurisdiction, and all other facets as well, whether ensuing from a fatally defective alleged warrant of arrest or alleged charging document/instrument, e.g. an Indictment as in the above referenced alleged matter, for employing/using and citing "unconstitutional statute(s)/law(s)/code(s), or "un/non-constitutional" statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) without nexus (relationship), e.g. contract or otherwise, established and existing between the parties, does not effectuate the same result, i.e. the judgment is VOID and a complete nullity ab initio, unenforceable, and without binding force, affect and effect, even before reversal.

99. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas other State Supreme Courts have held these so-called "Revised Codes," or however termed/styled, not to be the law of their respective states, the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, is any different from these other so-called "Revised Codes" and is the law of the United States of America, State of ... and Local equivalents/instrumentalities.

100. PROOF OF CLAIM, all jurisdiction with, and of, the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF... and LOCAL equivalents, is not by "contract"; and said contractual constraints are not binding upon ANY and ALL courts within said juridical constructs, and the jurisdiction exercised therein.

101. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "Executive Power", i.e. the administrative branch of Government, state and federal/national, as created, ordained, and established within the written document/instrument for its existence, is not limited and guided by the "law of the land."

102. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "law of the land" and "due process of law" do not have the same meaning; and the law intended by the Constitution, state and federal/national, is not the common-law.



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103. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "due process of law" clause as expressly written within the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, does not make and establish the common-law the "law of the land."
104. PROOF OF CLAIM, the common-law is not the foundation of "due process of law."
105. PROOF OF CLAIM, "due process of law" and "the law of the land" does not declare that a man cannot be deprived of his liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.
106. PROOF OF CLAIM, "due process of law" and what constitutes same is determined by the "Legislative Power" of Government, state and/or federal/national, and specifically that as exercised by the General Assembly of the present existing THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, within and/or through its statutes/codes/laws; and is not a restraint upon the legislative, as well as the executive and judicial powers of Government.
107. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas the Congress of the federal Government is not free to make any process it deems fit as constituting "due process of law," the General Assembly of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, are free to make any process they may deem fit as constituting due process of law.
108. PROOF OF CLAIM, what constitutes "due process of law" is not to be ascertained by an examination of the settled usages and mode of proceeding in the common and statute laws of England before the immigration of The People to this land and adoption of any Constitution.
109. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "due process of law" clause, i.e. the common-law as defined herein above, does not govern what the law on arrest is on the land, and where it exists, the most statutes can be, and specifically as contained within the UNITED STATES CODE, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, is not declaratory of the common-law; and, if there is no direct language in the constitution of a state, and specifically as this relates to and bears upon said Constitution for the United States of America c1819, directing what procedure or process is to be followed, the common-law made the "law of the land" through the due process clause of the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, is not to be the "due process of law" followed and enforced within the states, as opposed to some legislative statute(s)/code(s) (validly enacted or otherwise), or a city ordinance.
110. PROOF OF CLAIM, that a law enforcement officer, however such may be termed/styled, who does not abide by the "law of the land", i.e. the common-law as adopted through the due process clause of the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, are not trespassers.
111. PROOF OF CLAIM, in matters relating to, and bearing upon, arrests, fundamental law, i.e. the organic law, i.e. the Constitution, is not controlling over and upon legislative statutes, and specifically the UNITED STATES CODE, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and is not therefore the prevailing law.
112. PROOF OF CLAIM, "due process of law" by which a man may be deprived of his liberty, and property, is not that process which existed at common-law.
113. PROOF OF CLAIM, a man can be arrested upon a warrant without "due process of law."
114. PROOF OF CLAIM, "due process of law" does not have the same meaning throughout America.
115. PROOF OF CLAIM, in a criminal proceeding where an arrest is made without warrant, an invalid warrant, or a warrant illegally/un-lawfully executed, the burden is not upon the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and/or STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, as this matter relates to and bears upon the above referenced alleged matter, to justify the arrest upon said warrant, or lack thereof, and subsequent criminal proceedings, as one not violating of Constitutional provisions, and the invalidity of the arrest will not render any search invalid and ALL evidence obtained inadmissible.
116. PROOF OF CLAIM, the warrant used/employed by an arresting officer in executing said arrest must not be in said officer's possession.
117. PROOF OF CLAIM, "possession" of a warrant of arrest by the arresting officer executing said warrant does not mandate it must be in the hand or pocket of said officer, and said "possession" does not mandate, require, and establish that said warrant must be so nearby as to show it upon request with reasonable promptness.
118. PROOF OF CLAIM, where an offense is not committed in the presence of an officer, as in the above referenced alleged matter, in making an arrest for said offense, said officer does not need to have the warrant for arrest in his actual possession if the arrest is to be lawful.
119. PROOF OF CLAIM, knowledge of the issuance and existence of a warrant of arrest by the party named therein does relax, or even do away with, the requirement that the arresting officer must be in possession of the warrant.
120. PROOF OF CLAIM, a warrant of arrest must not be shown and read to a man allegedly named therein, and being placed under arrest, or informed of being under arrest, if requested to do so.
121. PROOF OF CLAIM, failure to show or display a warrant when a warrant for an arrest allegedly exists, the arrest does not thereby, and therein, become unlawful/illegal.
122. PROOF OF CLAIM, the primary reason for the officer to have the warrant in his possession when making an arrest under the warrant is not so that it can be shown to the one arrested, so that he may know the authority by which he is being deprived of his liberty.
123. PROOF OF CLAIM, the argument that officers are free to arrest because there is a warrant "outstanding" is not nullified by the requirement of law that one arresting under a warrant must show it if requested to do so, which is not manifestly impossible unless the arresting officer has the warrant in his possession at the time of arrest.
124. PROOF OF CLAIM, any statute/code/law, validly enacted or otherwise, requiring the warrant to be shown upon arrest, and specifically within, the UNITED STATES CODE, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Supplementary Rules of Admiralty, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, is not but declaratory of the "due process of law" procedure(s) that must be followed in an arrest; and therefore a statute requiring a warrant to be shown upon arrest is needed, and where such a statute exists, it is not merely redundant in nature.
125. PROOF OF CLAIM, the reason for the duty of the arresting officer executing a warrant of arrest to explain the cause, for which the warrant issued, to the party arrested is not to state the nature and substance of the process which gives the arresting officer the authority which he professes to exercise; and if it is demanded of the arresting officer, to produce and exhibit it to the arrested party for his perusal that he may have no excuse for resistance.
126. PROOF OF CLAIM, a prima facie invalid warrant will not be, and is not, regarded as any warrant, and an officer attempting to execute an arrest there under of the party named therein is protected by it.
127. PROOF OF CLAIM, both a proper subject-matter, in personam, political and geographical jurisdiction are not necessary and essential for a valid warrant.
128. PROOF OF CLAIM, the question of jurisdiction cannot be raised at any time; and consent and/or waiver can confer or grant jurisdiction; and a court, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, does have any authority to proceed where it appears from the record that it has no authority due to an insufficient warrant of arrest.
129. PROOF OF CLAIM, whenever a warrant of arrest is invalid on its face, or where it is only a summons, the arresting officer, or officer attempting to execute service thereof, upon the party named therein, said officer is not liable for damages.
130. PROOF OF CLAIM, the requirements of what a warrant of arrest should contain does not depend primarily on Constitutional mandates and common-law principles.
131. PROOF OF CLAIM, the common-law does not require that a warrant of arrest be issued for an arrest only after a formal charge is made under oath; and an arrest is valid if not based upon a sworn affidavit.
132. PROOF OF CLAIM, a warrant of arrest does not require the individual review of a neutral judicial officer, i.e. magistrate, justice of the peace, or judge who is learned in the law and qualified to determine if probable cause exists to issue said warrant; and does not require the signature of said judicial officer, which can be

A handwritten signature in blue ink is written over a red circular stamp. The stamp appears to be a fingerprint or a similar official mark.

By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

"rubber stamped" with the judicial officer's name by some clerk or administrative employee; and such a practice of "rubber stamping" the judicial officer's name does constitute signature of said officer, and is not thereby, and therein, VOID and invalid.

133. PROOF OF CLAIM, a warrant is not regarded as insufficient and thus VOID if, on its face, it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a crime.

134. PROOF OF CLAIM, a designation or description of the offense should not be written in the warrant.

135. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas inaccuracies and imperfections do not vitiate a warrant which substantially charges an offense, a complaint recited in substance in a warrant and which is verified merely on information and belief and does not thereby, and therein, state facts sufficient to constitute an offense, said warrant must not be held to be invalid on its face.

136. PROOF OF CLAIM, an affidavit that merely states belief in the guilt of the accused is not insufficient to support a warrant of arrest.

137. PROOF OF CLAIM, an affidavit which is based upon a presumption or belief of crime does give jurisdiction to the court, and specifically as this matter relates to and bears upon such affidavit and the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, to issue a warrant, and a law enforcement officer, however termed/styled, can execute a warrant, which is essentially LOCAL, outside their jurisdiction.

138. PROOF OF CLAIM, the officer(s) executing a warrant of arrest is not bound to know if under the law, the warrant is defective, and not fair on its face; and he is not liable as a trespasser if it does not appear on its face to be a lawful warrant; and said officer's(s') ignorance is an excuse.

139. PROOF OF CLAIM, the following are not the basic requisites and essentials needed to make a warrant of arrest valid: 1) A warrant is to be issued by a judicial officer and signed by him; 2) It must state the facts that show the matter to be within the jurisdiction of the judicial officer issuing it; 3) It cannot be based upon mere belief or suspicion, but upon probable cause; 4) The warrant is to list a complaint which is to state the offenses committed and the facts that constitute a crime; 5) A warrant is to contain an affidavit of the person making the charge under oath; and 6) It must truly name the man to be arrested, or describe him sufficiently to identify him.

140. PROOF OF CLAIM, in commercial law, any document or instrument, e.g. inter alia, legal briefs, securities, promissory notes, contracts, and affidavits must contain seven (7) essential elements to be valid; and any of these seven (7) essential elements which are missing, does not render the document or instrument commercially defective, void, or expressly fraudulent.

141. PROOF OF CLAIM, these seven (7) essential elements as applied to an affidavit in support of a warrant of arrest or a charging document/instrument, are not: 1) Accurate identification of the parties to the document, or instrument, or dispute; 2) Nature and content of the allegations or claims set-forth with particularity; 3) Ledgering - accounting of the remedy or relief sought as recompense or compensation for specific wrongs, or contractual violations, or defaults; 4) Evidence of solvency - identification of the property sought/pledged as the stakes over which the dispute occurs, to be forfeited to the prevailing party to pay the debt/damage and satisfy the judgment; 5) Facts and law - specific laws violated and facts in evidence by exhibit; 6) Certification - statement under oath by party asserting an allegation or claim that everything asserted is "true, correct, and complete," whether criminal or civil; and 7) Witnesses - third party certification substantiating the actual lawful/legal identity of the party executing the document or instrument.

142. PROOF OF CLAIM, the 4th Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 does not apply to arrests made and executed under warrants of arrest; and does not govern and regulate how such warrants are to issue; and does not make the issuance of such warrants to be solely upon "probable cause" supported by Oath or affirmation absolutely mandatory and essential for said warrant of arrest to be valid, lawful, and in compliance with "due process of law" or "the law of the land", i.e. common-law rules and principles established and present in this land before the adoption of said Constitution, as practiced and administered in England prior to the immigration of The People to this land.

143. PROOF OF CLAIM, where an arrest is made and executed without a warrant of arrest, which is recognized and authorized by the common-law only for a select and specific class of offenses, and therefore outside the provisions of the 4th Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, the standards of "due process of law" or "the law of the land", i.e. common-law rules and principles, must not be applied to said arrest; and failure to apply said rules and principles to said arrest would not, and does not, constitute and establish said arrest as a "False Arrest," and therefore VOID.

144. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas the Undersigned has never seen the original, nor been presented with a copy, "certified" or otherwise, of the alleged warrant of arrest, and the alleged affidavit in support thereof, employed/used within the above referenced alleged matter by the arresting officer(s), and therefore has no reason to believe a valid, lawful, and properly supported warrant of arrest which truly names/identifies/references the Undersigned exists; that such a warrant of arrest for the Undersigned does exist; and is signed/authenticated by a lawful judicial officer, and does allege/charge a violation(s) of validly enacted statute(s)/law(s); and therefore does establish/create a crime/offense within the jurisdiction of the judicial officer signatory thereon; and does create all facets of jurisdiction for the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter; and the affidavit in support thereof does comply with ALL seven (7) points of a seven (7) point document/instrument; and any signature of a judicial officer appearing upon the face of the warrant of arrest is/was, at the time of affixing his signature thereon, and thereto, validly and lawfully holding his office, having perfected title thereto, and thereby lawfully in possession and use of the "plenary powers" resident therein, and containing ALL additional requisites and essentials as set-forth above within Proof of Claim No. 139; and in ALL areas is in accordance with and pursuant to rules and principles as established and ordained by the "due process of law" or "the law of the land."

145. PROOF OF CLAIM, without a valid and lawful warrant of arrest being in existence for the Undersigned within the above referenced alleged matter, a defense against the claim of "False Arrest" and "False Imprisonment" does exist for the Defendants.

146. PROOF OF CLAIM, the law does not set such a high value upon the liberty of a man that even an attempt to un-lawfully arrest said man is not esteemed a great provocation.

147. PROOF OF CLAIM, an arrest may not be made either with, or without, any physical force or touching of the arrested man by the arresting officer.

148. PROOF OF CLAIM, any un-lawful or illegal restraint of a man's personal liberty by the act of another, and specifically as this relates to and bears upon the arresting officer(s) within the above referenced alleged matter, does not give the man so restrained a cause of action and claim for false arrest and false imprisonment resulting therefrom, against the one causing the un-lawful or illegal restraint; and ANY restraint executed by fear or force is not prima facie un-lawful.

149. PROOF OF CLAIM, in ALL cases of arrest in which there is no physical touching or seizure, NOR any resistance, the intentions of the parties to the transaction are not to be considered, i.e. there must have been intent on the part of one of them to arrest or restrain the other, and intent on the part of such other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission was necessary.

150. PROOF OF CLAIM, any restraint, however slight, upon a man's liberty to come and go as he pleases, does not constitute an arrest.

151. PROOF OF CLAIM, when a man has shown that he was arrested, imprisoned, or restrained of his liberty by another, the law does not presume it to be un-lawful till proven otherwise.

152. PROOF OF CLAIM, in a claim of false arrest and false imprisonment "good faith" on the part of the arresting/restraining officer(s)/person(s) is a justification for the custody, detention or imprisonment; and a lack/want of "reasonable" or "probable cause," and "malice" are essential elements of the action/claim, and are therefore viable and acceptable defenses against said action/claim.

153. PROOF OF CLAIM, where an un-lawful arrest and imprisonment are claimed to have been for the "public good," such a defense will stop damages.

154. PROOF OF CLAIM, a belief in the guilt of a man, no matter how strong or well founded in the mind of an arresting officer(s)/person(s), is a justification against a claim of false arrest and false imprisonment.

155. PROOF OF CLAIM, a man's liberty does depend upon good faith merely, but not upon legal rules governing official action.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

156. PROOF OF CLAIM, in claims/actions of false arrest and false imprisonment, the arresting officer(s)/person(s) cannot avoid liability only by pleading justification for the arrest and all other arguments must not necessarily fail.
157. PROOF OF CLAIM, the guilt of a man arrested does have any bearing upon the legality of the arrest.
158. PROOF OF CLAIM, even where a man has plead guilty, the arresting officer(s)/person(s) cannot still be liable for false arrest, and therefore, it has not been held that consent to an un-lawful arrest will not excuse an officer(s)/person(s) from his acts, nor will the law permit such a claim to be made.
159. PROOF OF CLAIM, a false, or un-lawful, arrest is not in and of itself an assault, or an assault and battery, trespass, or a graver offense; and the law does not regard such arrests as any other assault which may be resisted by the assaulted; and the officer(s)/person(s) making the arrest is not regarded as a personal trespasser.
160. PROOF OF CLAIM, a man cannot resist the un-lawful seizure of personal property sought or forcefully taken without warrant, i.e. a warrant outside, and foreign to, the "law of the land" or "due process of law" without nexus (relationship) thereto, contractually or otherwise, or a warrant invalid on its face and not in compliance with requirements and prohibitions of the 4th Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America 1819; and such personal property does not include, inter alia, fingerprints, photographic images of the man, bodily fluids, D.N.A., R.N.A., exemplars, and the like.
161. PROOF OF CLAIM, the law that allows a man to resist an un-lawful arrest is not the same law that allows a man to repel an attack or assault upon his self; and said law is not the Law of self-defense and self-preservation, which is a man's unalienable Right to in the protection of his life, liberty, and property from un-lawful attack or harm; and such Right is not recognized and secured by the Constitution for the United States of America c1819. [See: Constitution for the United States of America c1819 Preamble; articles in amendment I, II, IV, V, VI, IX, and X] [...in pari materia to all other state constitutions.]
162. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Supreme Court of the United States and every other court in the past deciding upon the matter, has not recognized that at common-law a man had the right to resist the illegal attempt to arrest him; and it has not been held that a man can resist any arrest where he has reasonable grounds to believe that the officer(s)/person(s) is not acting in good faith; and that by submitting to arrest and being disarmed he will, by reason of this fact, be in danger of great bodily harm or of losing his life.
163. PROOF OF CLAIM, the common-law or law of the land, does not draw certain limitations upon how and when an arrest can be made; and that all arrests which are to be lawful must not necessarily be grounded in and upon such principles; and one such principle is not that an arrest must be founded upon probable cause of guilt, and not mere suspicion, for the two must exist together.
164. PROOF OF CLAIM, the word "suspicion" as used and employed within "Codes" and "Statutes" today, and specifically within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, is not so used and employed to authorize arrests which the common-law or "the law of the land" prohibits, and upon defeat of said cause, to justify arrest for yet some other non-related cause from the first; in short, justification to conduct a mere "hunting expedition" with the hope of "bagging" some "prize."
165. PROOF OF CLAIM, the wisdom of the ages, which brought the law on arrests, was not, and is not, boldly declared in the Magna Carta which states: "No one shall be arrested or imprisoned but by the law of the land."
166. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Undersigned, as well as any man today, was arrested upon, and under, a warrant of arrest in accordance with, and pursuant to, rules and principles established and ordained within, under, and by "the law of the land."
167. PROOF OF CLAIM, the restrictive principles of common-law, which though annoying to those in Government in their attempts to get the "crooks" and "bad guys," are not purposely so in order to restrict those in Government and make them follow set procedures, and thereby, make it difficult for those in Government to deprive men of their Rights, as the common-law or "law of the land" prescribes that in order to safeguard the rights of the innocent, the guilty must on occasion go free.
168. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas the common-law recognizes and authorizes arrests without warrants only in cases where the public security requires it, such interests are not confined only to felonies and breaches of the peace committed in the presence of an officer.
169. PROOF OF CLAIM, that it is not a fundamental rule of procedure well grounded in the common-law, that where an arrest is made, the alleged offender is to be taken before a magistrate to be dealt with according to law.
170. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas an offender is to be taken before a magistrate to be dealt with according to law upon arrest, such fundamental rule of procedure is not to be observed without delay, or without unnecessary delay, and the failure in the observance of said procedural rule does not render the arresting officer(s)/person(s) liable for false imprisonment.
171. PROOF OF CLAIM, where an arrest is lawful, a failure on the part of the arresting officer(s)/person(s) in observing their duty to take the arrested man before a magistrate, and to do so without delay or unnecessary delay, will not be regarded as false imprisonment.
172. PROOF OF CLAIM, this fundamental procedural rule of taking a man upon arrest before a magistrate without delay, or unnecessary delay, is not the "due process of law" or "the law of the land" to be followed; and a false imprisonment does not ensue from the arresting officer(s) or person(s) dropping off said man to a jail for detention and custody therein, as said officer(s)/person(s) are so authorized to act in such manner under the law of the land."
173. PROOF OF CLAIM, the only reason that can justify having an arrested man in jail or detained/custody by the arresting officer(s)/person(s) is not as a necessary step in bringing the man before a magistrate; and therefore the detainment of said man in a jail, police office, station, barracks, and the like for purposes of "booking," "finger printing," "investigating," "interrogation," and the like is not un-lawful and illegal.
174. PROOF OF CLAIM, even in matters involving the most severe/serious of offenses, as in felonies, the arresting officer(s)/person(s) is not still duty bound/required to bring a man placed under arrest before the nearest magistrate or court as a matter of fundamental law without delay or unnecessary delay; and said arresting officer(s)/person(s) is not liable for false imprisonment if he arrests with the intent of only detaining, or if his unreasonable delay causes a detainment, thereby failing and/or grossly neglecting his duty and observance thereof.
175. PROOF OF CLAIM, where a man is arrested and taken to jail, or police station, or the like, and detained there with no warrant issued before or after the arrest, it is not false imprisonment.
176. PROOF OF CLAIM, to take an arrested man to a jail, police station, or the like to be detained and finger printed, measured, photographed, booked, and the like before said man is ever brought before a magistrate is not a violation of his Rights; and is not proof of the arresting officer(s)/person(s) intent not to observe his duty in this matter and his disregard of, and for, his duty incumbent upon him to fulfill and observe.
177. PROOF OF CLAIM, an arrested man's Right to be promptly taken to a judicial officer for hearing/examination, and the duty of the arresting officer(s)/person(s) to protect said Right, does depend upon statute law of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as may be contained within the UNITED STATES CODE, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents.
178. PROOF OF CLAIM, this rule of law requiring an arresting officer(s)/person(s) to bring the arrested man before a magistrate, or judicial officer having jurisdiction, is not the same throughout all the States composing the American compact; and can be abrogated by statute as may be contained within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents; and said rule has not been upheld within the federal courts; and is not prescribed within said courts rules.
179. PROOF OF CLAIM, the arresting officer(s)/person(s) is not guilty of official oppression and neglect of duty when they willfully detain a man without arraigning him before a magistrate within a reasonable time.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

180. PROOF OF CLAIM, the rule of law requiring that an arrested man be brought without delay, or unnecessary delay, directly to a court or judicial officer having jurisdiction is not "due process of law" or "the law of the land", and as such, this procedural requirement can be abrogated by statute as may be contained with the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents.

181. PROOF OF CLAIM, it is not a fundamental rule of law that one who abuses an authority given him by Law does not become a trespasser ab initio, i.e. he becomes a wrongdoer from the beginning of his actions.

182. PROOF OF CLAIM, where an arresting officer(s)/person(s) fails to take a man he has arrested before a proper judicial officer, or where said officer(s)/person(s) causes an unreasonable delay in doing so, or having failed to procure/obtain a proper/valid warrant for the detention of the arrested man, said officer(s)/person(s) does not become a trespasser ab initio; and is not thereby guilty of false imprisonment; and such failure or delay in his official duty does not render said arrest unlawful.

183. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "Office of the (President) Judge" is not charged with the administration and oversight of ALL proceedings, matters, cases, and the like within purview of the whole of the court, past and present, and is not therefore the "Office of the Principal" of, and over, ALL the "Offices of a/the judge" acting in their capacity as agents of the principal; and the same is not true for the "Office of the United States Attorney" and "Office of the Attorney General," and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents.

184. PROOF OF CLAIM, when an arresting officer(s)/person(s) fails to perform part of his duty, and it impinges upon the Rights of a man, he is not deemed to be a trespasser ab initio because the whole of his justification fails, and he stands as if he never had any authority at all to act.

185. PROOF OF CLAIM, the basis of this well established procedural rule of law in taking an arrested man without delay, or without unnecessary delay, directly before a court or judicial officer having jurisdiction is not to avoid having the liberty of the arrested man unjustly dealt with by extra-judicial acts of executive officers, i.e. law enforcement officers and public officers however termed/styled.

186. PROOF OF CLAIM, arresting officers are not "executive officers."

187. PROOF OF CLAIM, the detainment of a man upon arrest is not a judicial question; and a judicial officer is not the sole authority to decide if there are grounds for holding the man arrested, or whether he must be further examined by trial, or if he is to be bailed and released; and the taking of said man to a jail to be "booked" without first honoring this duty is not un-lawful; or to detain said man to enable the arresting officer(s) to make a further investigation of the alleged/suspected offense against said man is not also un-lawful.

188. PROOF OF CLAIM, "executive officers" or "clerks" are to determine if a man under arrest is to be held or released upon bail; and are to fix the amount of bail; and such power to so determine is not judicial.

189. PROOF OF CLAIM, "executive officers", i.e. arresting officers, having arrested a man can hold said man in order to complete paperwork or make out reports.

190. PROOF OF CLAIM, "good faith" does justify an unreasonable detention and deprivation of one's liberty caused by a failure or delay in bringing one arrested before a magistrate.

191. PROOF OF CLAIM, it is not a common practice for an arresting officer(s) to drop a man they have arrested off at a police station, county jail, or the like and leave said man in the custody of others; and such a practice does thereby, and therein, relinquish the duty of the arresting officer(s) to the arrested man; and said officer(s) can therefore claim exception of liability when the others to whom they dropped said man off into the custody of failed to fulfill the arresting officer's(s') duty and take said man without delay, or unnecessary delay, directly before a proper/valid judicial officer having jurisdiction, as the arresting officer(s) are not responsible for the arrested man, and can rely on others to perform their duty.

192. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas one of the most common defenses raised in actions/claims of false imprisonment involves arguments of whether the delay in bringing one to a court was reasonable or necessary, such does not depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, and is not question for the jury.

193. PROOF OF CLAIM, the common-law procedural rule for "due process of the law" made "the law of the land" through express constitutional provision(s) is not that an arresting officer(s)/person(s) is to present the arrested man without delay to a magistrate, having jurisdiction, and said procedural rule of law does not mean no delay of time is allowed which is not incident to the act of bringing said man before a magistrate; and said common-law procedural rule of law does not nullify and void all present day statutory requirements of twenty-four (24) hours, thirty-six(36) hours, seventy-two(72) hours, or however many hours/days said statute may stipulate as contained within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, which, by their very existence, does not constitute blatant acts of tyranny and declarations thereof.

194. PROOF OF CLAIM, a man who has been arrested and subjected to procedures known as "booking procedures" which include, inter alia, photographing, measuring, finger printing, and the like are lawful, and are necessary to detect and arrest a man; and are necessary to prevent crime; and is not criminal in character; and do not constitute an assault; and, everyone concerned/participating therein is not liable civilly for damages arising from the injury to, and upon, said man subjected to said procedures, but also to criminal prosecution under the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, as operating upon, and over, ALL voluntary commercial indentures to the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, as agents of said Government.

195. PROOF OF CLAIM, any present day "statute" which may be contained within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, which mandates the finger printing of any and every man arrested, a practice the common-law or "the law of the land" permits only after/upon conviction, in order to allow a man to be admitted to bail, or for any other purpose/excuse, is not a serious invasion upon the liberty of said man; and such a "statute" is not unconstitutional or un-un/non-constitutional without nexus of relationship, i.e. contract.

196. PROOF OF CLAIM, there is any right/authority given to Government, and specifically the Government of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, by the common-law or "the law of the land" to take fingerprints prior to conviction within a criminal proceeding.

197. PROOF OF CLAIM, any court decisions which may appear to strike down the common-law or "the law of the land" principles which act to prohibit finger printing, measuring, and photographing of an arrested man prior to conviction within a criminal proceeding is not based upon principles of some other un/non-constitutional source of law affording the court the ability to apply the doctrine of "Constitutional Avoidance" to the issue through said court's taking silent judicial notice of some contract, real or presumed, expressed or implied, revealed or unrevealed, existing between the parties to the issue before the court, such as principles of equity and/or admiralty.

198. PROOF OF CLAIM, the compulsory taking of samples of an arrested man's blood, urine, hair, finger prints, exemplars, and the like is not an un-lawful taking of said man's property without "due process of the law" and compensation, for a violation of said man's personal privacy, an un-lawful attack and breach of said man's right not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence, and an assault and battery upon said man.

199. PROOF OF CLAIM, it cannot be concluded there are at least five (5) reasons why the acts of compulsory finger printing, blood testing, measuring, photographing, D.N.A./R.N.A. extraction, exemplars, and the like are un-lawful, and said reasons are not: 1) They are an invasion of a man's right of privacy; 2) Such compels evidence to be used as self-incriminating evidence; 3) Such is an assault and/or battery; 4) Such violates "due process of the law" or "the law of the land" in the taking of a man's property; and, 5) prohibits bail when refused (if refusal is possible), and thereby infringes on one's liberty.

200. PROOF OF CLAIM, any court decisions which may appear to have struck down the common-law or "the law of the land" principles which act to prohibit the compulsory taking of samples of an arrested man's blood, urine, hair, D.N.A./R.N.A., exemplars, and the like upon arrest, during any proceeding within the prosecution, or any process of "evidence collection", and any "statutes" as may appear within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, authorizing such, is not based upon principles of some other un/non-constitutional source of law affording the court the ability to apply the doctrine of



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

"Constitutional Avoidance" to the issue through said court's taking silent judicial notice of some contract, real or presumed, expressed or implied, revealed or unrevealed, existing between the parties to the issue before the court, such as principles of equity and/or admiralty.

201. PROOF OF CLAIM, a man d.b.a. as Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, or Judicial Officer, in order to be validly in possession and use of the "plenary powers" resident within his "office," must not have "perfected title" to said "office"; and, said perfection is not accomplished through valid and Lawful Oath of office and bond thereon.

202. PROOF OF CLAIM, the failure of a man d.b.a. as Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, or Judicial Officer, in "perfecting title" to his "office" as set-forth above, is not operating under a serious/severe disability of capacity acting to bar his lawful access to said "office," possession and use of the "plenary powers" resident within said "office"; and due to his disability, said "office" is not vacant; and therefore does not render ALL acts performed by said man under said disability VOID; and does not render said man for ALL acts performed while under said disability, guilty of, inter alia, false personation, false pretenses, usurpation, fraud, official oppression, fraudulent and deceptive business practices, and trespass ab initio, and thereby, and therein, does not render said man liable for damages arising from all injuries he caused, subjected to, and inflicted upon the arrested man brought before him.

203. PROOF OF CLAIM, an arrested man brought before a man d.b.a. as Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, or Judicial Officer, which operating/functioning under a disability of "office" through his failure to "perfect title" thereto and lawfully possess and use the "plenary powers" resident therein, does fulfill the well established and settled fundamental procedural rule of law established as "due process of the law" ordained through "the law of the land" by express constitutional provision therein; and a man under arrest brought before such a magistrate, justice of the peace, or judicial officer does not constitute and establish an unreasonable, unnecessary, and willful delay; and does not constitute and establish, inter alia, failure of process, official oppression, gross negligence, and false imprisonment.

204. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Undersigned within the above referenced alleged matter was brought before a Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, or Judicial officer having "perfected title" to said "office" through a valid Oath and bond thereon, and therefore was not exercising/employing the "plenary powers" resident within said "office" un-lawfully; and was not acting under color-of-law, false pretenses, false personation, fraudulent and deceptive business practices, fraud, official oppression; and said "office" was not vacant; and said warrant of arrest and writ of detainment was obtained/procured from a Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, or Judicial Officer having lawfully "perfected title" to his "office".

205. PROOF OF CLAIM, that ALL acts of the magistrate, justice of the peace, and or judicial officer(s) within the above referenced alleged matter as they relate to and bear upon the Undersigned therein, for reasons that have been set-forth already, are not VOID ab initio thereby, and therein, establishing and constituting the entire alleged matter as referenced above VOID ab initio along with the un-lawful or false imprisonment of the Undersigned therein to date.

206. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas in many of the older court cases we find the declaration: "The law is very jealous of the liberty of the citizen," said law is not the common-law; and it does not declare that, "One who interferes with another's liberty does so at his peril."

207. PROOF OF CLAIM, false imprisonment does not consist of any type of un-lawful restraint or interference with the personal liberty of a man, and is not a trespass.

208. PROOF OF CLAIM, false imprisonment is not classified as a tort under the common-law, and also as a crime.

209. PROOF OF CLAIM, false imprisonment has not been labeled as a tort, a trespass, an assault, a wrong, damage, and an injury giving the man so affected cause to bring process for relief and remedy against the offending man/party.

210. PROOF OF CLAIM, injuries to the liberty of a man are not principally termed "false imprisonments" or "malicious prosecutions."

211. PROOF OF CLAIM, actual seizure or the laying on of hands is necessary to constitute un-lawful detention; and the ONLY essential elements of an action for un-lawful detention are not 1) Detention or restraint against one's will, and 2) The un-lawfulness of such detention or restraint.

212. PROOF OF CLAIM, "false imprisonment" is not akin to assault and battery imposed by force or threats affecting an un-lawful restraint upon a man's liberty.

213. PROOF OF CLAIM, any and every confinement of a man is not an imprisonment.

214. PROOF OF CLAIM, the term/word "false" as used and employed in law does not come from the common-law; and is not synonymous with "un-lawful"; and a false arrest is not one means of committing a false imprisonment.

215. PROOF OF CLAIM false imprisonment does not exist by words or acts, or both, which one fears to disregard, but also does not exist by such acts and measures that he cannot disregard.

216. PROOF OF CLAIM, the un-lawful arrest and detention of a man without lawful authority is not one manner in which the category of those torts that un-lawfully deprive or interfere with the liberty of a man termed "false imprisonment" is committed.

217. PROOF OF CLAIM, "false imprisonment" is not effectuated by the un-lawful arrest or detention of a man without warrant, or by an illegal warrant, or a warrant illegally executed.

218. PROOF OF CLAIM, the tort, or wrong of "false imprisonment" does not occur the instant that a man is restrained in the exercise of his liberty; and there is a reasonable length of time for a restraint before the tort can be claimed.

219. PROOF OF CLAIM, a man wronged by "false imprisonment" is not entitled to recover damages for ALL the natural and probable consequences thereof for the whole of the time he was un-lawfully/false imprisoned.

220. PROOF OF CLAIM, false imprisonment does not include an assault and battery; and does not always, at least, include a technical assault.

221. PROOF OF CLAIM, the law does not specify or divide damages arising from torts for injury into two (2) types or classes, and those two (2) types or classes are not "actual damages" and "punitive damages."

222. PROOF OF CLAIM, "actual damages" are not compensation for the injury as would follow the nature and character of the act which would not include, inter alia, pain and suffering, physical discomfort, sense of shame, wrong, and outrage; and such damages are not also termed "compensatory damages" as they compensate the injured man for the actual injuries sustained, and no more.

223. PROOF OF CLAIM, "punitive damages" are not those that grow out of the wantonness or atrocity, or aggravated by the act, of the act resulting in the injuries and sufferings that were intended, or occurred through malice, carelessness or negligence amounting to a wrong so reckless and wanton as to be without excuse; and such damages are not also termed "exemplary damages."

224. PROOF OF CLAIM, anyone who assists or participates in an un-lawful arrest and or un-lawful imprisonment, e.g. Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Judge, United States Attorney (or Assistant), Defense Attorney, United States Attorney General, County Prison Superintendent, Secretary of Corrections, Director of Federal Bureau of Prisons, Warden and/or Superintendent of the warehousing Correctional Institution, clerk, and CITY, COUNTY, STATE, FEDERAL/NATIONAL GOVERNMENT equivalents and the like, is not equally liable for the damages arising from the injuries caused by said acts.

225. PROOF OF CLAIM, "actual" or "compensatory damages" in actions/claims for false arrest/false imprisonment have not been established at 25,000 dollars per twenty-three (23) minutes, 1,600,000 million dollars per day; and punitive damages may not be set by the injured party, and specifically the Undersigned as the injured party within the above referenced alleged matter.

226. PROOF OF CLAIM, Trezevant v. City of Tampa, cannot be utilized by the Undersigned in determining actual/compensatory damages should Defendants agree the Undersigned has been falsely imprisoned; and Defendants can provide any valid, lawful, and reasonable objection as to why it should not, or cannot, be so utilized and applied in this matter.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

227. PROOF OF CLAIM, the distinction between false imprisonment and malicious prosecution is not the right in the former, which even a guilty man has to be protected against any un-lawful restraint of his personal liberty and in the latter, the right of an innocent man to be compensated in damages for an injury he may sustain when a groundless charge is brought against him, even though such charge may be presented and prosecuted in accordance with the strictest forms of law.
228. PROOF OF CLAIM, the aspects of malicious prosecution in a matter involving false imprisonment cannot be used in determining punitive damages in a false imprisonment action/claim.
229. PROOF OF CLAIM, the want of authority is not an essential element in an action/claim for false imprisonment, and malice and want of probable cause are not the essential elements in an action/claim for malicious prosecution.
230. PROOF OF CLAIM, the defense for/against an action/claim of false imprisonment is not limited to showing that the arrest was pursuant to law, and the one arresting had lawful authority to so act, thus, valid defense or proper justification for/against an action/claim of false imprisonment is not one asserting the legality and lawfulness of the arrest.
231. PROOF OF CLAIM, the arrest of the Undersigned in the above reference alleged matter was for a lawful cause, i.e. for a crime/public offense created and established by validly enacted statute/law originating from the sole legislative power/authority as created by express Constitutional provisions clearly identified as such upon its face and properly, validly, and lawfully promulgated/published; and was in a legal and lawful manner, i.e. pursuant to "due process of the law" as ordained by "the law of the land" through express constitutional provisions; and executed by those with lawful authority, i.e. lawfully holding/occupying their "office" and thereby in lawful possession and use of the "powers" resident therein.
232. PROOF OF CLAIM, due to the high regards placed upon liberty by the law, not ALL imprisonments are deemed un-lawful until the contrary is shown; and a defense based upon the one who was arrested must prove the arrest/imprisonment was un-lawful in order to prevail in any process for relief and remedy can be used.
233. PROOF OF CLAIM, the only thing a man who has been arrested and imprisoned needs to claim and to prove is not one of two (2) things, which are: 1) The defendant made an arrest or imprisonment, or 2) the defendant affirmatively instigated, encouraged, incited, or caused the arrest or imprisonment.
234. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Undersigned has not up to this point within this established his arrest and imprisonment at the hands, and by the acts, of ALL parties participating within the above referenced alleged matter, and the un-lawful/false nature of said arrest and imprisonment within said alleged matter.
235. PROOF OF CLAIM, should the Defendants agree, expressly or through tacit acquiescence, with the facts contained within this, they are not bound by their duty to correct this matter and provide relief and remedy to the Undersigned in this matter without delay, i.e. releasing the Undersigned, Undersigned's corpus and person, along with ALL property of the Undersigned's from the bonds of false imprisonment and restore the Undersigned to a state of liberty (freedom of locomotion), full compensation as invoiced by notice, and completely expunging this matter from ALL Criminal Records, data bases, files, and the like no matter how stored.
236. PROOF OF CLAIM, the failure of Defendants in exercising their duty in this matter as set-forth above, does not thereby, and therein, act to make Defendants liable for the false arrest and false imprisonment of the Undersigned resulting from the above referenced alleged matter, jointly and severally.
237. PROOF OF CLAIM, it has not been held and well established in law that in false imprisonment processes for relief and remedy the defendant, in order to escape liability, must prove that he did not imprison the man, or he must justify the imprisonment, or stated another way, the burden is upon the defendant to show that the arrest was by authority of law.
238. PROOF OF CLAIM, in cases of false imprisonment, the only essential elements of the action/claim for relief and remedy are not detention and its un-lawfulness, and that malice and the want of probable cause does need to be shown, or are necessary to a proper cause of action for false imprisonment.
239. PROOF OF CLAIM, un-lawful detention or imprisonment does become lawful because it was out of ignorance of the law.
240. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas a magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Judge, Attorney (Prosecuting/Defense), and arresting officers are ALL schooled, trained, and "licensed" to practice law, some more than others, and specifically as this matter relates to and bears upon said parties acting within the above referenced alleged matter, and therefore have superior knowledge of the law, said parties, and the Defendants, are capable or justified in claiming ignorance of the lawfulness and legality of the arrest of the Undersigned and subsequent imprisonment resulting therefrom within said alleged matter; and such an assertion would not thereby, and therein, operate to constitute said parties, and the Defendants, as unqualified and or unfit to practice law, and at the very least, in need of additional schooling/training.
241. PROOF OF CLAIM, in an action for false imprisonment, a record of conviction for the same offense for which the arrest was made is admissible.
242. PROOF OF CLAIM, in an action/process for relief and remedy from false imprisonment such is not to be based solely upon the legality of the arrest, and is to be based upon the filing of some complaint, or the proof of an alleged crime, or the results of some trial.
243. PROOF OF CLAIM, the argument of "official immunity" is a valid defense for public/Government agents when proceeded against for their own torts in an action/process for relief and remedy from a false imprisonment claim.
244. PROOF OF CLAIM, under the "doctrine of immunity" there have not been distinctions made between acts that are "discretionary duties" which one in the performance thereof is immune within, and acts which are "ministerial duties" which one in the performance thereof is liable for.
245. PROOF OF CLAIM, that a "law enforcement officer's" official duty is not described as "ministerial," when it is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts; and, the same cannot be said of the official duty of a Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Judge, United States Attorney (or Assistant), and an Attorney General, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities.
246. PROOF OF CLAIM, the act of arresting a man by a law enforcement officer, however termed/styled, is not a ministerial act, and is a discretionary act.
247. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "due process of the law" argument in false imprisonment matters will not nullify the statutes, rules, regulations, ordinances, and the like as may be contained within the UNITED STATES CODE, and STATE OF EQUIVALENTS/INSTRUMENTALITIES, and elsewhere that are contrary to the common-law rule on arrest; and a legislative act can abrogate what is "the law of the land."
248. PROOF OF CLAIM, a man confined by virtue of a void warrant, and thereupon imprisoned, is not falsely imprisoned; and the complainant, the prosecuting attorney, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, and or Judge, who ordered said man to be committed, along with the arresting officer who executed said void warrant, the jailer/warden/superintendent and the like are not all liable for false imprisonment.
249. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 as the express document/instrument for the Government of the Original Jurisdiction does not reference genuine law.
250. PROOF OF CLAIM, there is not a difference between what is lawful and what is "legal" as such term/word is employed/used by the present day civil authorities and their courts.
251. PROOF OF CLAIM, lawful does not mean in accordance with "the law of the land", according to the law, permitted, sanctioned, or justified by law; and is not dealing with the spirit, i.e. the substance, content, object of law; and does not properly imply a thing conformable to or enjoined by law.
252. PROOF OF CLAIM, "legal" does not pertain to the understanding, the exposition, the administration, the science, and the practice of law, as the legal profession, legal advice, legal blanks, newspaper, and the like.
253. PROOF OF CLAIM, "legal" does not mean implied or imputed in law, and is not opposed to actual, i.e. express, what is real, substantial, existing presently in act, valid objective existence as opposed to that which is merely theoretical or possible.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

254. PROOF OF CLAIM, "legal" does not look more to the "letter" of the law, i.e. form, appearance, and shadow of the law.
255. PROOF OF CLAIM, "legal" is not more appropriate for conformity with positive rules of law, and lawful is not more appropriate for accord with ethical principles.
256. PROOF OF CLAIM, "legal" does not import rather the forms (appearances) of law are observed, that the proceeding is correct in method, and rules prescribed (dictated) have been obeyed.
257. PROOF OF CLAIM, lawful does not import that the right is actual in substance, and that moral quality is secured.
258. PROOF OF CLAIM, "legal" is not the antithesis of equitable, and is not the equivalent of "constructive", i.e. that which has not the character assigned to it in its own essential nature, but acquires such character in consequence of the way in which it is regarded by a rule or policy of law; hence, inferred, implied, made out by "legal" interpretation.
259. PROOF OF CLAIM, a writ or warrant of arrest issuing from any court, and specifically the alleged court of record within the above referenced alleged matter, under "color-of-law" is not a "legal" process however defective.
260. PROOF OF CLAIM, "legal" matters do not administrate, conform to, and follow rules; and are not equitable in nature; and are not implied, i.e. presumed, rather than actual, i.e. express.
261. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "legal" process cannot be defective in law, and the "legal" process within the above referenced alleged matter is not defective in law.
262. PROOF OF CLAIM, to be "legal," a matter does follow the law, and is required to follow the law, and does not rather conform to and follow the rules or forms of law.
263. PROOF OF CLAIM, lawful matters are not ethically enjoined in "the law of the land", the law of the People; and are not actual in nature, they are implied.
264. PROOF OF CLAIM, the proper and truthful definition and meaning of the term/word "legal" is not "color-of-law", i.e. the appearance or semblance of law, without the substance, or right.
265. PROOF OF CLAIM, "colorable" does not mean that which is in appearance only, and not in reality, what it purports to be, i.e. counterfeit, feigned, having the appearance only of truth.
266. PROOF OF CLAIM, "statutory jurisdiction" is not a "colorable" jurisdiction, created to enforce colorable contracts; and is not legislative and administrative rather than judicial in nature; and does not operate/function/exist to enforce commercial agreements based upon "implied consent" rather than contracts under the common law or "the law of the land."
267. PROOF OF CLAIM, "public policy" does not equal Government policy; which does not equal corporate policy; which does not equal commerce; which does not equal Federal Reserve re-insurance policy; which does not equal public credit/debt; which does not equal commercial transactions of private enterprise; which does not equal non-substance re-insurance script (Federal Reserve Notes [a note being evidence of debt]); which does not function as "money" (currency) in a "colorable" equity/admiralty/maritime jurisdiction.
268. PROOF OF CLAIM, a copyright symbol employed/used in the publication of written or recorded matter does not act/operate to give NOTICE that said printed/recorded matter is the private intellectual property (out of the public domain) of the copyright owner.
269. PROOF OF CLAIM, a copyright symbol employed/used in publication of "statute/law" books ("Codes") as specifically employed/used in the printed publication of the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, does not act/operate to give NOTICE to all that the contents therein is the private intellectual property of the copyright owner, and out of the public domain.
270. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "statute/law" book ("Code") placed under copyright such as the UNITED STATES CODE, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, is not by virtue and operation of said copyright factually, substantially, and truthfully "private law" in support of a "private right" belonging to the copyright owner.
271. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Maxim of Law: Ignorance of the law is no excuse does apply to "private law" in support of a "private right"; and that any man, and specifically the Undersigned as this relates to and bears upon the above referenced alleged matter, does have any duty, obligation, or compelling need to know the "private law" in support of a "private right" of any man or person.
272. PROOF OF CLAIM, that genuine, actual, true law of the People can be copyrighted.
273. PROOF OF CLAIM, any true public document of a de jure and de facto State or Nation has been, and can be under copyright, and such are not in the public domain.
274. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas ALL "statute/law" books ("Codes") of the federal and state Governments are copyrighted, a man practicing law would not require a "letters patent" to practice said law within the present day courts; and said right to practice law is not a "property right" existing by virtue of "letters patent"; and said patent is not the so-called "license" an attorney holds out as possessing to would be clients; and without said patent, said man, would not be doing that which would otherwise be illegal, a trespass, or a tort.
275. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas West Publishing Company holds out its firm as the copyright owner, the fact that said company is owned by The Thompson Group, LLC, LTD a publishing interest of The Crown, does not thereby, and therein, constitute and establish said "statute/law" books ("Codes") known as the UNITED STATES CODE, and STATE OF ... equivalents, foreign owned "private law" in support of a "private right" of the actual copyright owner, i.e. The Crown. NOTE: The Thompson Group owns, inter alia, West Publishing Company, Barclays West Group, Bancroft Whitney, Clark Bordman, Callaghan, Legal Solicitas, Rutter Group, Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Lawyers Co-op, Reed Elsevier owns, inter alia, Lexis, Deering Codes, rendering all such published "law" private, non-public domain, property of The Crown.
276. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "court of record" is not a judicial tribunal having attributes and exercising functions independently of the "person" of the Magistrate designated generally to hold it; and does not proceed according to the course of common law; and its acts and proceedings are not "enrolled", i.e. to register, to make a record, to enter on the rolls of a court, to transcribe, for a "perpetual" memorial.
277. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "court of record" is not the ONLY court that possesses the power to fine or imprison; and "courts not of record" do possess the power to fine or imprison.
278. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "de facto court" is not a court established, organized, and exercising its judicial functions under authority of a "statute" apparently valid, but which may in fact be unconstitutional and afterward so adjudged; and is not a court, which is established and acting under the authority of a "de facto Government."
279. PROOF OF CLAIM, if a court is not a "court of record" it does have any power to fix and establish a "penalty", i.e. a punishment established by law or authority for a criminal/public offense; and does thereby, and therein, create any "penological interest" for others to claim, e.g. State and Federal Correctional Institutions.
280. PROOF OF CLAIM, "prison," and "penitentiary" are not used synonymously.
281. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "prison" or "penitentiary" is not a place of confinement of men for the purpose of "punishment."
282. PROOF OF CLAIM, the word/term "correctional" as used in "State/Federal Correctional Institution," does not mean discipline for the purpose of curing faults, or bringing one into proper subjection.
283. PROOF OF CLAIM, the word/term "institution" does not denote a "public" establishment/corporation, which is created and exists by "statute" or "public authority" such as an asylum, charity, college, university, schoolhouse, and the like.
284. PROOF OF CLAIM, the alleged "court of record" within the above referenced alleged matter was, and is, in fact established and functioning as a valid and lawful "court of record" which proceeds according to the course of common law; and whose acts and proceedings are "enrolled"; and a court which does have power to fine



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

and imprison and thereby, and therein, creating a "penological interest" of which may be claimed by the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities.

285. PROOF OF CLAIM, there does exist, this present day, any "courts of records" within the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities.

286. PROOF OF CLAIM, a courts power to "punish" by fine or imprisonment does not ensue from a valid and lawfully enacted "statute(s)/law(s)" creating a real criminal/public offense; and such "penal statutes/laws" do exist within the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities; and the absence of such "penal statutes/laws" is not one of the reasons which "courts of record" do not exist within the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, as said courts, and specifically the alleged "court of record" within the above referenced alleged matter, is not proceeding according to the course of common-law, but merely upon the forms/shadow of that which formerly existed in spirit, substance, content, and actuality, i.e. expressly.

287. PROOF OF CLAIM, "prisons," and "penitentiaries" do exist within the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, wherein such are established for the purpose of "punishment" ensuing from valid and lawful "penal statutes/laws", and which may claim a "penological interest" in, and from, such statutes/laws.

288. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "penological interest" does exist for and within "State/Federal Correctional Institutions", and specifically ALL those which compose the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, and such are not functioning/operating as disciplinarian asylums for the purpose of "treating/treatment" of presumed mental/emotional dysfunctions and re-indoctrination/programming to cure faults in the nature of social breaches in thought, action, behavior, and the like.

289. PROOF OF CLAIM, the inability of courts today, and specifically the alleged "court of record" within the above referenced alleged matter, to punish is not why the mental health laws were merged with the "Criminal Process" so as to allow the courts the ability to "treat", and thereby confine those convicted/adjudged, i.e. in need thereof.

290. PROOF OF CLAIM, the alleged "court of record" within the above referenced alleged matter was not, and is not, established, organized, and exercising its judicial functions under authority of a statute; and said statute is not unconstitutional; and is not established and acting under authority, e.g. authority derived from a foreign "un/non-constitutional source of authority" of law, of a de facto Government, i.e. a Government not lawfully created, operating, functioning, and exercising its authority in accordance with and pursuant to the instrument/document of its creation which established and ordained the Government for the United States of America, i.e. the Original Jurisdiction as opposed to the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF... and LOCAL equivalents; and was not, and is not, exercising its judicial functions and authority as a "de facto court" of said de facto Government/authority.

291. PROOF OF CLAIM, the UNITED STATES/THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF... and LOCAL equivalents, is not a federal corporation.

292. PROOF OF CLAIM, the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA is not a municipal for-profit corporation originally incorporated February 21, 1871, under the name "District of Columbia," and Reorganized June 8, 1878, d.b.a. "UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT aka/dba THE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA." [See: 16 Stat. 419, ch. 62, 41st Congress, 3rd Session, "An Act to Provide a Government for the District of Columbia"; 20 Stat. 102, ch. 180, 45th Congress, 2nd Session, "An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia."]

293. PROOF OF CLAIM, the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, is not a corporate entity operating/functioning in commerce as a bankrupt in Chapter 11 Reorganization wherein, and whereby, the Federal/State Government represented therein has been dissolved along with said corporations' Sovereign Authority, and the official capacities of all offices, officers, and departments, and said federal Government does not exist today in name only. [See: House Joint Resolution 192 of June 5, 1933, Pub. R. 73-10; Executive Orders 6072, 6102, 6111, and 6246; Senate Report 93-549; Cong. Rec., March 17, 1993, vol. 33, speaker: James A. Traficant, Jr., which states in part: "Mr. Speaker. We are now here in Chapter 11. Members of Congress are official trustees presiding over the greatest reorganization in world history, the U.S. Government.... It is an established fact that the United States Federal Government has been dissolved by the Emergency Banking Act, March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1, Public Law 89-719, declared by President Roosevelt, being bankrupt and insolvent. H.J.R. 192, 73rd Congress in session June 5, 1933 - Joint Resolution to Suspend the Gold Standard and Abrogate the Gold Clause - dissolved the Sovereign Authority of all United States and the official capacities of all United States Government Offices, Officers, and Departments and is further evidence that the United States Federal Government exists today in name only..."]

294. PROOF OF CLAIM, this new "municipal corporation" d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, did not adopt the original organic Constitution for the United States of America c1819 as its corporate municipal charter. [See: 41st Congress' Act(s), Session 3, ch. 62, p. 419, Sec. 34, February 21, 1871]

295. PROOF OF CLAIM, the location of the UNITED STATES/THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, is not in the District of Columbia. [See: UCC 9-307(h); which states: "Location of United States is located in the District of Columbia."; cf. Title 28 D. C. Code § 28.9-307(h)].

296. PROOF OF CLAIM, this Government for the "District of Columbia" was not abolished by Act of June 20, 1874; and a temporary Government by "commissioners" was not thereby created and existed until the Act of June 11, 1878, wherein provision was made for the continuance of the "District of Columbia" as a "municipal corporation" controlled by the federal Government through these "commissioners"; and said corporation is not subject to the ordinary rules that govern the law of procedure between private persons. [See: U.S. Rev. Stat. 1 Supp. 22; 7 D.C. 178; 132 U.S. 1, which states: "The sovereign power is lodged in the Government of the United States, and not the corporation of the district."]

297. PROOF OF CLAIM, the term "United States" as used and employed within the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 at Article III Section 3, is not used in the plural, i.e. them, their; and does not mean none other than the People of the "several states" and the National Government situated within the ten (10) mile square of the District of Columbia, its enclaves, forts, magazines, docks, and arsenals scattered abroad, under, and only under, said Constitution establishing and ordaining the Original Jurisdiction and the Government for same.

298. PROOF OF CLAIM, the term/word "State" does not mean a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States [See: UCC 9-102(a)(76); cf. Title 28 D.C. Code § 28.9-102(a)(76)]; and a "state of the United States" is inclusive of the fifty freely associated compact states, i.e. the "several states," but a "state of the United States" is not a corporate or corporately "colored" sub-franchise territorial State unit of the parent corporation, i.e. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

299. PROOF OF CLAIM, the term "in this state," "this state," and "State" as employed/used within federal and state statutes/laws/ordinances/regulations/codes, and the like, and as this relates to and bears upon the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and ALL Titles thereof, and the two-capital-letter federal postal designation, e.g. AL, GA, KY AND NY and the five-digit ZIP, i.e. Zoning Improvement Plan, code are references to, and are inclusive of the freely associated compact unit states, i.e. the "several states," and are not rather terms, designations, and codes defining and referencing federal zones/territorial state units; and are not defined for tax jurisdiction purposes as the "District of Columbia", i.e. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

300. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "District of Columbia," and the territorial district of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA are "states" within the meaning of the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 and the "Judiciary Act" so as to enable a citizen thereof to sue a citizen of one of the states in federal courts, and are not "states" as that word is used in treaties with foreign powers, with respect to the ownership, disposition, and inheritance of property.

301. PROOF OF CLAIM, if a nation comes down from its position of sovereignty and enters the domain of commerce, it does not submit itself to the same laws that govern individuals therein; and does not assume the position of an ordinary citizen therein; and can recede from the fulfillment of its obligations therein.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

302. PROOF OF CLAIM, the united States did not stipulate to becoming "territorial state units of the UNITED STATES" for receipt of benefits through the Social Security Act of 1935.

303. PROOF OF CLAIM, the several union States did not accommodate the federal bankruptcy through pledge of its faith and credit to the aid thereof at the Conference of Governors, March 6, 1933. [See: Declaration of Interdependence, January 22, 1937, Book of the States, vol. II, p. 144]

304. PROOF OF CLAIM, the walk-out of the seven (7) southern nation states from Congress March 27, 1861, without setting a day to reconvene or a vote of adjournment, thereby leaving Congress without a quorum, did not dissolve the de jure and/or de facto Congress of the United States of America, to which President Lincoln responded with force, reconvening Congress within a private military jurisdiction under martial law in his capacity as Commander-In-Chief; and said Congress does not, and is not, operating/functioning in same capacity, and under same authority, to this present day.

305. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Post Civil War "Revisions" of the Constitutions of the freely associated compact union states, i.e. the "several states," such said revision of any State did not alter said instruments specifically in one important area, i.e. abolishing the entire class of free "electors" and replacing them with the "elective franchise" (registered voters) in compliance with the "Public Trust", i.e. the cestui que trust, i.e. a constructive trust, i.e. a trust which is a mixture of law and (not or) fraud as established within and under the purview of the XIVth Amendment to the federal corporate parents' Charter/Constitution formerly adopted, or so alleged, February 27, 1871, thereby, and therein, extending said Public Trust to operate within the several states; and said revisions of said constitutions did not thereby, and therein dissolve the General Assembly(s) as originally established and ordained, of all the states; and such did not place these General Assemblies upon the same footing and within the same jurisdiction as that of the Congress wherein, and whereby, their constitutional identity as constitutionally created entities by law was not lost; and did not cause same to lose all lawful Right, authority, and power to legislate upon any and all subjects for the People of the "several states", which did not cause the post civil war "revisions" of all the statutes/laws into "Codes" which did not act to remove the law and leave merely the form/shadow of same, i.e. the legal aspects standing.

306. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "revisions" of the state Constitutions as originally established and ordained, upon cessation of open hostilities of the Civil War in which were destroyed the entire class of "sovereign electors" and replaced by "registered voters" (the elective franchise), such did not destroy "sole proprietorships (or principal creditor-ships of, by, and for the People); and did not replace them with (artificial) corporate franchises under purview of the XIVth Amendment to the federal corporate municipal for-profit parent Government's Charter/Constitution.

307. PROOF OF CLAIM, under the "Instrumentality Rule" the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA/United States of America is not, and will not, be responsible when the subservient corporation becomes exposed as a mere instrument and actually indistinct from the controlling corporation, i.e. the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF ... equivalents, also known by any and all derivatives and variations in the spelling of said names, is not operating and functioning as a mere corporate instrument (sub-franchise compact territorial corporate state unit) of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

308. PROOF OF CLAIM, the doctrine of "equal standing" in law and the Maxim of Law: "Disparata non debent jungi" (Dissimilar things ought not to be joined), does not make it perfectly clear that only parties of equal standing can communicate in law.

309. PROOF OF CLAIM, a judgment is not "void for uncertainty" if it fails to identify the parties for, and against, whom it is rendered with such certainty that it may be readily enforced.

310. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter is not a corporate franchise, and/or cestui que vie, and/or constructive trust, and/or estate, and/or the like.

311. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter is not an "idem sonans", i.e. sounding the same or alike, as with the name of the Undersigned.

312. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter does not represent, and is not, a "legal name", i.e. the name of the "legal person" recognized in law.

313. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "legal name", as this relates to and bears upon the "named" alleged defendant within the above referenced alleged matter, is not a name constructed upon the "form" and "shadow" of "true name," but without the substance, value, spirit, essence, and the like; and "legal names" are not the ONLY names recognized, and capable of being recognized, in law today; and do not denote, identify, and reference "artificial persons."

314. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "legal name", and specifically as this relates to and bears upon the "named" alleged in the above referenced alleged matter, is not written in "legalese", i.e. a language foreign to, and constructed outside of, the bounds of English grammar.

315. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter is not a "juristic person", i.e. a "person", i.e. an "artificial person", i.e. a "legal person", i.e. an entity, such as a corporation, created by law [Birth Registration Acts of the various corporate sub-franchise compact territorial state units] and given certain "legal rights [grants/benefit/privileges] and duties of a being, real or imaginary, who for the purpose of legal reasoning is treated more or less as a man, and also termed a "fictitious person," "juristic person," and "legal person."

316. PROOF OF CLAIM, the term "in propria persona", i.e. "in one's own person," does not tacitly, if not expressly, declare and affirm that there is some other "person" by whom and through whom one can/may act; and such other "person" is not a corporate "person" (persona).

317. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter does not exist only by force of or in contemplation of law, i.e. solely within the imagination having no actual existence.

318. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter is not a "dummy", i.e. a sham, make believe, pretended, imitation, strawman, a man who serves in place of another, or who serves until the "proper person" is named or available to take its place, e.g. as in dummy corporate officers, dummy owners of real estate; and when its name is called in court and specifically as this relates to and bears upon the "named" alleged defendant within the above referenced alleged matter, and a living, breathing flesh-and-blood "real" man, e.g. the Undersigned, answers believing said "name" to be his own "true name," said "proper person" is not thus found, available, and thereby, and therein, "joined", without notion all-be-it through fraud.

319. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter is not a "dummy corporation", i.e. a corporation formed for sham purposes and not for conducting legitimate business, e.g. to avoid "personal liability"; and as this relates to and bears upon the above referenced alleged matter, to establish the obligation for payment of fines, fees, and specific performance as that of the Undersigned's as an "accommodation party," and "surety" for the Principal, i.e. the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in said alleged matter.

320. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter is not an "ens legis", i.e. a creature of the law, an artificial being, as contrasted with flesh-and-blood, real, sentient man, such as the Undersigned, applied to corporations, and considered as deriving their existence entirely from the law.

321. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter is not a "fictitious name", i.e. a counterfeit, feigned, or pretended name, differing in some particular essential from a man's "true name," with the implication that it is meant to deceive or mislead, consisting of a Christian name and patronymic (name of the house/father/family; surname).

322. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "fictitious name" is not the opposite of a "true name" of a man, e.g. the Undersigned's "true name" as shown herein below; and said "fictitious name" is not created by Public Policy of the corporate THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, at the time of a man's birth and "brought wholly into separate existence" via the man's birth record/document/instrument thereby, and therein "christening" said "corporate franchise" as a commercial "vessel" under THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, registry.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

323. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter is not an "individual" as such word/term is used/employed in State and Federal statutes/laws/codes; and is not defined as a "citizen of the United States"; and said definition is not a reference to the XIVth Amendment of the corporate THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Charter/Constitution; and said reference does not denote said "named" individual as that of a "trust entity."
324. PROOF OF CLAIM, that where a federal definition of a term/word exists and is provided, such definition does not supersede any and all definitions given for the same term/word within the sub-franchise compact territorial state units a.k.a. STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents.
325. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter is not a "legal fiction", i.e. something "assumed" to pretend, to accept without proof, an "assumption" created by the imagination which, without that irksome necessity for proof, allows for truth to be a lie, and a lie to be the truth, establishing essentially the "Doctrine of Pretending," based on pretense, lies, deceit, and dissembling, i.e. to conceal or disguise the true nature of so as to deceive, and to conceal one's true nature, i.e. to act hypocritically.
326. PROOF OF CLAIM, "recognized in law" as applied to these "legal names" of "legal persons" and employed/used within the courts, and specifically the alleged "court of record" within the above referenced alleged matter, and legal system today does not mean "existing by force of or in contemplation of law."
327. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter does not reference and identify a "public vessel", i.e. one owned and used by the a nation or Government for its public service, e.g. within its revenue service.
328. PROOF OF CLAIM, "public" is not the vast multitude, which includes the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous; and does not reference and identify ONLY "artificial persons" which possess no brain nor intelligence; and the "public" of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, is not comprised solely of such "artificial persons"; and Public Law/Policy, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL, does not operate solely upon said "persons."
329. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "vessel" in admiralty law is limited to ships or "vessels" engaged in commerce; and in admiralty the "names" of "vessels" are not designated in all-capital-letter format/style; and the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter does not represent and identify a "vessel" in admiralty in which all jurisdiction ensues, flows, and arises from "contract", real or presumed, expressed or implied, revealed or unrevealed.
330. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter is not referencing and identifying a "straw man" (stramineus homo), i.e. an artificial person created by law having a fictitious name, existing only by force of or in contemplation of law, a distinct "legal entity" (corporate) that benefits the creator, i.e. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, allowing the creator to accomplishing things in the name of the "straw man" that would not otherwise be permitted.
331. PROOF OF CLAIM, the word/term "transmit" does not mean to convey, send, transfer, or to pass along as used and employed within the current present day legal profession and courts.
332. PROOF OF CLAIM, the word/term "utility" in patent law does not mean "Industrial value, the capability of being so applied in practical affairs as to prove advantageous in the ordinary pursuits of life, or add to the enjoyment of mankind."
333. PROOF OF CLAIM, the word/term "utility" is not further defined as having some beneficial purpose; and the degree of "utility" is material.
334. PROOF OF CLAIM, "goods" and "services" from the public venue are not solely accessed, i.e. "transmitted" for billing purposes, in an all-capital-letter formatted name.
335. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant in the above referenced alleged matter is not a "transmitting utility", i.e. a conduit acting as a nexus between the public venue and a man, e.g. the Undersigned, and thereby evidencing an industrial value so applied in practical affairs as to prove advantageous and beneficial.
336. PROOF OF CLAIM, the word/term "person" as used/employed in the legal system and science thereof today is not a "general word" which includes in its scope a variety of entities other than man.
337. PROOF OF CLAIM, the word/term "person" cannot be limited by the statutory rule of construction which teaches that the meaning of a word in a statute may be determined by reference to its association with other words or phrases.
338. PROOF OF CLAIM, the statutory rule of construction "ejusdem generis" is not an illustration of a broader rule of statutory construction "noscitur a sociis."
339. PROOF OF CLAIM, the general word/term "person" as applied to the statutory rule of construction "ejusdem generis" is to be construed/interpreted in its widest extent wherein it follows an enumeration of "persons" or "things" by words of a particular and specific meaning; and is not rather to be held as applying ONLY to "persons" or "things" of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned; and such specific terms do not modify and restrict interpretation of the general term.
340. PROOF OF CLAIM, the origin of the general word/term "person" as defined, fixed, known, used, and employed in the legal system and science of law today is not a "mask an actor wears," and is not the true, correct, and complete signification of said word/term in said system and science.
341. PROOF OF CLAIM, under the rule of construction expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, and specifically as this rule of construction relates to and bears upon the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, where a statute or Constitution/Charter enumerates the things on which it is to operate or forbids certain things, it is not to be construed/interpreted as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned.
342. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "person" or "any person" as employed and used in statutes today, and specifically within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, is not merely a corporation/corporately colored entity, which exists merely by force of or in contemplation of law, i.e. solely within the mind and imagination of a man.
343. PROOF OF CLAIM, the general term "person" or "any person", and specifically within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, does include and does apply and refer to a man, i.e. a breathing, flesh-and-blood Living Soul.
344. PROOF OF CLAIM, the general word/term "person" or "any person" as used and employed in statutes today, and specifically within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, does not exclude a man, i.e. a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood Living Soul being from inclusion within the operation of the statute.
345. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas a "natural person" is defined as a "human being" [See: Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th ed., 1968, p. 1300 at "PERSON"], a term not defined within any Law Dictionary the Undersigned has researched, i.e. "human being," and a "person" being a general term which includes every natural person, firm, co-partner-ship, corporation, association, or organization which is restricted in its interpretation by the specific word/term "corporation," statutes employing and using the term "person" or "any person", and specifically as this relates to and bears upon the UNITED STATES CODE, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, is not restricted in its interpretation to that of some form, kind and style of corporate (artificial) entity through such rules of construction as inter alia, "noscitur a sociis," "ejusdem geris," and "expressio unius est alterius," thereby, and therein, excluding "natural person" (man) from the operation of said statute.
346. PROOF OF CLAIM, it is not the nature of Law that what One creates, One controls.
347. PROOF OF CLAIM, this principle of Law, i.e. that what One creates, One controls, is not the natural Law, which binds a creature to its Creator.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

348. PROOF OF CLAIM, a man is not a creature of a Creator.

349. PROOF OF CLAIM, man's Creator is not Jehovah the Living God (YHWH/JHVH), and a man is not created in His image; and, He, Jehovah the Living God (YHWH), is not spirit; and His image (likeness) is not spiritual; and a man is not therefore a spiritual entity in possession of a physical body.

350. PROOF OF CLAIM, that a man as a creature of Jehovah the Living God (YHWH/JHVH), He, and He alone, does not by Right of Creation have authority and power to control man.

351. PROOF OF CLAIM, the word/term "natural" as used/employed within the legal profession, science thereof, and present day courts is not defined and to be understood in its vernacular; and such definition is not "present in or produced by nature", i.e. the physical/natural world and its "phenomena", i.e. the laws of nature.

352. PROOF OF CLAIM, the word/term "natural" and "nature" do not share the same Latin origin, i.e. nasci, to be born.

353. PROOF OF CLAIM, "to be born" of natural phenomena (the laws of nature present in or produced by nature (the physical/natural world) in accordance with and pursuant to the laws of nature (natural/physical phenomena) is not an act whereby that which is born is brought into life or being within the physical/natural world.

354. PROOF OF CLAIM, a difference does not exist between a man and person; and in said words/terms as used/employed within the legal profession, and science thereof, and present day courts as operating/functioning presently.

355. PROOF OF CLAIM, if Defendants agree expressly or otherwise, that a man is a spiritual being in possession and use of a physical/natural body, said body is not operating/functioning, and existing as a vessel, a shell, a mask through which, and by which a man communicates, interacts, and interfaces with, and within, the physical/natural world around him during his physical/natural sojourn within the physical/natural world.

356. PROOF OF CLAIM, it is not man's physical/natural body, which through the act of birth is born of natural/physical phenomena (laws of nature) present in or produced of nature (physical/natural world) in accordance with, and pursuant to, the laws of nature (natural/physical phenomena), and thereby, and therein, born, i.e. brought, into life and being within the physical/natural world.

357. PROOF OF CLAIM, man's physical/natural body is not by Divine design, function, operation, and by definition a "person" as such word/term is used/employed within the legal profession, science thereof, and present day courts.

358. PROOF OF CLAIM, it is not man's physical /natural body upon which a man commits a trespass against the "person" of another through the act of false imprisonment; and a man can falsely imprison, arrest, detain, restrain, search, and the like the "person" or anything other than a "person" physically/naturally existing within the physical/natural world.

359. PROOF OF CLAIM, man's physical/natural body is not a "natural person"; and is not the object defined by said word/term as used/employed within the legal profession, science thereof, and present day courts.

360. PROOF OF CLAIM, a statute(s)/law(s), and specifically those contained within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, which use/employ the word/term "person" are referring to and identifying a "natural person", as opposed to a "corporate/artificial person" which is birthed (berthed) solely within the imagination/mind of a man, and therein brought wholly into separate existence by force of, or in contemplation, of law; and by thus far covered rules of statutory construction, statute(s)/law(s) should not expressly and specifically use/employ the word/term "natural person" if operation of said statute(s)/law(s) are meant to operate over and upon said specific "person"; and the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant within the above referenced alleged matter is a "natural person."

361. PROOF OF CLAIM, that as the General Assembly (legislature) of the corporate compact territorial unit d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, did not create the man, and specifically as this relates to and bears upon the Undersigned, nor another form, style, kind, and type of corporate juridical construct, it does possess, and does have, any authority to control a man based upon real or presumed Right of Creation which acts to bind said man to said juridical construct.

362. PROOF OF CLAIM, that to get around this issue of Right of Creation and control the man, the General Assembly (legislature) of the corporate compact territorial unit d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, did not create an "office of person," an "office" within its corporate structure and venue, which by Right of Creation it controls and regulates.

363. PROOF OF CLAIM, that the corporate compact territorial unit d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, does not through employment and use of empty, fictitious, and false inducements disguised as benefits, privileges, immunities, grants, and the like backed by threats, duress, and coercion, e.g. "you may not drive, fish, hunt, marry, operate a business, work, in short, live, without a license (permission to do that which would otherwise be illegal) or you will be fined, go to jail, or both," thereby, and therein, inducing a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man into alleged contracts and to occupy/hold the "office of person" created by the General Assembly (legislature) of said corporate construct State; and thereby, and therein, control a man through said "office of person", which by Right of Creation it controls and regulates.

364. PROOF OF CLAIM, that where this control over a man by the corporate compact territorial unit d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, is achieved by the man holding the "office of person" and bound thereby, and therein, through nexus of contract, there are not a plethora of administrative agencies, departments, bureaus, and the like, along with countless sub-whatever's therein, operating as "sources of authority" and effectively legislating so-called laws into existence operating over and upon said "office of person" wherein the man is bound through nexus of alleged contract and effectively and completely controlled and regulated.

365. PROOF OF CLAIM, that this legislatively created State/Federal "office of person" is not a mask, a corporate mask/person, a fictional device of artifice created solely for the ability of the corporate compact territorial unit d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, to accomplish the presumed "voluntary enslavement and servitude (achieved through fraud and deceit of gross proportions) of the man wearing the mask.

366. PROOF OF CLAIM, "residency" within the corporate compact territorial unit d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, is not a requirement for eligibility of benefits, privileges, immunities, grants and the like from said corporate juridical constructs.

367. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "office of person" is not a sub-set/class of "resident."

368. PROOF OF CLAIM, a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man does not step into, take up, and hold the "office of person" by taking up "residency" within the corporate compact territorial unit d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, thereby, and therein, donning the mask of a "person" within the venue and jurisdiction of said juridical construct.

369. PROOF OF CLAIM, "residency" is not defined as a "factual" place of abode, living in a particular locality, and requiring only bodily presence as an "inhabitant" of a place.

370. PROOF OF CLAIM, "locality" is not defined as a definite region in any part of space, a geographical position.

371. PROOF OF CLAIM, "space" is not defined as the infinite extension of the three-dimensional, i.e. having height, breadth, and depth field of everyday life.

372. PROOF OF CLAIM, "inhabitant" is not defined as One who resides actually, and permanently, in a given place, and has his domicile there.

373. PROOF OF CLAIM, "residency" is not therefore a "real" geographical location, region, or position existing within three-dimensional space in which a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man, possessing a body, may bodily be present in a fixed and permanent manner wherein is his domicile and thereby, and therein, constitutes him an inhabitant.



374. PROOF OF CLAIM, a living breathing, flesh-and-blood man, and specifically as this relates to and bears upon the Undersigned, can take up "residence" and bodily inhabit the artificial/fictional juridical construct of the corporate compact territorial unit d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, which exist solely within the mind/imagination of man by force of, or in contemplation, of law.

375. PROOF OF CLAIM, a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man, and specifically as this relates to and bears upon the Undersigned and the above referenced alleged matter, does not need to hold/occupy an "office" within the corporate compact territorial unit d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, e.g. "office of person" for said corporate juridical construct's General Assembly (legislature) to regulate and control said man.

376. PROOF OF CLAIM, the right and authority of the General Assembly (legislature) of the corporate compact territorial unit d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, to regulate and control living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man, and specifically as this relates to, and bears upon, the Undersigned through operation of the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, as in above referenced alleged matter, which is not occupying/holding any "office", e.g. "office of person" within the corporate juridical construct is not also prohibited by the Bill of Rights contained within the Charter of said construct. [See: Constitution for the United States of America c1819 articles in amendment]

377. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas the alleged XIIIth Amendment to the Constitution/Charter of the federal municipal for-profit corporate Government juridical construct d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, prohibits involuntary slavery and servitude, except as "punishment for crime," voluntary slavery and servitude are prohibited by this same Amendment. [See: Constitution for the United States of America, alleged XIIIth Amendment, Sec. I, cf. alleged XIVth Amendment, Sec. I]

378. PROOF OF CLAIM, the corporate compact territorial unit's d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, manner of inducing a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man into occupying/holding the "office of person" within said construct, i.e. fraud, deceit, artifice, threats, duress, coercion, and the like, does not constitute involuntary slavery and servitude prohibited by its parent corporate juridical Government construct's Charter, and does not thereby, and therein, constitute "ultra vires" acts, i.e. acts beyond the scope of the powers of a corporation, as defined by its Charter or act of incorporation, which applies not only to acts prohibited by its Charter, but acts which are in excess of powers granted and not prohibited.

379. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "crime" and the allegation thereof, and specifically as this relates to and bears upon the above referenced alleged matter, is not by definition an offense committed against the "state" and an offense committed against a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man is not by definition a "tort," which may be, inter alia, in the nature of a personal injury, slander, or defamation of character.

380. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "crime" is not those wrongs, which the Government notices as injurious to the "public," and punishes in what is called a "criminal proceedings" in its own name.

381. PROOF OF CLAIM, the distinction between a "crime" and a "tort" is not that the former is a "breach" and violation of the public right and duties due to the whole community considered as such, and in its social aggregate.

382. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "public," "community," "social aggregate," and the like which comprises the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, is not composed solely of "artificial persons," ens legis corporate entities in the form of some "office", e.g. "office of a person," "resident," "citizen," and the like operating, functioning, and existing as a mask worn by a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man as an actor within the venue, and upon the stage, of the corporate juridical construct and bound thereto, and therein, through nexus of contract with said corporate State/Federal juridical construct; and said "public," "community," "social aggregate," and the like is composed of living, breathing, flesh-and-blood men.

383. PROOF OF CLAIM, a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man, and specifically the Undersigned in relation to the above referenced alleged matter, can commit a "crime" or "public offense," and can cause an injury to an artificial corporate entity existing only within the mind/imagination of man by force of, or in contemplation of, law; and a "breach" of the public right and duties due which would constitute a "crime" or "public" offense or would be "injurious" to the public, and therefore is punished in the name of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, is not and must not ensue from contract, e.g. between the Undersigned and the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, binding the Undersigned to the corporate policy and therefore liable for "breaches" thereof on the part of the Undersigned.

384. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man cannot commit a "crime," "public offense," or injury against an artificial corporate Government juridical construct, its "public," "community," "social aggregate," and the like which solely exist as artificial entities and without tangible substance or actual existence, and specifically as this relates to the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, and the Undersigned, a conviction, sentence, commitment, and term of imprisonment for a non-existent "crime" or "public offense" which cannot possibly be carried out does not constitute involuntary slavery and servitude in violation of the parent corporate Government's Charter at the alleged XIIIth and XIVth Amendments thereto; and does not therein, and thereby, constitute "ultra vires" acts on the part of said Government actors/agents involved therein.

385. PROOF OF CLAIM, all political power is not inherent in the "People"; and the use of the word/term "people" rather than "person" as elsewhere within the text of the Constitution/Charter does not declare beyond any doubt the People are the sovereign political power holders. [See: Constitution for the United States of America c1819 Preamble; Art. I, § 2, cl. 1; Art I, § 3, cl. 1; Amends. IX, and X]

386. PROOF OF CLAIM, this principle of inherent political power does not demonstrate the natural law and the natural flow of delegated power.

387. PROOF OF CLAIM, in "common usage" the word/term "person" does include the sovereign; and statutes/laws which use/employ the word/term "person" are not construed to exclude the sovereign.

388. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "People" have not succeeded to the rights of the King, the former sovereign of the state, and are therefore bound by "general words" in a statute without being expressly named therein.

389. PROOF OF CLAIM, the federal corporation d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, does not fully embrace the sovereign immunity theory.

390. PROOF OF CLAIM, the living, breathing flesh-and-blood "People" are not the Sovereign's, without subjects, and are not superior to the alleged government, regardless of form and construct.

391. PROOF OF CLAIM, the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, did create the "office of Sovereign political power holder"; and can ascribe penalties for "breach" of said "office" supported by a contract obtained through "full disclosure" wherein a "fair or valuable consideration" was given.

392. PROOF OF CLAIM, the decision of the court in Hale v. Henkel does not contrast the Sovereign paradigm and the corporate franchise feudal paradigm.

393. PROOF OF CLAIM, the use/employment of the word/term "individual" in Hale v. Henkel rather than "Sovereign" as in: "The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen,..." does not establish and demonstrate the principle that the Sovereign, being a non-signatory to the Constitution and a non-party to this social compact, therefore has no rights created by said compact as his rights, i.e. the Sovereigns, existed by the law of the land (common-law) long antecedent to the organization of the State, that said Rights are not inherent, and are not solely "secured" by the social compact, not granted thereby nor created therein; and said Constitutional rights, e.g. The Bill of Rights, are grants, but are not rather prohibitions as they operate upon the agents of Government through contractual nexus not to violate them in respect to the People, and are not to construe such as to deny or disparage others retained by the People.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

394. PROOF OF CLAIM, that the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, or STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, has overturned *Hale v. Henkel*, or any of the various issues of this case.
395. PROOF OF CLAIM, a Sovereign man can be named in a statute/law, and specifically as this relates to and bears upon the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, as merely a "person" or "any person" or any other abstraction acting as a label, and thereby failing to name the Sovereign by specific and particular words.
396. PROOF OF CLAIM, that whereas the corporate compact territorial unit d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, charters declares all "men" are free, the same does hold true, and all "persons" are free.
397. PROOF OF CLAIM, the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, in using/employing the word/term "person," such word/term should not be interpreted to mean a corporation/corporately colored entity.
398. PROOF OF CLAIM, an "attorney" is not an "officer of the court", and as such, is not an "officer" and "arm" of the State.
399. PROOF OF CLAIM, an "attorney" is not a "State Officer," and as such is not firmly part of the Judicial Branch of the State allegedly "licensed" to practice law by the CHIEF JUSTICE of the SUPREME COURT, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities.
400. PROOF OF CLAIM, an "attorney", i.e. a State Officer of the Court firmly entrenched in the Judicial Branch of Government, is not therefore barred under the "Separation of Powers" Clause, and the prohibition of multiple title holdings within the Constitution(s)/Charter(s) of both the State and federal juridical Government constructs from holding any position or office outside the judicial branch of said Government, e.g. office of the President/Governor, office of a Representative/Senator, is not un-lawful and a felony as defined within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities.
401. PROOF OF CLAIM, an "attorney's" first duty is not to the court and public, and is in fact to the client; and wherever the duties to his client conflict with those he owes as an "officer of the court" in the administration of justice, the former must not yield to the latter; and such duty to the court can be shirked under the guise of representing a client.
402. PROOF OF CLAIM, the duty of an "attorney" is not to the court if a litigant client's interest threatens a STATE/FEDERAL interest.
403. PROOF OF CLAIM, an "attorney" who is admitted to practice, both by virtue of his oath of office and customs and traditions of the legal professions, does not owe to the court the highest duty of fidelity as an "esquire", i.e. a shield bearer, to the master he serves.
404. PROOF OF CLAIM, all courtrooms in America today, and specifically the alleged "court of record" within the above referenced alleged matter, are not commercial market places dealing in matters bearing exclusively upon the private, commercial scrip known as "Federal Reserve Notes" (F.R.N.'s), under the jurisdiction of a foreign, occupying, militaristic power, that are managed from the "bench" from the Italian "banca" for "bank" which is not broken in half, i.e. bankrupt, administered by merchant bankers called, inter alia, judges and magistrates; and who are not enforcing private, copyrighted, corporate policy known as, inter alia, "Code(s)", which is not wholly owned by British Corporations under the aegis of The Crown.
405. PROOF OF CLAIM, a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man by retaining or accepting the services of an "attorney," to speak or file written documents for him, is not assumed, presumed, deemed, construed, and the like to be "non compos mentis", i.e. not mentally competent.
406. PROOF OF CLAIM, a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man presumed, deemed, construed, and the like to be "non compos mentis" is not further damned as being a "ward of the court."
407. PROOF OF CLAIM, a living, breathing, flesh-and-blood man considered to be a "ward of the court" does not lose all his rights, and will be permitted to do anything therein.
408. PROOF OF CLAIM, the creation of these "corporate franchises", i.e. all-capital-letter entities, e.g. the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant within the above referenced alleged matter, did not accomplish two (2) primary objectives, to wit: 1) Taking away absolute property rights (in personam), and 2) Replace same with personal property rights (in rem) regardless of race.
409. PROOF OF CLAIM, "in personam" jurisdiction does any longer apply to the average man, and has not become a "mask" (personae) by which he is defrauded, raped, pillaged, and plundered.
410. PROOF OF CLAIM, these "corporate franchises" are not laboring under a conclusive presumption (statutorily imposed), judicially established, that they are "citizens" and "subjects" of the State of incorporation, i.e. port of entry (state of birth of the man and State of berth of the "vessel") for which an estoppel has not been imposed upon anyone denying such citizenship.
411. PROOF OF CLAIM, that any estoppels can be imposed upon a presumption by statute or otherwise.
412. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "corporate franchise" is not defined non-obstante as "The right to exist and do business as a corporation. The right or privilege granted by the state or Government to the persons forming an aggregate corporation, and their successors, to exist and do business as a corporation, and to exercise the rights and powers incidental to that form of organization, under 'contract,' or necessarily implied in the grant."
413. PROOF OF CLAIM, a Charter of a corporation, e.g. the Charter/Constitution of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1871, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, is not said corporation's "general franchise", and a "special franchise" does not consist in any rights granted by the "public" to use property for "public use" but with private profit.
414. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "franchise" is not a "capital asset" resulting in capital gain or loss, depending on whether all significant powers, rights, or continuing "interests" are "transferred" (after the fact) pursuant to the sale of a "franchise."
415. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "capital asset" is not inclusive of a man as a resource, i.e. a man being, i.e. biological "goods."
416. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "transfer" of property is not an act of the parties, or of the law, by which the title to property is conveyed from one man or person to another man or person; the sale and every other method, direct or indirect, of disposing of, or parting, with property or with an "interest" therein, or with the possession thereof (always by delivery or "livery of seisen"), or of fixing a secret indelible maritime lien upon property or upon an "interest" therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily, by, or without, judicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, payment, pledge, hypothecation, mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gift, security, or otherwise.
417. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "transfer" is not an "assignment" or "conveyance" of property, including an instrument or document that "vests" in the transferee such rights as the transferor had therein; and is not a general term, i.e. all-encompassing term, used by the Uniform Commercial Code as Codified in the UNITED STATES CODE, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, to describe the act that passes an "interest" in an instrument to another.
418. PROOF OF CLAIM, it is not the retention or relinquishment of this "interest" in every species of contract that determines who the Creditor and who the Debtor are and said parties "reasonable expectations" as to whom will succeed in any contract dispute arising from such a legal or commercial transaction.
419. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas "transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, in disposing or parting with property or with an "interest" in property, it may not include retention of the "res" and title (the "legal interest") upon proper terms, as a "security interest," or foreclosure of the debtors equity of redemption, as an un-liquidated claim to the holder in due course, having given value and secured the accrued right of action for enforcement purposes.



420. PROOF OF CLAIM, these "corporate franchises" are not governed by the maritime law of England.

421. PROOF OF CLAIM, Title 28 of the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (F.R.Civ.P.), STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, is not an admiralty rule book which governs ALL disputes over maritime contracts "in rem," or "quasi in rem," and "actions" or "transactions" that impose a debt, duty, obligation, or liability, e.g. an un-liquidated claim and an accrued right of action; and said Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted and in use/employment within the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, as contained in the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, are not also an admiralty rule book aping its corporate parent's Rule Book.

422. PROOF OF CLAIM, there is not a two (2)-part test to determine existence of traditional admiralty jurisdiction, and those two (2) parts are not: 1) It must be established; and 2) It must be proven.

423. PROOF OF CLAIM, there is not a four (4) part test to determine traditional maritime jurisdiction, and those four (4) parts are not: 1) What are the functions and rule of the parties (the terms of the contract); 2) What are the types of vehicles and instrumentalities used (reward contract and duty to perform); 3) What is the causation (breach of contract and duty to perform) and type of injury (breach of warranty to pay - by the fraudulent debtor); and 4) Can the traditional concepts of rule of admiralty law be applied (who is the debtor and who is the creditor).

424. PROOF OF CLAIM, that ALL contracts with Government, i.e. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents sub-franchise compact territorial State units, be they real or presumed, express or implied, revealed or unrevealed are not maritime in their nature, and are not therefore of admiralty jurisdiction.

425. PROOF OF CLAIM, a case/matter in admiralty does in fact arise under the Constitution or Laws of the United States of America.

426. PROOF OF CLAIM, in 1697, the British Board of Trade, under the Navigation Act, did not establish vice-admiralty courts set-up under the Townsend Acts, to provide a separate forum for "corporate franchise" merchants under license, or charter of the king, to resolve contractual disputes over the "transfer" or "conveyance" of "interests" in property, as well as property itself; more often than not, being disputes over "chattel paper," as opposed to money of different weight and fineness having numismatic or intrinsic value, and said disputes generally involving a controversy over the "transfer" of an "interest" (res and title) to the property involved, or upon the terms or conditions of its delivery (livery of seisen); and said merchant system was not introduced in England since before 1290 A.D. ; and did not evolve into a system of registration, first called "The Great Exchequer of the Jews," which operated to effect a security transaction and livery of seisen (Jewish mortgage; i.e., a "dead-gage," a pawn or pledge; something deposited as security for the performance of some act or the payment of money which, on failure or non-performance, is forfeited. A mortgage being a dead-gage as whatever profit it yields, it redeems not itself unless the whole amount secured is paid at the appointed time), which did not have more influence upon the common-law (legal) mortgage than is generally believed, which, today is called a legal and/or equitable (contractual) mortgage through the registration of any written document/instrument, e.g. the registration of live birth of a child, that describes the property and transfers a security interest in the property, to effect a lien and secure contract obligations, e.g. a U.C.C.-1 Financing Statement.

427. PROOF OF CLAIM, this system of admiralty and/or maritime jurisdiction has not evolved today to the point that whenever the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, is a party to an action, "Chancery" is not adopted which jurisdiction is not conferred on federal and State courts by the Constitution, now statute and charter, and usages of "Chancery" in England whom furnish Chancery law that is exercised.

428. PROOF OF CLAIM, "Chancery" jurisdiction is not synonymous with "general equity jurisdiction," which is practiced according to STATE law or LOCAL practice; and is not practiced according to the law of England.

429. PROOF OF CLAIM, "Chancery" jurisdiction is not a "special" maritime jurisdiction "in rem."

430. PROOF OF CLAIM, "in rem" is not a technical term used to designate proceedings or actions instituted against the "thing" (res), in contradistinction to personal actions which are "in personam"; and do not include judgments of property as forfeited (or forfeitable as property previously pledged or hypothecated).

431. PROOF OF CLAIM, "Chancery" or "General Equity" jurisdiction is not ordinarily exercised to enforce pledges, trusts, uses, confidences, and other forms of contracts; and does not come to America right out of the "King and Queen's Bench," regarding the law for bankruptcy and insolvent debtors; and is not separate and distinct from the *lex non-scripta* (Anglo-saxon common-law).

432. PROOF OF CLAIM, "forfeiture" is not an action of debt, and as such, does not begin in admiralty whether on land or navigable water.

433. PROOF OF CLAIM, where it has been stated that the forms of proceeding between actions at law and suits in equity have been abolished, such is not misleading; and such proceedings have not rather been judicially merged as of 1938 and 1966; and the difference in substance between law and equity is not firmly imbedded in the Constitution, and does not remain unaltered.

434. PROOF OF CLAIM, maritime jurisdiction is not implemented by "in rem" or "quasi in rem" attachment over the "res"; and does not depend upon the actual physical control of the "res" at the time litigations are begun; and such maritime jurisdiction "in rem" over the "res" is not judicially recognized by the Supreme Court.

435. PROOF OF CLAIM, "attachment" is not the act or process of taking, "apprehending," or seizing persons or property, by virtue of a writ, summons, or other judicial order ("warrant of arrest"), and bringing the same into the custody of the law for the purpose of bringing a person (e.g., an absconding, concealed, or fraudulent debtor) before the court for acquiring jurisdiction over the property seized, to compel an appearance, to furnish security for debt or costs, or to arrest a fund in the hands of a third party (garnishment/Custom of London); and is not a remedy ancillary to an action by which a plaintiff, specifically the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, as in the above referenced alleged matter, is enabled to acquire a lien (mortgage) upon property or effects of the "named" alleged defendant, and specifically the "named" alleged defendant within the above referenced alleged matter, for satisfaction of judgment, which plaintiff may obtain where the alleged defendant and the Undersigned is a non-resident, or beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court, his goods or lands within the territory may be seized upon process of "attachment"; whereby he will be compelled to enter an appearance, or the court acquires jurisdiction so far as to dispose of the property attached; and said form of "attachment" is not also termed "foreign attachment"; and such a proceeding does not become in substance one "in rem" against the attached property which more properly does not belong to a process otherwise familiarly known as "garnishment," a peculiar and ancient remedy open to creditors within the jurisdiction of the city of London (Custom of London); and is not a power and process variously denominated as "garnishment," "trustee process," or "factorizing."

436. PROOF OF CLAIM, the alleged warrant of arrest used/employed within the above referenced alleged matter is not in nature, and actuality, some manner and form of "attachment" proceeding according to equity rather than proceeding according to common-law.

437. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "law of persons and things" is not the "law of status"; and the "law of things" is not the "law of property", or better yet, "contract."

438. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas a "person" as such word/term is used/employed within statutes/laws/codes/regulations/rules/ordinances, and the like, and specifically within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, is a subject of "rights" ("person of inheritance" [entitled]) and duties ("person of incidence" [bound]), and as a subject of a right, the "person" is the object of the correlative duty, such "rights are not "legal rights"; which are not more properly and accurately defined as "benefits/privileges"; and "duty" is not more properly and accurately defined as "obligations", which do not arise from the acceptance (possession) and "use" of such "rights"; and this correlative relationship of "benefits and obligations" does not arise from "contract" between the parties, real or presumed, expressed or implied, revealed or unrevealed.

439. PROOF OF CLAIM, where a "benefit(s)" is compelled, and specifically if said "benefit(s)" is in the nature of an economic benefit(s), the correlative "obligation" can be enforced, compelled, demanded, extracted, and the like.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

440. PROOF OF CLAIM, President Lincoln did not replace the Constitution, law, custom, and tradition of America with Roman Civil Law by Justinian, which was available as a codified whole, and of which he was an able scholar.
441. PROOF OF CLAIM, the principle of "novation", i.e. the substitution of an old debt with a new one, contained within the Roman Civil Law, did exist in America prior to the Civil War and Congressional Walk-Out of the Southern states therefrom, and said Congress' reconvening under martial law by President Lincoln in his capacity as Commander-In-Chief.
442. PROOF OF CLAIM, this principle of "novation" is not accomplished by the registration, recording, and enrollment of the birth document/instrument (however termed/styled) of a new born child when the "interest" in biological property/goods is transferred and recorded, originally at the County Recorder's Office, sent to the Secretary of State, exported to the Department of Commerce through the Bureau of the Census therein, and thereof, thereby effectuating the process of "conversion" of a man's life, labor, and property to a "capital asset" of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, and said process of "novation" being complete and ratified when said child/man assents to being a debtor by submitting an application for a benefit, privilege, immunity, or opportunity from any branch, agency, or instrumentality of the parent municipal for-profit corporate Government d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, therein creating the obligation of a debtor to repay or perform for which the "privilege" of "limited liability" for debts is extended to the new debtor.
443. PROOF OF CLAIM, the concept and principle of "limited liability" was not, and is not, taken from and developed from the Roman Church's practice of peddling "indulgences."
444. PROOF OF CLAIM, "conveyances" whether effectuated by pledge, hypothecation, or otherwise which will thereby render a man insolvent, without "fair consideration" is not fraudulent.
445. PROOF OF CLAIM, all modern FEDERAL and STATE law, and specifically the so-called law as contained within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, does not appear in the form of codes patterned after the Code of Justinian, and often following it in places exactly.
446. PROOF OF CLAIM, Roman Civil Law is not a perversion of "private law."
447. PROOF OF CLAIM, Roman Civil Law is not also known as "Black Letter Law," a term which does not refer to the laws of "servitude" to the church or king, for which use/employment of the color/word/term "Black" is not symbolic of the unquestionable (ex cathedra) authority of the priest (judges/legislators) dictates (private conscience), when clothed in his morning robe.
448. PROOF OF CLAIM, this "Black Letter Law" does not form the basis of all law, both STATE and FEDERAL, and specifically that of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, as allegedly promulgated within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, and does not represent the most insidious form of slavery of mind, which is not effectuated by entrapment through one-sided (unilateral), or implied, contracts which a man is never aware of until he is hammered with compelled performance.
449. PROOF OF CLAIM, "private law" is not the "conscience law" of one being, or entity, acting as an alleged "source of authority"; and there is liberty of conscience, of choice of contract as to its terms; and the "offeror" of ALL Roman Civil Law Governments is not based upon the personal beliefs of the Emperor (Governor/President/Chief-Executive Officer); and acceptance is not signified by "tacit procuration" wherein, and whereby, silence equates to "consent."
450. PROOF OF CLAIM, "Public Policy" is not "private law."
451. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "conscience" of "private law" was meant to operate in forming, or influencing, "public law" or "policy."
452. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "conscience" of "private law" can operate without bilateral contracts, i.e. a contract in which both contracting parties are bound to fulfill obligations reciprocally towards each other containing mutual promises between the parties (each party being both promisor and promisee), and one which includes both rights and duties on each side, unless it was through a "trust," or "confidence" reposed.
453. PROOF OF CLAIM, "private law" has not always been concerned with "bilateral contract"; and cannot only be used in, or by, Lawful Government for establishing private commercial relations called "licenses."
454. PROOF OF CLAIM, "Public Law" for "private use" does not protect the identity of the People apart from civil Government, and Roman Civil Law does allow for this.
455. PROOF OF CLAIM, the court's decision in *Hale v. Henkel* as cited supra, does not mark the beginning of a "collective entity rule"; and does not establish the line of demarcation between "private law" to secure private unalienable Rights, as distinguished from "public law" for public commercial use, which, operating therein, and thereby, binds a man to all obligations ensuing or arising therefrom.
456. PROOF OF CLAIM, the 1st Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, now adopted Charter of the federal municipal for-profit corporate juridical construct d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, in its use/employment of the word/term "religion" does not refer to "conscience", i.e. what a man believes in his conscience is his religion; and is not therefore a prohibition upon the agents of said Government to prevent one man's, or a group of men's, personal conscience from being legislated into law as "public policy," thereby enjoining Government from interfering with a man's right to express his conscience by making any 'public policy' based upon it.
457. PROOF OF CLAIM, a legislature, and specifically the CONGRESS of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, does have any authority, or right, to obstruct through "Public Law" or "Public Policy" the obedience of a man, and specifically the Undersigned, which would cause such man to transgress the Law of his Creator.
458. PROOF OF CLAIM, whereas the Undersigned serves the Supreme Heavenly Jehovah the Living God YHWH/JHVH; and whereas a man cannot serve two masters or he will tend to the one and despise the other; the Undersigned does have and/or owe the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, ANY obedience, service, duty, obligation, or the like based upon lawful principals and or contract(s), real or presumed, expressed or implied, revealed or unrevealed.
459. PROOF OF CLAIM, prior to the Reconstruction Acts and the alleged XIVth Amendment of the federal corporate juridical construct's Charter, courts did have jurisdiction of non-XIVth Amendment Trust "res,"; and a want of a privity contract, or contract itself, did not act to deprive it of said jurisdiction over and within said matters.
460. PROOF OF CLAIM, that "privity of contract," or "contract" itself, is not the dividing line between a court having "subject-matter jurisdiction," and "jurisdiction of the subject-matter."
461. PROOF OF CLAIM, a man, and specifically the Undersigned, does not have to "contract" into the jurisdiction of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities; and at the heart of every "contract" does not lie a mystery involving the "transfer of the interest in property," which every "contract" embraces.
462. PROOF OF CLAIM, the ruling decision in *Hanson v. Deckla* does not sustain the proposition that the XIVth AMENDMENT to the federal municipal for-profit corporate juridical construct's Charter d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, cannot, and does not, work in favor of non-XIVth Amendment men, and specifically the Undersigned; and it does not establish a dividing line between public (municipal) law and private law, i.e. jus gentium publicum v. jus gentium privatum, which are both international in character.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

463. PROOF OF CLAIM, House Joint Resolution - 192 (HJR-192) is not mutable by will; and a man, and specifically the Undersigned, can be compelled to act as a bankrupt or insolvent under private law for public charitable purposes.
464. PROOF OF CLAIM, the General Assembly (legislature) of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, is a body which sits according to law of "Positive Act"; and does not rather sit by "resolution", i.e. expressing an "opinion," the subject matter of which would not, and does not, constitute a statute/law.
465. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "Reconstruction Acts" and the alleged XIVth Amendment to the corporate parent's Constitution/Charter d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, has not allowed one man's religious conscience in the Executive Branch thereof, in his capacity as Commander-In-Chief, to dictate "public policy" based solely upon his claim that "I am the State" in the eyes of International Law; and said "public policy" does not become the religious conscience of every member of the alleged XIVth Amendment eleemosynary corporate church State "public trust" whom have rewritten their Constitutions to conform to it.
466. PROOF OF CLAIM, that a man's participation within this "public trust" scheme was not, and is not, voluntary.
467. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Vth Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, and as adopted by the federal municipal for-profit corporate Government juridical construct d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and the STATE OF ... equivalents/instrumentalities, does pertain to the People of the states.
468. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Vth Amendment, unlike the alleged XIVth Amendment to the respective CONSTITUTIONS of THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... equivalents, does have an equal protection clause; and has been incorporated into the XIVth Amendment.
469. PROOF OF CLAIM, all contracts, whether express or implied, are not subject to the universal "essentials" of "contract law," pertaining to the fundamentals of the interaction between the parties.
470. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "contract" is not an agreement, e.g. as will be set, and established, by the parties to this, between two or more men/persons, which creates an obligation to do, or not to do, a particular thing.
471. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "essential" elements of "contract" are not 1) parties capable of contracting; 2) consent; 3) lawful object; 4) a sufficient cause or consideration; 5) mutuality of agreement; and 6) mutuality of obligation.
472. PROOF OF CLAIM, "agreement" can be vague, i.e. uncertain and not susceptible to being understood.
473. PROOF OF CLAIM, the "essentials" of "consent" are not it must be 1) free; 2) mutual; and 3) communicated by each to the other.
474. PROOF OF CLAIM, "consent" is not an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, wherein the mind is weighing in a balance the good (benefit) and evil (duty/obligation) of a proposed/offered "contract."
475. PROOF OF CLAIM, "consent" does not mean "voluntary" agreement by a man to make an intelligent choice to contract or not to contract.
476. PROOF OF CLAIM, "consent" and "submission" are synonymous; and a mere "submission" does necessarily involve "consent."
477. PROOF OF CLAIM, "consent" can be obtained, and is free and mutual, when obtained through duress, menace, fraud, undue influence, and or mistake.
478. PROOF OF CLAIM, "fraud" is not an intentional perversion of the truth to induce another, e.g. the Undersigned within the above referenced alleged matter, in reliance thereon to part with a valuable thing or legal right belonging to him, and/or a false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct, false or misleading allegations, or concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives, and is intended to deceive another, so he acts upon it to his injury embracing all multifarious means a man can devise to gain advantage over another, e.g. false suggestion, suppression of the truth, surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is cheated.
479. PROOF OF CLAIM, "fraud" does not vitiate, i.e. make void, cause to fail of force, affect or effect, destroy or annul the legal efficacy and binding force of an act or instrument every transaction and all contracts; and does not destroy the validity of everything into which it enters, even the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments.
480. PROOF OF CLAIM, "fraud" and "bad faith" (mala fides) are not synonymous; and both terms are not synonymous with dishonesty, infidelity, faithlessness, perfidy, and unfairness.
481. PROOF OF CLAIM, "fraud" is not always positive and intentional.
482. PROOF OF CLAIM, "fraud" does not comprise all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a breach of a legal or equitable duty and resulting in damage to another.
483. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Constitution/Charter, be it State or Federal, is not a contract.
484. PROOF OF CLAIM, that rights and duties/obligations contained within, and arising from, a contract do not only effect and bind parties to said contract.
485. PROOF OF CLAIM, parties to a contract are not determined by signature.
486. PROOF OF CLAIM, a man not a signatory to a contract does have any rights; and does have/owe any duties/obligations therein, and or arising therefrom.
487. PROOF OF CLAIM, the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, Constitution/Charter does operate over, and upon, the Undersigned.
488. PROOF OF CLAIM, there are clauses in the Federal Constitution/Charter that subject the Undersigned to the "statutory jurisdiction" of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities.
489. PROOF OF CLAIM, the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, Constitution/Charter does not operate solely over and upon only "office" holders, i.e. inter alia: officers, employees, agents, residents, citizens, public, and or persons of said corporate Government juridical constructs.
490. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Undersigned as a non-party and non-signatory to the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, Constitution/Charter does have any rights therein, or arising there from; and does owe any duty/obligation thereto.
491. PROOF OF CLAIM, there were at the time of the alleged violation(s) of statute(s)/law(s)/code(s) within the above referenced alleged matter, and are now this present day, any valid, lawful, enforceable "contracts," real or presumed, expressed or implied, revealed or unrevealed, between the Undersigned and the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, wherein there was "full disclosure," "fair or valuable consideration," free and mutual "consent," of which the alleged "court of record" within the above referenced alleged matter took tacit (silent), or express, judicial notice of to bind therein the Undersigned to the "private law" in support of a "private right" of the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF ... equivalents/instrumentalities, as contained within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, for a "breach" thereof, and acting to confer "subject-matter jurisdiction" of the alleged "breach" upon the court, and thereby allowing it to acquire the authority, right, and power to decide, make orders, and judgments binding and of legal force, affect and effect over, and upon, the Undersigned.
492. PROOF OF CLAIM, the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, does have a perfected, or otherwise, superior claim, i.e. lien hold interest, in the Undersigned, the Undersigned's Debtor, i.e. the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant within the above referenced alleged matter, and the Undersigned's property.
493. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Undersigned is not the perfected superior lien hold claimant and principal Creditor of the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant (Debtor) in the above referenced alleged matter, and property held in said "name."



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

494. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "name" of the alleged defendant within the above referenced alleged matter does reference and/or identify the Undersigned.
495. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Undersigned did agree to subordinate the Undersigned's "perfected security interest" in the Debtor, i.e. the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant within the above referenced alleged matter, and property to the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities.
496. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Undersigned is the "accommodation party," "surety," "fiduciary," and the like of the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant within the above referenced alleged matter; and is not Secured Party, Holder-in-Due-Course, Real-Party-in-Interest, Grantor, Bailor, Administrator, Creditor, Custodian, and/or Beneficiary for same.
497. PROOF OF CLAIM, the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and STATE OF... equivalents/instrumentalities, did not become a "corporate entity"; and did not thereby lay down its sovereignty and take on the character of a private citizen; and can exercise power which is not derived from the corporate Charter/Constitution.
498. PROOF OF CLAIM, within the above referenced alleged matter the Prosecutor did post any indemnity bond to indemnify his actions to any injury to the Undersigned.
499. PROOF OF CLAIM, the facts as set, established, and thereby agreed upon by the parties to this , i.e. Defendants and the Undersigned, do not apply, and operate within, and upon, any and all previous alleged matters irrespective and regardless of what the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, may have stated.
500. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Undersigned is, and was, a party to the above referenced alleged matter; and was not rather a non-party thereto; and said matter/dispute was not solely between fictional entities.
501. PROOF OF CLAIM, the all-capital-letter "named" alleged defendant and the Undersigned within the above referenced alleged matter did appear in court; and did enter a plea; and did waive or consent to the court's jurisdiction; and was not absent from court.
502. PROOF OF CLAIM, any of the real parties to, and within, the above referenced alleged matter are solvent; and do possess the capacity to sue and be sued, or sue or be sued in "Representative Capacity"; and can and did appear in court in said alleged matter.
503. PROOF OF CLAIM, offenses created by statute(s) as contained within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, are created by common-law; and are not offenses "malum prohibitum"; i.e. crimes only because prohibited by statute(s) (statutory offense(s)).
504. PROOF OF CLAIM, the statutes as contained within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, including but not limited to THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof do operate over, and upon, the Undersigned.
505. PROOF OF CLAIM, "statutory jurisdiction" is a lawful jurisdiction, lawfully created by the "fundamental law of the land" or common-law; and that the Undersigned is subject thereto, and is bound thereto, in any form or manner, contractually or otherwise.
506. PROOF OF CLAIM, the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE as codified within the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, and CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, is not the controlling/governing law of, and within, the alleged "court of record," within the above referenced alleged matter.
507. PROOF OF CLAIM, a "negotiable instrument" is not a promise or order to pay and/or perform; and, inter alia warrant of arrest, charging document (Indictment), orders, and judgment, and specifically such within the above referenced alleged matter, are not "negotiable instruments", and are not therefore governed by the Negotiable Instrument Law as made uniform within Article 3 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE codified in the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, and the CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities.
508. PROOF OF CLAIM, any lawful and or legal relationship (nexus), through contract or otherwise, does exist between the Undersigned and the "source of authority" for the UNITED STATES CODE, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, and/or specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 and any and all laws implemented based upon that alleged authority and foundation thereof, and are therefore binding and of legal force, affect or effect over, and upon, the Undersigned.
509. PROOF OF CLAIM, there was not fraud perpetrated against the Undersigned within the above referenced alleged matter by any and all real parties involved therein; and should the Defendants agree, expressly or otherwise, to the facts contained within this as said facts operate in favor of the Undersigned, such facts do not demonstrate, evidence, establish, and affirm fraud within said alleged matter; and said fraud does not vitiate all decisions, orders, the judgment, and the like within said alleged matter, ab initio.
510. PROOF OF CLAIM, there does still remain any arguable basis for the court's "subject-matter jurisdiction" within the above referenced alleged matter; and the judgment of said court in said alleged matter is not therefore void, ab initio.
511. Proofs of Claim- The Undersigned are/were knowing, willing, intelligent and intentional signatories to the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 and/or State of ... equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style.
512. Proofs of Claim- The Undersigned are/were knowing, willing, intelligent and intelligent parties to the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 and/or State of ... equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style.
513. Proofs of Claim- A man can be/is a knowing, willing, intelligent and intentional signatory/party absent a valid signature/autograph upon the contract.
514. Proof of Claim- The Constitution for the United States of America c1819 and State of ... equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, is not a contract.
515. Proof of Claim- The United States of America, State of ... and local equivalents are factually and actually the same entities as UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style.
516. Proof of Claim- By, under and pursuant to the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, and State of ... equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, the aforementioned entities were granted explicit authority to operate and/or conduct business under any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format they so desire, ie corporate, commercial, military, political, ecclesiastical and other capacities, characters, conditions, status and standings.
517. Proof of Claim- By, under and pursuant to the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 and State of ... equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, the aforementioned entities were granted explicit authority to alter and/or change jurisdictions, venues, law forms, authorities, process and procedures as specifically laid out therein.
518. Proof of Claim- By, under and pursuant to the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 and State of ... equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, the aforementioned entities were granted explicit authority to operate by, under and pursuant to emergency powers, authorities, process and procedures not in times of actual and factual civil unrest or lawfully declared war within the borders of the United States of America.
519. Proof of Claim- The Judicial branch of the United States of America, State of ... and local equivalents thereof, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, has/had explicit authority to legislate and create "law" from the "bench" that in any nature, shape, cause, kind, form or format affects or effects any man not a party to the controversy therein.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

520. Proof of Claim- The Undersigned were/are intelligently, intentionally, knowingly and willingly placing ourselves upon the United States of America, State of ... and local equivalents thereof, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, in any and all interactions/matters in any and all places and any and all times.

521. Proof of Claim- The Undersigned were/are intelligently, intentionally, knowingly and willingly joined/joining ourselves to any and all matters/interactions in any and all places and any and all times to the United States of America, State of ... and local equivalents thereof, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style.

522. Proof of Claim- The United States of America, State of ... and local equivalents thereof, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are actually and factually the real-party-in-interest in any and all matters/interactions with the Undersigned.

523. Proof of Claim- The Defendants have explicit Constitutional authority to deviate from and/or violate the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, State of ... equivalents, at any time and any place.

524. Proof of Claim- There exists explicit authority contained within the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 for the Defendants to effectuate, implement, enforce and/or utilize inherent or implied processes, procedures, authorities, jurisdictions, venues and/or law forms.

525. Proof of Claims- The Defendants and their employer, United States of America, State of ... and Local equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, possess explicit Constitutional authority, standing, status, character, condition and capacity to seek any and all claims, remedies and/or relief, civil and/or criminal, against the Undersigned.

526. Proof of Claim- The Defendants and their employer, United States of America, State of ... and Local equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, possess explicit Constitutional authority for the implementation, exercise and/or enforcement of malum prohibitum jurisdiction against the Undersigned.

527. Proof of Claim- The Defendants and their employer, United States of America, State of ... and Local equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, possess explicit Constitutional authority to interfere and/or alter a private Contract between the Undersigned and the Creator of all that was, is and shall be.

528. Proof of Claim- The Defendants and their employer, United States of America, State of ... and Local equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, possess Constitutional document(s), paper(s), digital data, tangible medium(s) and/or tangible item(s) in their care, custody and control thereof which demonstrate and prove that the Undersigned are knowing, willing, intelligent and intentional party(ies) and/or signatory(ies) to any social, public, civil, quasi-public, political, private, commercial, ecclesiastical, military, universal and/or other compact, agreement, covenant, contract and any other terms of art describing, demonstrating and/or utilized to mean the same, and any and all combinations and variations of the aforementioned, which can be demonstrated to operate to confer any actual and factual controlling, insurable, lawful, legal, private, public, quasi-public, equitable, political, commercial, social, civil, corporate, international, universal, quantum, spiritual, administrative, Talmudic, Babylonian, ecclesiastical, military, beneficial, admiralty/maritime, statutory, pecuniary, managerial, regulatory and/or any and all other interest, share, title, authority, relationship, jurisdiction, venue, et cetera, of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations of the aforementioned, without limitation, in and/or over the Undersigneds' physical, natural, spirit and/or soul being(s) and representation(s) thereof, of any nature, kind, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, without limitation, the Undersigneds' cestui que vie trust, estate, any and all other trusts and constructs, and any and all sub and/or constructive trusts and constructs thereof, any and all thereto, therefore, therewith and therefrom the Undersigned, without limitation, any and all property and assets of any nature, kind, form and format, and my share, as Heir of the Creator of all that was, is and shall be, without limitation, in any nature, way, cause and/or kind to the benefit of the Defendants' and their employer, United States of America, State of ... and Local equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style.

529. Proof of Claim- The Undersigned are specifically named/identified in any UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, acts, codes, statutes, rules, regulations, ordinances, et cetera.

530. Proof of Claim- The Undersigned have specific attachment/liability to any UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, acts, codes, statutes, rules, regulations, ordinances, et cetera.

531. Proof of Claim- The CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, STATE OF ... equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, does by way of Lawful nexus operate upon the Undersigned.

532. Proof of Claim- The Undersigned are Lawfully bound by any institutions formed by our fellow man without our individual explicit consent.

533. Proof of Claim- The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are real, not imaginary nor a fiction of law.

534. Proof of Claim- The Defendants by and through the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, as imaginary creations and fictions of law can Lawfully interface with Living men.

535. Proof of Claim- The Undersigned can Lawfully be identified in all caps style by the Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, in contradiction to a Lawfully given birth name.

536. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are not foreign to the Undersigned.

537. Proof of Claim- The Undersigned have not lived/are not living under unlawful pretended/fraudulent emergency/military/commercial/other rule in absolute violation of the Constitution for the United States of America c1819.

538. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are/have legally and lawfully abridged by Constitutional "laws" brought into force actual and factual states of Constitutional and Lawful "national emergency".

539. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are solvent and have plenary sovereign capacity, character, condition, status and standing at any and all places and any and all times.

540. Proof of Claim- The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ..., and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are independent sovereign nations/entities.

541. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, have not aided and abetted the removal of gold and silver from backing the National currency.

542. Proof of Claim- There can be any limitation on the power and authority of the Undersigned in proper capacity, character, condition, status and standing.

543. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, issue Constitutional and Lawful documents, presentments, instruments or any other term of art describing, demonstrating and/or utilized to mean the same, in any and all matters and interactions.

544. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, operate with "clean hands" and in "good faith" in any and all matters and interactions with the Undersigned.

545. Proof of Claims- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, effectuate and utilize police powers and authorities by, under and through explicit authorities emanating from the Constitution for the United States of America c1819.

546. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, utilized explicit Constitutional authority to declare the Undersigned enemies in and on their own land.

547. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are in plenary compliance to/with the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 in all matters and interactions with the Undersigned.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

548. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, and any and all employees, agents, assigns, successors, contractors, et cetera thereof, are in plenary compliance to/with explicit provisions of the Law of the Land aka Constitution for the United States of America c1819 at all times and all places in all matters and interactions.

549. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, and any and all employees, agents, assigns, successors, contractors, et cetera thereof, are holding Constitutional Office and/or positions with perfected title thereto, and exercising authorities and privileges therein in plenary compliance to explicit provisions of the Law of the Land aka Constitution for the United States of America c1819 at all places and all times in all matters and interactions.

550. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, have plenary authority by and through the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 to rule over and interfere with the private dealings and affairs of the Undersigned.

551. Proof of Claim- The capacities, characters, conditions, status and standing effectuated and utilized by the Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are in plenary compliance with, and explicitly authorized by, the Constitution for the United States of America c1819.

552. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, and any and all employees, agents, assigns, successors, contractors, et cetera thereof, have taken lawful Oaths to the Constitution for the United States of America c1819.

553. proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, and any and all employees, agents, assigns, successors, contractors, et cetera thereof, are operating by and through full disclosure in their respective day to day matters and interactions.

554. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are granted explicit authority from the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 to commercially benefit from the utilization from the laws of occupation, laws of war and the EMERGENCY BANKING RELIEF ACT to the detriment and injury of the Undersigned.

555. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are granted explicit authority from the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 to maintain and operate commercial/military courts, prisons and police for the use against, and suppression of, the Undersigned.

556. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are granted explicit authority from the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 to claim ownership of, or hold liens against, the Undersigned and/or their property and assets.

557. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are granted explicit authority from the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 to alter and/or blend the jurisdictions of Law, Equity and Admiralty/Maritime.

558. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are granted explicit authority from the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 to operate and utilize malum primum authority against the Undersigned.

559. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are granted explicit authority from the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 to operate and utilize martial rule/law against and over the Undersigned without actual and factual proof of civil unrest.

560. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are granted explicit authority from the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 to ignore, hamper or violate the Undersigned's right to expatriate.

561. Proof of Claim- The Undersigned can be forced to serve two masters.

562. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are granted explicit authority from the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 to adhere to, and respect, legislation from the bench.

563. Proof of Claim- The Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, are granted explicit authority from the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 to hinder and/or alter the Undersigned's God-granted right to plenary Life, Liberty and Pursuit of Happiness.

564. Proof of Claim- The Undersigned are fictions of law created by the Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, thereby creating a nexus and absolute authority over the same.

565. Proof of Claim- The Undersigned are an officer, agent, shareholder, franchise or fiduciary agent, a resident of, inhabitant of or domiciled in the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents.

566. Proof of Claim- The Undersigned are a vessel registered to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

567. Proof of Claim- The Undersigned are an actual and factual enemies of Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE of ... and LOCAL equivalents, and any and all derivatives thereof regardless of style, or any of its creations and liabilities.

568. Proof of Claim- The presumption that the Undersigned are any of the aforementioned 564-567, or any documentation implying the same absent a wet-ink signature/autograph, are Lawful and in explicit compliance to the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, and are not fraudulent, illusionary, a false representation of a matter of fact or a kind of artifice employed by the same for self-serving purposes.

569. PROOF OF CLAIM, that should the Defendants confess the injury(s) to the Undersigned, set, established, and agreed upon by the parties hereto within this, the Undersigned cannot exercise his "exclusive" remedy, being a Tort Claim and/or Private third party Judgment and other, for the wrongs committed by the Defendants, including but not limited to, "constitutional misapplication of the statute(s)," breach of this contractually binding agreement, conspiracy (two or more involved), denying your own "public policy," trespasses and moral wrongs committed by, and through, ultra vires acts not authorized/prohibited by the charter of the commercial vessel d.b.a. the THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, and other trespasses and moral wrongs, known and unknown.

570. PROOF OF CLAIM, the Defendants do not have the "duty" and "obligation" to produce the "Proofs Of Claim," as requested herein, pursuant to the principles and doctrines of "clean hands" and "good faith" dealings with the Undersigned, and applicable statute(s) as they operate upon Defendants as "office holders", i.e. officer(s)/agent(s), of the corporate Government juridical construct commercial vessel d.b.a. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ... and LOCAL equivalents/instrumentalities, by oath of office thereto, and contract therewith, as a voluntary commercial indenture therein, and thereto.

As our duly perfected and absolutely secured interest, title and share in the Creator's Creation, whether actual, constructive and/or implied, is at jeopardy, risk and being harmed, unlawfully being utilized in military, corporate, commercial, ecclesiastical, social, political, civil and/or other scheme(s) to operate and maintain a slavery system, for private and limited benefit, of and by real-man Living Souls and their created fictional entities, all self-proclaiming to be "looking out for our best interest", but as a matter of fact, matter of truth and matter of law, by every action and inaction, the same being detrimental and disadvantageous to both our assets and ourselves; Irreparable harm and injury of every nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format has been, and is being, attempted and/or accomplished.



CAVEAT

By the inability and/or refusal of the STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA to actually and factually support their aforementioned irrational, unlawful, un/non Constitutional claims, as is self-evident by their daily actions and/or inactions, Remedy is duly perfected, due and owing and should be immediately corrected via Private Law, without further hindrance and delay.

By the failure and/or refusal to correct these obvious and extremely serious violations of the alleged Supreme Law of the Land via violent, nefarious and fraudulent means, actions and inactions, the same will be utilized as actual and factual evidence of a continuing criminal enterprise by addressing the same matters in Superior Venues, and under Superior Jurisdictions and Law Forms. These violations and crimes can be corrected very simply via Private Law for the benefit and remedy of the Undersigned, and would be in full compliance with your respective duties and responsibilities agreed to individually by, under and through your respective Oaths of Office, a voluntary commercial indenture. Upon proper correction and remedy this can, and shall, serve as full indemnification and forgiveness of not only individual liability, but collective liability, as the STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA and/or THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Authorities

Genesis 1:26 - And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.

Genesis 1:28 - And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.

Genesis 2:7 - And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a Living Soul;

Genesis 2:24 - Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh.

Exodus 3:14 - And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM; and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the Children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.

Exodus 6:2-3 - And God spake unto Moses, and said unto him, I am the Lord;

And I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name of God Almighty, but by my name Jehovah was I not known to them.

Psalms 36:9 - For with thee is the foundation of life: in thy light shall we see light.

Psalms 82:6 - I have said, Ye are gods; and all of you are children of the most High.

Psalms 83:18 - That men may know that thou, whose name alone is Jehovah, art the most High over all the earth.

2 Timothy 2:3-4 - Thou therefore endure hardness, as a good soldier of Jesus Christ.

No man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of this life; that he may please Him who hath chosen him to be a soldier.

St. John 8:32 - And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.

St. John 8:44 - Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it.

St. John 8:58 - Jesus said unto them verily, verily, I say unto you, before Abraham was, I AM.

Ezekiel 44:24 - And in controversy they shall stand in judgment; and they shall judge it according to my judgments; and thy shall keep my laws and my statutes in all mine assemblies; and they shall hallow my sabbaths.

Judges 17:6 - In those days there was king in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes.

I Corinthians 3:16-17 - Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?

If any man shall defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy; for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are.

I Corinthians 6:1-10 - Dare any of you, having a matter against another, go to law before the unjust, and not before the saints?

Do ye not know that the saints shall judge the world? and if the world shall be judged by you, are ye unworthy to judge the smallest matters?

Know ye not that we shall judge angels? how much more things that pertain to this life?

If then ye have judgments of things pertaining to this life, set them to judge who are least esteemed in the church.

I speak to your shame. Is it so, that there is not a wise man among you? no, not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren?

But brother goeth to law with brother, and that before the unbelievers.

Now therefore there is utterly a fault among you, because ye go to law one with another. Why do ye not rather take wrong? why do ye not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?

Nay, ye do wrong, and defraud, and that your brethren.

Know ye not that the unrighteous shall not inherit the kingdom of God? Be not deceived: neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind,

Nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, shall inherit the kingdom of God.

I Corinthians 6:17 - But he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit.

I Corinthians 6:19-20 - What? Know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own?

For ye are bought with a price: Therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are God's.

I Corinthians 15:45 - And so it is written, the first man Adam was made a Living Soul; The last Adam was made a quickening spirit.

Acts 5:29 - Then Peter and the other apostles answered and said, we ought to obey God rather than men.

Acts 10:34-35 - Then Peter opened his mouth, and said, of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: But in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him.

Acts 22:28 - And the chief captain answered, with a great sum obtained I this freedom; And Paul said, But I was freeborn.

Romans 8:14-17 - For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.

For ye have not received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father.

The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God:



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And if children, then heirs; heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ; if so be that we suffer with him, that we may also be glorified together.

Romans 12:1-2 – I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service.

And be not conformed to this world: but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God.

Romans 13:8-10 – Owe no man anything, but to love one another: for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law.

For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not covet, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbor: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.

Ephesians 2:2 – Wherein in time past ye walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience:

Ephesians 2:18-19 – For through Him we both have access by one Spirit unto the Father.

Now therefore ye are no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow citizens with the saints, and of the household of God.

Ephesians 3:6 – That the Gentiles should be fellow heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of his promise in Christ by the gospel:

Ephesians 4:6 – One God and Father of All, who is above all, and through all, and in you all.

Ephesians 4:14 – That we henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro; and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive.

James 2:8 – If ye fulfil the royal law according to the scripture, thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, ye do well.

James 4:4 – Ye adulterers and adulteresses, know ye not that the friendship of the world is enmity with God? Whosoever therefore will be a friend of the world is the enemy of God?

James 4:12 – There is one lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy: who art thou that judgest another?

James 5:12 – But above all things, my brethren, swear not, neither by Heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath: but let your yea be yea; and your nay, nay; lest ye fall into condemnation.

St. Luke 6:31 – And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye to them likewise.

St. Luke 16:13 – No servant can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other, or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other; Ye cannot serve God and mammon.

St. Luke 19:8 – And Zacchaeus stood, and said unto the Lord: Behold, Lord, the half of my goods I give to the poor; and if I have taken anything from any man by false accusation, I restore him fourfold.

Galatians 3:26-29 – For ye are all the children of God by faith in Jesus Christ.

For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ;

There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female, for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.

And if ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise.

Galatians 4:6-7 – And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father.

Wherefore thou art no more a servant, but a son; and if a son, then an Heir of God through Christ.

Galatians 5:1 – Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage.

Galatians 5:14 – For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this; Thou shalt love thy neighbors as thyself.

I Thessalonians 4:6 – That no man go beyond and defraud his brother in any matter: because that the Lord is the avenger of all such, as we also have forewarned you and testified.

I John 3:1-2 – Behold, what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the sons of God: therefore the world knoweth us not, because it knew Him not.

Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is.

I John 2:15 – Love not the world, neither the things *that are* in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him.

I John 3:23-24 – And this is his commandment, That we should believe on the name of his Son Jesus Christ, and love one another, as he gave us commandment.

And he that keepeth His Commandments dwelleth in Him, and He in him. And hereby we know that He abideth in us, by the Spirit which He hath given us.

I John 4:7-8 – Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God, for God is love.

I John 4:12-13 – No man hath seen God at any time. If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and His love is perfected in us. Hereby know we that we dwell in Him, and He in us, because He hath given us of His Spirit.

I John 4:16 – And we have known and believed the love that God hath to us. God is love; and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him.

II Corinthians 3:17 – Now the Lord is that Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord *is*, there *is* liberty.

II Corinthians 5:20 – Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech *you* by us: we pray *you* in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God.

II Corinthians 6:16 – And what agreement hath the temple of God with idols? for ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will dwell in them, and walk in them; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people.

II Corinthians 6:18 – And will be a Father unto you, and ye shall be my sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty.

II Corinthians 13:1 – This is the third time I am coming to you. In the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every word be established.

Matthew 5:34-37 – But I say unto you, Swear not at all; neither by heaven; for it is God's throne:

Nor by the earth; for it is his footstool: neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great King.

Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black.

But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.



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Matthew 7:1-2 - Judge not, that ye be not judged.

For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.

Matthew 19:4-6 - And he answered and said unto them, Have ye not read, that he which made them at the beginning made them male and female,

And said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh?

Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.

Hebrews 13:4 - Marriage is honourable in all, and the bed undefiled: but whoremongers and adulterers God will judge.

Proverbs 1:22 - How long, ye simple ones, will ye love simplicity? and the scorers delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge?

Proverbs 11:15 - He that is surety for a stranger shall smart for it: and he that hateth suretyship is sure.

Proverbs 18:22 - Whoso findeth a wife findeth a good thing, and obtaineth favour of the LORD.

Mark 10:7 - For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife;

Mark 10:8 - And they twain shall be one flesh: so then they are no more twain, but one flesh.

Mark 10:9 - What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.

Colossians 1:16 - For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him, and for him:

Colossians 3:25 - But he that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong which he hath done: and there is no respect of persons.

I Timothy 1:8-10 - But we know that the law is good, if a man use it lawfully;

Knowing this, that the law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and for sinners, for unholy and profane, for murderers of fathers and murderers of mothers, for manslayers,

For whoremongers, for them that defile themselves with mankind, for menstealers, for liars, for perjured persons, and if there be any other thing that is contrary to sound doctrine;

1 Timothy 6:15 - Which in his times he shall shew, *who* is the blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings, and Lord of lords;

Leviticus 24:20 - Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth: as he hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again.

Titus 3:7-9 - That being justified by his grace, we should be made heirs according to the hope of eternal life.

This is a faithful saying, and these things I will that thou affirm constantly, that they which have believed in God might be careful to maintain good works. These things are good and profitable unto men.

But avoid foolish questions, and genealogies, and contentions, and strivings about the law; for they are unprofitable and vain.

Ecclesiastes 5:8 - If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of judgment and justice in a province, marvel not at the matter: for he that is higher than the highest regardeth; and there be higher than they.

Ecclesiastes 12:13 - Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man.

The entire compilation of words and letter combinations commonly known as the Holy Bible KING JAMES version is hereby restated in its entirety, and incorporated herein, as if set forth in full with plenary force, affect and effect.

Things do not change their ownership when captured by pirates and robbers.

Expect from others the same treatment that they receive from you.

Absolute power in all things lawful.

An accessory does not lead, but follows his principal.

External actions show the secret intentions.

An action is the right of prosecuting to judgment that which is one's due.

Acts indicate the intention.

An act done without my consent is not my act.

An admiralty court has no jurisdiction over those questions which are determined by the common law.

It is the duty of justices to administer justice to everyone seeking it from him.

Equity acts upon the person.

Equity supplies defects.

Equity remedies errors.

Equity is the correction of law, when too general, in the part in which it is defective.

Equity is a kind of perfect reason which interprets and amends the written law; comprehended in no code, but consistent with reason alone.

Equity assists ignorance, but not carelessness.

Jurisdiction is not confounded by equity.

Equity will not assist unless the occasion renders it necessary.

Equity does not regard the form and circumstance, but rather the substance of the act.

Equity is the daughter of truth, and the sister of goodness and justice

Equity desires by all means to arrive at the truth.

Equity desires the spoiled, the deceived, and the ruined, above all things, to have restitution.

What is just and right is the law of laws.

He who affirms, not he who denies, must bear the burden of proof.


He who affirms must prove.

To conceal is one thing, to be silent another.



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He who alleges contradictory- things is not to be heard.
An ambiguous answer shall be construed against him who offers it.
An argument from authority is very strong in law.
The laws permit the taking arms against the armed.
A twisting of language is unworthy of a judge.
He is guilty of barratry who for money barter justice.
It is the duty of a good judge to order judgment to be executed without delay.
A good judge decides according to justice and right, and prefers equity to strict law.
Necessary good is not good beyond the bounds of necessity.
Causes of dower, life, liberty, revenue, are among the favorable things in law.
The cause of the Church is equal to public causes; and for the best of reasons, it is the cause of religion.
Cease to reign, if you do not wish to adjudicate.
A charter concerning a thing not in existence avails not.
Those who sin secretly are punished more severely than those who sin openly.
A college or incorporated body can only exist by consent of the sovereign.
No man should derive any benefit from his own wrong.
An agreement avails no one unless he is a party or privy to it.
The law never permits anything contrary to truth.
A contract should be understood according to the intention of the parties, expressed in words.
A convention of private persons cannot affect public right.
The crime of treason exceeds all other crimes as to its punishment.
A human body is not susceptible of appraisement.
Gross negligence is equivalent to fraud.
Where the proofs of facts are present, what need is there of words?
Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their rights.
There may be damage without injury-
As to the proper name it is not to be regarded, where it errs not in substance; because names are changeable, but things are immutable.
Every man's house should be a perfectly safe refuge.
Laws assist the deceived, not the deceiving.
A delegated power cannot be delegated.
A delegate cannot delegate.
The power derived cannot be greater than that from which it is derived.
Delays in law are odious.
By fraud or dolo a contract perishes.
A deceiver deals in generalities.
Deceit and fraud shall excuse or benefit no man.
Deceit and fraud should always be remedied.
Wrongful intention is presumed against one engaged in an unlawful act.
To everyone his house is his surest refuge; or, every man's house is his castle.
The law gives no more than is demanded.
Right cannot die.
The effect follows the cause.
The proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon him who denies.
Specification of one thing is an exclusion of the rest.
In the same way in which anything is constituted, it may be destroyed.
Equity suffers not a right without a remedy.
An error which is not resisted is approved.
To refer errors to their principals is to refute them.
Violence may also put on the mask of the law.
The meeting of the minds of two or more in an agreement makes a contract.
From a wrong no contract can arise.
He who derives advantage from anyone should bear that person's obligations.
There is no plea against an action which entirely destroys the plea.
A foreigner has no lands, but only his personal effects, and life, and liberty.
Facts are more powerful than words.
An action of a judge, which relates not to his office, is of no force.
No proof is incumbent upon him who denies a fact.
False in one thing, false in all things.
Things favorably considered in law are, the treasury, dower, life, and liberty.
Felony is implied in every treason.
Let justice be done though the heavens fall.
Fiction yields to truth; where there is truth fiction of law does not exist.
Fraud binds, but does not dissolve, perjury.
It is a fraud to conceal a fraud.
Fraud and deceit should benefit no one.
Fraud and justice never dwell together.
Fraud lies hidden in general expressions.
Fraud is most hateful to law.




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He who offends against the law seeks in vain the help of the law.
Man is a term of nature; person, of the civil law.
Ignorance of those things which one is bound to know does not excuse.
Ignorance of the law excuses no one; for all are presumed to know those things to which all consent.
That which is not otherwise lawful, necessity makes lawful, and necessity makes a privilege which supersedes law.
Impunity invites to greater crimes.
No one may come into court with unclean hands.
In things obvious there is no room for conjecture.
In agreements the rule is to regard the intention of the contracting parties rather than their words.
In criminal cases the silence of a person present presumes consent; in civil cases sometimes that of the person absent, and even ignorant where his interest lies, does the same.
In favor of life, liberty, and innocence, all things are to be presumed.
In a legal fiction equity always exists.
He truly acts fraudulently who, observing the letter of the law, eludes its spirit.
In law all things are always judged from their present condition.
In criminal matters, the intention is regarded, not the event.
In all contracts whether named or not, an exchange is understood.
Equity is to be regarded in all things, but particularly in law.
In presence of the major the minor power ceases.
In a doubtful case the negative, rather than the affirmative, is to be understood.
One may do with his own as he pleases, if he does not invade the rights of others.
It is improper, unless the whole law be examined, to give judgment or advice upon a view of a single clause of it.
It is unlawful to judge of any part unless the whole sentence be examined.
The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another.
Infinity in law is reprehensible.
A man should not be benefited by his own wrong doing.
He is insane who, reason being thrown away, does everything with violence and rage.
A hidden intention is bad.
Among many things, you will even question laws and learned men.
Among equals no one is the more powerful.
The judge should decide according to the allegations and the proofs.
To a judge who exceeds his office no obedience is due.
It is the duty of a judge to decide according to the facts alleged and proved.
It is the duty of a judge to declare, not to make the law.
It is the duty of a judge to finish the work of each day within that day.
It is a decision to favor those things that favor religion, though words be wanting.
The laws of nature are unchangeable.
Jurors ought to be neighbors, of sufficient estate, and free from suspicion.
By the law of nature it is just that no one become more rich by the detriment and injury of another.
Civil law is that which each nation has established for itself.
Law is the science of the good and the just.
Law is a rule of right, and whatever is contrary to the rule of right, is an injury.
Right and fraud never dwell together.
Natural right is that which has the same power among all men.
The law of nature is properly the dictate of right reason, by which we know what is dishonest and what is honest; what should be done and what avoided.
It is not safe to obey him who has no right.
A public law cannot be changed by the agreement of private parties.
The form of taking an oath differs in words, yet agrees in meaning; for it ought to have this sense, that the Deity be invoked.
An oath made among others should neither harm nor profit.
Justice ought to be unbought, because nothing is more hateful than venal justice; free, for justice should not shut out; and quick, for delay is a sort of denial.
Justice is an excellent virtue, and pleasing to the Most High.
Justice should be denied to no one.
Justice is not to be denied, nor delayed.
Justice knows neither father nor mother; justice regards truth alone.
Where the law gives a thing, it gives a remedy to recover.
The law favors the life of & man.
Wilful negligence is equal to deceit.
Law favoereth honor and order.
Law favoereth justice and right.
Law favoereth life, liberty, and dower.
Law favoereth truth, faith, and certainty.
LAW HATETH WRONG.
The contract makes the law.
The law of God and the law of the land are all one.
Human laws are born, live, and die.
The laws of nature are perfect and immutable; but the condition of human law tends always to infinity, and there is nothing in it that can continue perpetually.
Laws should bind those who make them.
Laws aid the vigilant, not the negligent.



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Laws imposed by the state failing, we must act by the law of nature.
Fictions arise from the law, and not the law from fictions.
The law delights in equity; it covets perfection; it is a rule of right.
The law always abhors delays.
An unjust law is not a law.
The law works harm to no one, and does no one an injury.
The law forces not to impossibilities.
The law does not require that which is apparent to the court to be verified.
The law is the more praised when it is consonant to reason.
Law will always give a remedy.
The law always intends what is agreeable to reason.
The law regards the order of nature.
The law assists the ignorant.
The law speaks to all with one mouth.
Law assists the wakeful, not the sleeping.
Liberty is an inestimable thing.
Liberty is the right to alienate or restrain one's own right.
Liberty has no price.
Liberty is more favored than all things.
The civil laws reduce an ungrateful freeman to his original slavery; but the laws of England regard a man once manumitted as ever after free.
The body of a freeman does not admit of a valuation.
Everyone is free to ascertain for himself, or to have recourse to counsel.
Natural allegiance is restrained by no barriers, curbed by no bounds, compressed by no limits.
Long possession produces the right of possession, and takes away an action from the true owner.
Long time and long use, which exceeds the memory of man, suffices in law.
Speak as the ordinary people; think as the learned.
Great neglect is equivalent to fraud.
Evil deeds should not remain unpunished; and impunity affords continual incitement to the delinquent.
The more common an evil is, the worse.
Things manifest need no proof.
A maxim is so called because its dignity is chiefest, and its authority the most certain, and because it is universally approved by all.
Force and injury are chiefly contrary to peace.
It is better to suffer every wrong than to consent to wrong.
The term merchandise belongs to movable things only.
Men are not included under the name of merchandise.
He justly loses the benefit of the law who purposes to overturn the law itself.
He threatens the innocent who spares the guilty.
A minor cannot make oath.
Custom and agreement overrule law.
Monuments, which we call records, are the vestiges of truth and antiquity.
Delay is reproved by law.
A custom of the truest antiquity is to be retained.
We are ignorant of many things that would not be hidden from us if the readings of old authors were familiar to us.
Many things pertain not to human laws, but to divine jurisdiction.
Multiplicity and indistinctness produce confusion; and questions, the more simple they are, the more lucid.
Ten make a multitude.
A multitude of ignorant persons destroys a court.
Nature desires perfection; so does the law.
Where the Divinity is insulted the case is unpardonable.
That is necessary which cannot be otherwise.
Necessity makes that lawful which otherwise is not lawful.
Necessity gives a privilege with reference to private rights.
Necessity has no law.
Necessity is not restrained by law; since what otherwise is not lawful, necessity makes lawful.
Necessity defends what it compels.
Necessity overcomes the law; it breaks the chains of justice.
Denial cannot be proved.
No one may sue at law in the name of another.
No one does damage, unless he is doing what he has no right to do.
No one may be dragged from his own house.
No one should interfere in another's business— in nothing relating to him.
No one should be retained in partnership against his will.
No one should lose his property without his own act or negligence.
No one is beyond the law.
No one is relieved, or gains an advantage from his own proper deceit.
No one is held to act fraudulently who acts in exercise of his rights.
No man warring for God should be troubled by secular business.
No one can transfer to another a greater right than he has himself.



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No one can do by another what he cannot do by himself.
No man can fill two offices, or two dignities.
One is not present unless he understands.
No one is bound to expose himself to misfortunes and dangers.
Nothing is so contrary to consent as force and fear.
Nothing wicked is to be presumed.
We can do nothing against truth.
Nothing which is against reason is lawful.
Nothing similar is identical.
Nothing is so consonant to natural equity, as that the same thing be dissolved by the same means by which it was bound.
Nothing is so becoming to authority, as to live according to the law.
Nothing is useful or honorable that is contrary to law.
He who errs does not consent.
He who does not defend himself when present is considered as submitting.
Nothing is so consonant to natural equity, as that the same thing be dissolved by the same means by which it was bound.
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Nothing is useful or honorable that is contrary to law.
He who errs does not consent.
He who does not defend himself when present is considered as submitting.
There is no stronger link among men than an oath.
The affairs of the republic should not be delegated to improper persons.
It is not law but servitude to be held by what we have not consented to.
Names of things should be understood according to common usage, not according to the opinions of individuals.
You are not to do evil that good may come of it.
Not what is said, but what is done, is to be regarded.
It matters not what is known to the judge, if it be not known to him judicially.
It matters not if a revocation is made by word or deed.
Those who err are not considered as consenting.
He does not appear to have retained consent who has changed anything through the menaces of a party threatening.
It matters not what is known to the judge, if it be not known to him judicially.
It matters not if a revocation is made by word or deed.
Those who err are not considered as consenting.
He does not appear to have retained consent who has changed anything through the menaces of a party threatening.
There is no loss without a remedy.
No one shall obtain an advantage by his own wrong.
No one shall be called a principal felon except the party actually committing the felony, or the party present, aiding and abetting in its commission.
No man can forfeit the right of another.
Every law has either been created by consent, or established by necessity, or confirmed by custom.
Every word sincerely spoken constitutes an obligation.
All men are either freemen or slaves.
All shall have liberty to renounce those things which have been established in their favor.
All things are to be presumed against a wrong doer.
All contracts made under a law, perish under a contrary law.
Every dishonorable contract is odious to the laws.
There is no disputing against or denying principles.
Every definition in law is dangerous, for there is but little that can not be overthrown.
Once a fraud, always a fraud.
A thing certain must be brought to judgment.
Laws should be short, that they may be more easily comprehended by the ignorant.
The best evidence of the matter will prevail.
The origin of a thing ought to be regarded.
Violence and injury- are especially contrary to peace.
Contracts which are not against law, and do not originate in fraud, are in all respects to be observed.
Agreements give the law to the contract.
That contracts which are made against law or against good morals, have no force, is a principle of undoubted law.
Mutual contracts bind either both parties, or neither one.
Unequal things ought not to be joined.
Word of mouth flies away, things written remain.
By a contract something is permitted, which, without it, could not be admitted.
An equal has no power over an equal.
Like things unite with like.
Crimes against nature are the most heinous.
He adds sin to sin who, when he commits an offense, joins the protection of a defense.
Let one perish, rather than all.
They are perjured, who, preserving the words of an oath, deceive the ears of those who receive it.
It is a perpetual law that no human or positive law can be perpetual.
The law is opposed to perpetuities.
Plain truths need not to be proved.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

Let full and speedy justice be done to the parties.
Several persons cannot each have, at the same time, an equal right to the same thing.
Politics are to be adapted to the laws, and not the laws to politics.
Possession is a good title where no better title appears.
A power is to be strictly interpreted.
Supreme power can dissolve, but cannot bind itself.
The presence of the body cures error in the name.
There is no doubt that the rights of others cannot be prejudiced by private agreement.
An agreement of private individuals cannot derogate from public law.
One privileged person cannot plead his privilege against another privileged person.
Proofs ought to be evident, that is, clear and easily understood.
Things which are taken from enemies immediately become the property of the captors.
Things which hold the place of accessories are extinguished when the principal things are destroyed.
Words spoken to one end, should not be perverted to another.
Things which are done between others, ought not to injure a person, but may benefit him.
Things which are forbidden in the nature of things are confirmed by no law.
Things which afford a ground of action, if raised within a certain time, may be pleaded at any time, by way of exception.
Every jurisdiction has its own limits.
To investigate is the way to know what things are really true.
He who reaps the advantage, must also bear the disadvantage.
Let him who accuses be of clear fame, and not criminal.
He who acquires for himself, acquires for his heirs.
He who gives an end gives the means necessary to that end.
He who overthrows the cause, overthrows the future consequence.
He who commits fraud, acts in vain.
He who has jurisdiction to loosen, has jurisdiction to bind.
He who uses his own right harms no one.
He who acts badly, hates the light.
He who commands, is held to have done the thing himself.
He who proves most, recovers most.
He who does not blame, approves.
He who does not freely speak truth, is a betrayer of the truth.
He who does not prevent what he can prevent, is considered as doing the thing.
He who does not forbid when he can forbid, commands.
He who does not repel a wrong when he can, occasions it.
He who spares the guilty punishes the innocent.
He who does anything through another, is regarded as doing it himself.
He who first offends causes the strife.
They who seek a reason for everything, subvert reason.
He who is once bad is presumed to be always bad in the same degree.
He who experiences the benefit ought to bear the burden.
He who is silent appears to consent.
That which is not valid at the beginning, improves not by lapse of time.
All men are equal as far as the natural law is concerned.
What otherwise is good and just, if it be sought by force and fraud, becomes bad and unjust.
What I approve I do not reject.
What otherwise was not lawful, necessity makes lawful.
What appears clearly, need not be proved.
What appears to the court needs not the help of witnesses.
What is done contrary to law is regarded as not done.
That which is of necessity, is never introduced except when necessary.
What is inconvenient or contrary to reason is not allowed in law.
What is necessary is lawful.
What is done without counsel, we revoke upon consideration.
Time cannot render valid an act void in its origin.
What is mine cannot be taken away without my consent.
What necessity compels, it justifies.
That which does not appear, does not exist.
That which is not good in its principal, will not be good as to accessories or consequences.
That which is ours cannot be lost or transferred to another without our own act, or our own fault.
That which belongs to no one is by natural reason, given to the occupant.
What I cannot do by myself, I cannot do by another.
What is first is true; and what is first in time is best in law.
Let everyone employ himself in what he knows.
Where choice is once made it cannot be disapproved any longer.
What is understood, is not wanting.
That person should be chosen who best understands, and is willing and able to perform the duty of the office.
In whatever manner a thing is constituted, in the same manner it is dissolved.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

When the interpretation between liberty and slavery is doubtful, the decision must be in favor of liberty.

Things taken in war go to the state.

Ratification is equal to a command.

Reason is the formal cause of custom.

Reason is a ray of divine light.

Reason in law is perfect equity.

Reason is not confined to any place.

Records are the traces of antiquity and of truth.

We must have recourse to what is extraordinary when what is ordinary fails.

To restore, is to give back nothing but what was taken.

The property in a thing deposited, and the possession thereof, remains in the depositor.

A mandate of an illegal thing is void.

Of things relating to each other, one being known, the other is known.

Remedies for rights are ever favorably extended.

Every one is the manager and disposer of his own affairs.

Things done between strangers ought not to injure those who are not parties to them.

Matters adjudged in a cause do not prejudice those who were not parties to it.

A thing is private which is not common.

A thing sacred admits of no valuation.

Reservation and protest do not create a right, but protect a right.

The right of the grantor being extinguished, the right granted is extinguished.

When the right of the giver becomes void, the right of the receiver ceases.

Let the principal answer.

The answer of one witness shall not be heard at all.

A traitor is punished, that one may die lest all perish.

Rights never die.

A sacrilegious person transcends the cupidity and wickedness of all other robbers.

In many counselors there is safety.

Equal knowledge on both sides makes the contracting parties equal.

A wrong is not done to one who knows and wills it.

You ought to know with whom you contract.

The presumption is always in favor of the one who denies.

He who does not prohibit the intervention of another in his behalf, is supposed to authorize it.

The male sex always includes the female.

A sentence passed by one who is not a judge should not harm any one.

Power should follow justice, not precede it.

Slavery is an institution by the law of nations, by which a man is subjected to a foreign master, contrary to nature.

If any one of certain required forms be wanting, when equity requires, it will be aided.

If there be no inference which leads to a different result, words are to be understood according to their proper meaning, not in a grammatical, but in a popular and ordinary sense.

Silence shows consent.

Laws are silent amidst arms.

The hope of impunity holds out a continual temptation to crime.

A presumption shall stand until the contrary is proved.

An affirmative statute does not take from the common law.

Remove the foundation, the work falls.

The greatest charity is to do justice to individuals, and at any time whenever it may be necessary.

That is the highest law which favors religion.

That reason is strongest which operates in favor of religion.

The higher the law, the greater the injury. The higher the law, the higher the punishment.

Suppression of the truth is equal to the expression of the false.

Suppression of the truth equals the suggestion of the false.

Supreme power can dissolve itself.

Evidences are to be weighed, not numbered.

The husband and wife are but one person in the law.

The law favors a thing which is of necessity.

The law favors works of charity, right, and truth; and abhors fraud, covin, and uncertainties which obscure the truth, contrarieties, delays, unnecessary circumstances, and such like.

The owner of property is not divested of his title by a larceny of it.

Things are dissolved as they are contracted.

Things grounded upon an ill and void beginning cannot have a good perfection.

Things of a higher nature determine things of a lower nature.

Three things needful and pertaining to every deed are, writing, sealing, and delivery.

A title is the just right of possessing that which is our own.

Tort is contrary to the law.

Where transgression is multiplied, let the infliction of punishment be increased.

Three form a corporation.

Trusts survive.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

When an ordinary remedy ceases to be of service, recourse must be had to an extraordinary one.
Where there is culpability, there ought the punishment to be undergone.
Where there is a right, there is a remedy.
When the law fails to serve as a rule, almost everything should be suspected.
Where there is no authority to enforce, there is no necessity to obey.
Where there is no manifest injustice, the judges are to be considered as honest men, and their judgment as truth.
Where there is an injury, there a loss follows.
One ought not to take advantage of his own wrong.
One person can scarcely supply the places of two.
The answer of one witness shall not be heard at all.
Every obligation is dissolved in the same manner in which it is contracted.
Usury is odious in law.
He is not considered to consent, who obeys the orders of his father or master.
Plain truths need not be proved.
Words should be regarded, not the speaker.
Where there is no ambiguity, words stand as written.
The truth of the description removes the error of the name.
Truth fears nothing but concealment.
The truth of the name removes the error of description.
Truth which is not sufficiently defended, is oppressed.
He who does not speak the truth freely, is a traitor to the truth.
The laws serve the vigilant, and not those who sleep.
It is lawful to repel force by force; but let it be done with the moderation of blameless defense; not to take revenge, but to repel injury.
Void things are as no things.
Words spoken vanish; words written remain.
The voice of the people is the voice of God.
When an agreement is reduced to writing, all previous treaties are resolved into that.
When the foundation fails, all fails.
When the law gives anything, it gives a remedy for the same.
Wife cannot be produced a witness for or against her husband, for they are two souls in one flesh.

Notice and Cognizance Required In Application to your Fictional Realm only

Cestui Que Vie Act of 1666 and all amendments thereto
Constitution for the United States of America c1819
Declaration of Independence c1776
Treaty of Paris 1783
Articles of Confederation
Blackstone Commentaries

1. [See: Black & White Taxi Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533; 72 L.Ed. 681, 38 S Ct 404 (1928), which states: "Law in the sense in which the courts speak of it today, does not exist without some definite authority behind it."]
6. [See: Borden v. State, 11 Ark. 519, 526 (1851), which states: "Man's laws are strength-less before Jehovah the Living God's Law, consequently a law, directly contrary to the law of Jehovah the Living God, would be an absolute nullity."]
8. [See: United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 172, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733, 85 S Ct 850 (1965), which states: "There is a higher loyalty than loyalty to this country, loyalty to Jehovah the Living God."]
14. [See: Gibson v. State, 214 Ala. 38, 106 So. 231, 235]; i.e., into a complete system of positive law, scientifically ordered, and promulgated (i.e., to publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory [See: Price v. Supreme Home of the Ancient Order of Pilgrims, 285 S.W. 310, 312 (Tex.Com.App.))] by legislative authority of the statutes/laws of a State and/or the United States of America; and specifically the United States Code and specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9TH, 1933 AND Titles 4, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 28 and 42 thereof as employed and used within the above referenced alleged Criminal Case/Cause, is not a redrafting and simplification of the entire body of a statute which effects a revision, and a complete restatement of the law which is then substituted - i.e. put in place of the former; exchanged, serving in lieu of and displaces and repeals the former law as it stood relating to the subjects within its purview. [See: MacLean v. Brodigan, 41 Nev. 468, 172 P. 375; Elite Laundry Co. v. Dunn, 126 W.Va. 858, 30 S.E.2d 454, 458]; and, is not drastically different in nature and scope that a mere compilation. [Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Meek, 171 S.W.2d 41, 43-44 (Ky. 1943), which states: "A compilation is merely an arrangement and classification of the legislation of a state in the exact form in which it was enacted, with no change in language. It does not require a legislative action in order to have the effect it is intended to have. A revision, on the other hand, contemplates a redrafting and simplification of the entire body of a statute. A revision is a complete restatement of the law. It requires enactment by the legislature in order to be effective..."]
19. [See: Eastman Kodak Co. v. Richards, 204 N.Y.S. 246, 248, 123 Miscel. 83]; to deliberate about and ponder over [See: People v. Tru-Sport Pub. Co., 291 N.Y.S. 449, 457, 160 Miscel. 628] [See: Constitution of/for the United States of America (1789, as amended 1791) Art. I, § 7, cl. 1, 2, 3; Harvey Walker, Law Making in the United States, N.Y., 1934, p. 272, which states: "The usual practice is to introduce the revision [of statutes] as a single bill. Obviously, however, the members of the legislature cannot give such a comprehensive measure adequate consideration. It is almost as difficult for a committee to do so."] [...in pari materia to all other state constitutions.]
21. [See: State v. Mauer, 164 S.W. 551, 552, 255 Mo. 152 (1914), which states: "... revisers have no legislative authority, and are therefore powerless to lessen or expand the letter or meaning of the law."]
22. [See: Harvey Walker, supra, ibid. at 19, p. 316, which states: "The three essential parts of every bill or law is: (1) the title, (2) the enacting clause, and (3) the body."]
23. [See: Joiner v. State, 155 S.E.2d 8, 10, 223 Ga. 367 (1967), NOTE: This case/cause arose in Georgia state whose Constitution contains no express provisions for the use and employment of an enacting clause just as the United States Constitution does not contain such an express provision; Ferrill v. Keel, 151 S.W. 269, 272, 105



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

Ark. 380 (1912); State v. Reilly, 95 Atl. 1005, 1006, 88 N.J.Law 104 (1915); Harvey Walker, supra, ibid at 19, p. 346, which states: "The enacting clause is a short formal statement, appearing after the title, indicating that all which follows is to become law, and giving the authority by which the law is made. There is no excuse for not using it."; Title 1 USC § 101] [...and pari materia to all other state constitutions.]

25. [See: 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 93, which states: "The almost unbroken custom for centuries has been to preface laws with a statement in some form declaring the enacting authority. The purpose of an enacting clause of a statute is to identify it as an act of legislation by expressing on its face the authority behind the law."; Sjoberg v. Security Savings & Loan Ass'n, 73 Minn. 203, 212-213 (1898), which states: "Written laws, in all times and all centuries, whether the edicts of absolute monarchs, decrees of King and Council, or the enactments of representative bodies, have almost invariably, in some form, expressed upon their face the authority by which they were promulgated or enacted. The almost unbroken Custom for Centuries has been to preface laws with a statement in some form declaring the enacting authority."; State v. Burrow, 104 S.W. 526, 529, 119 Tenn. 376 (1907), which states: "The propriety of an enacting clause in conformity to this ancient usage was recognized by several states of the Union after the American Revolution, when they came to adopt constitutions for their Governments, and without exception, so far as we can ascertain, express provision was made for the form to be used by the legislative department of the state in enacting laws."; cf. Title 1 USC § 101; Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 170 S.W. 171, 175, 160 Ky. 745 (1914); State v. Kozier, 239 P. 805, 807 (Oregon 1925); Joiner v. State, 155 S.E.2d 8, 9, 223 Ga. 367 (1967); City of Carlyle v. Nicolay 165 N.E. 211, 216-217 (Ill. 1929); Cane v. Robbins, 131 P.2d 516, 518, 61 Nev. 416 (1942), which states: "A declaration of the enacting authority in law is a usage and custom of great antiquity... and a compulsory observance of it is found in sound reason."; Ruling Case Law, vol. 25, Statutes, § 22, p. 776, which states: "In recognition of this custom [of using an enacting clause], it has sometimes been declared that an enacting clause is necessary to the validity of a statute, though there no provision in the fundamental law requiring such a clause."; Cushing's Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (1819), § 2102, which states: "(2) Where the enacting words are not prescribed by a constitutional provision, the enacting authority must notwithstanding be stated, and any words which do this to a common understanding are doubtless sufficient, or the words may be prescribed by rule. In this respect much must depend on usage." 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 65, p. 104, which states: "Although there is no constitutional provision requiring an enacting clause, such a clause has been held to be requisite to the validity of a legislative enactment."; Harry Bettenson, Documents of the Christian Church, 2nd ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1963, p. 65; Select Documents of the English Constitutional History, edited by G. Adams and H. Stephens, MacMillan Co., London, 1926, p. 68, 124; Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, Washington, 1909, vol. I, p. 46; (George III, 1792) 32 George III.c.60; Documents of American History, edited by Henry S. Commager, Appleton, N.Y., 1949, p.13, op. cit., p. 40]

26. [See: Nevada v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250, 255, 256 (1875); approved: Caine v. Robbins, 131 P.2d 516, 518, 61 Nev. 416 (1942)]

27. [See: Morgan v. Murray, 328 P.2d 644, 654 (Mont. 1958), which states: "The enacting clause of a bill goes to the substance of that bill, it is not merely procedural."]

28. [See: Scudder v. Smith 331 Pa. 165, 200 A. 601, 604; McDowell v. People, 68 N.E. 379, 204 Ill. 499; Conley v. Texas Division of United Daughters of the Confederacy, Tex.Civ.App. 164 S.W. 24, 26; Ex parte Hague, 104 N.J.Eq. 31, 144 A. 546, 559; Chicago & N.P.R. Co. v. City Of Chicago, 51 N.E. 596, 598 (Ill. 1898); Village of Altamont v. Baltimore & O.S.W. Ry. Co., 56 N.E. 340, 341, 184 Ill. 47; Van Hovenberg v. Holeman, 144 S.W.2d 718, 721, 261 Ark. 370 (1940); 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 3, p.270, cases cited.]

29. [See: In re Seat of Government, 1 Wash. Ter. 115, 123 (1861), which states: "Strip this act of its outside appendages, leave it 'solitary and alone,' is it possible for any man to tell by what authority the seat of Government of Washington Territory was to be removed from Olympia to Vancouver? The [...] fact that the constitutions of so many states, made and perfected by the wisdom their greatest legal lights, contain a statement of an enacting clause, in which the power of the enacting authority is incorporated, is to our minds a strong, and powerful argument of its necessity. It is fortified and strengthened by the further fact that Congress, and other states, to say nothing of the English Parliament, have, by almost unbroken custom and usage, prefaced all their laws with some set form of words, in which is contained the enacting authority. Guided by the authority of such eminent jurists as Blackstone, Kent, and Cushing, and the precedents of national and state legislation, the Court arrives with satisfaction and consciousnesses of right in declaring, that where an act like the one now under consideration, is wanting in the essential formalities and solemnities which have been mentioned, it is inoperative and void, and of no binding force or effect."]

30. [See: State v. Naftalin, 74 N.W.2d 249, 261, 246 Minn. 181 (1956); Cunningham v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 66 S.W.2d 765, 773 (Tex.Civ.App.), which states: "Face has been defined as the surface of anything; especially the front, upper, or outer part of surface; that which particularly offers itself to the view of a spectator." cf. In re Stoneman, 146 N.Y.S. 172, 174, which states: "The face of an instrument is shown by the language employed without any modification or addition from extrinsic facts of evidence."]

31. [See: Preckel v. Byrne, 243 N.W. 823, 826, 62 N.D. 356 (1932), which states: "The purpose of an enacting in legislation is to express in the face of the legislation itself the authority behind the act and identify it as an act of legislation." State v. Burrow, 104 S.W. 526, 529, 119 Tenn. 376 (1907), which states: "The purpose of provisions of this character [enacting clauses] is that all statutes may bear upon their faces a declaration of the sovereign authority by which they are enacted and declared to be the law, and to promote and preserve uniformity in legislation. Such clauses also import a command of obedience and clothe the statute with a certain dignity, believed in all times to command respect and aid in the enforcement of law."; People v. Dettenhalwer, 77 N.W. 450, 451, 118 Mich. 595 (1898), citing: Swan v. Bank 40 Miss. 268 (1866), which states: "It is necessary that every law should show on its face the authority by which it is adopted and promulgated, and that it should clearly appear that it is intended by the legislative power that enacts it that it should take effect as law."; Sjoberg v. Security Saving & Loan Ass'n, 73 Minn. 203, 213, 75 N.W. 1116 (1898), which states: "If an enacting clause is useful and important, if it is desirable that laws shall bear upon their face the authority by which they are enacted, so that people who are to obey them need not search legislative and other records to ascertain the authority."; Vinsant, Adm'x v. Knox 27 Ark. 266, 284, 285 (1871), which states: "[A] legislative act, when made, should be a written expression of the legislative will, in evidence, not only of the passage, but of the authority of the law-making power, is nearly or quite a self-evident proposition. Likewise, we regard it as necessary that every act, thus expressed, should show on its face the authority by which it was enacted and promulgated, in order that it should clearly appear, upon simple inspection of the written law, that it was intended by the legislative power, which enacted it, that it should take effect as law. These relate to the legislative authenticity of the legislative will. These are features by which courts of justice and the public are to judge of its authenticity and validity. These then, are essentials of the weightless importance, and the requirements of their observance, in the enacting and promulgation of laws, are imperative. Not the least important of these essentials is the style or enacting clause."]

33. [See: Joiner v. State, 155, S.E.2d 8, 10, 223 Ga. 367 (1967), in which the Supreme Court of Georgia; a State whose Constitution contains no express provision for using and employing enacting clauses upon the face of "bills/laws"; nevertheless, in considering an act containing no enacting clause, held the act to be: "...a nullity and of no force and effect as law.", for its lack/want of an enacting clause.; cf. Walden v. Town of Whigham, 48 S.E. 159, 120 Ga. 646 (1904); In re Swartz, 27 P. 839, 840, 47 Man. 157 (1891), which states: "The publication of an act of the legislature, omitting the enacting clause or any other essential part thereof, is no publication in law. The law not being in force when the indictment was found against the petitioner, nor when the acts complained of therein were done, the petitioner could not have been guilty of any crime under its provisions, and is therefore, so far as this indictment is concerned, entitled to his discharge."; State v. Kearns, 623 P.2d 507, 509, 229 Kan. 207 (1981), which states: "In [the case of] In re Swartz, Petitioner, 47 Kan. 157, 27 P. 839 (1891), this court found the act in question was invalid because it had been mistakenly published without an enacting clause. We again adhere to the dictates of the opinion."; Ruling Case Law, vol. 25, Statutes, § 133, p. 884, citing: L.R.A. 1915B, p. 1065, which states: "The publication of a statute without the enacting clause is no publication."; Commonwealth v. Illinois R. Co., 170 S.W. 171, 175, 160 Ky. 745 (1914), which states: "It will be noticed that the act does not contain an enacting clause.... The alleged act or law in question is unnamed; it shows no sign of authority; it carries with it no evidence that the General Assembly or any other lawmaking power is responsible or answerable for it."]



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

35. [See: Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Banks-Baldwin Law Pub., Cleveland 1948, p. 955] does change or effect anything regarding the nature of the statute/law contained therein aside from its weight of evidence; i.e., as "legal evidence," of the law therein. [See: United States v. Zuger, 602 F.Supp. 889, 891 (1984); Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 (C.A. 9 (Ariz.) 1985)]
38. [See: Hornick v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 161 A. 75, 77, 307 Pa. 264; Oko v. Krzyzanowski, 27 A.2d 414, 419, 150 Pa. Super. 205]
41. [See: Cane v. Robbins, 131 P.2d 516 518 (Nev. 1942), which states: "[N]othing becomes a law simply and solely because men who possess the legislative power will that it shall be, unless they express their determination to that effect, in the mode pointed out by the instrument which invests them with power, and under all the forms which that instrument has rendered essential."; Vinsant Adm'x v. Knox, 27 Ark. 266, 277 (1871), which states: "These rules and solemnities, whether derived from the common law or prescribed by the Constitution, which are of the essentials of lawmaking, must be observed and complied with, and, without such observance and compliance, the will of the legislature can have no validity as law."]
44. [See: Title 1 USC § 101]
45. [See: Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1883, p. 493, which states: "The proceedings in any court are void if it wants jurisdiction of the case in which it has assumed to act. Jurisdiction is, first, of the subject-matter; and, second, of the persons whose rights are to be passed upon."; 21 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, § 338, p. 558, which states: "To try a person for the commission of a crime, the trial court must have jurisdiction of both the subject-matter and the person of the defendant."]
46. [See: State v. Brown, 64 S.W.2d 841, 849 (Tenn. 1933), which states: "Personal jurisdiction, or the authority to judge a person, is primarily one of venue or procedure. Generally, if one is standing in a court, it has some degree of jurisdiction over the person. Thus, if one is named in suit, but is 'absent' from court by being either in prison or by escape, there is a want of jurisdiction over the person, and the Court cannot proceed with the trial."]
47. [See: Smith v. State, 148 S. 858, 860 (Ala. App. 1933); State v. Smith, 70 A.2d 175, 177, 7 N.J.Super. 85 (1949)]
48. [See: Stilwell v. Markman, 10 P.2d 15, 16 (Kan. 1932), which states: "The subject-matter of a criminal offense is the crime itself. Subject-matter in its broadest sense means the cause; the object, the thing in dispute."; Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Ed., 1968, p. 53 at ACTUAL, which states: "Real; substantial; existing presently in act, having a valid objective [of/or having to do with a material object as distinguished from a mental concept; having actual existence of reality] existence [as opposed to artificial; e.g. corporations, L.L.C.s, franchises, ens legis entities existing only in contemplation of/or by force of law; i.e., in the mind only, a mental concept, and its "by-laws" which are; ipso facto, artificial laws of the artificial entity existing only in contemplation of/or by force of law, a mental concept] as opposed to that which is merely theoretical or possible... Something real, in opposition to constructive or speculative." NOTE: bracketed material added by the Undersigned.]
49. [See: Brown v. State, 37 N.E.2d 73, 77 (Ind. 1941), which states: "Jurisdiction over the subject matter of action is essential to power of court to act, and is conferred only by constitution or by valid statute."]
50. [See: 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 157, p. 189, citing: People v. Katrinak, 185 Cal.Rptr. 869, 136 Cal.App.2d 145 (1982), which states: "If a criminal statute is unconstitutional, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and cannot proceed to try the case."]
51. [See: Kelley v. Meyers, 263 P. 903, 905 (Ore. 1928), which states: "If these sections are unconstitutional, the law is void and an offense created by them is not a crime and a conviction under them cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment, for no court can acquire jurisdiction to try a person for acts which are made criminal only by an unconstitutional law."; State v. Christensen, 329 N.W.2d 382, 383, 110 Wis.2d 538 (1983), which states: "Where the offense charged does not exist, the trial court lacks jurisdiction."; cf. State ex rel. Hansen v. Rigg, 104 N.W.2d 553, 258 Minn. 388 (1960)]
52. [See: Singleton v. Commonwealth, 208 S.W.2d 325, 327, 306 Ky. 454 (1948), which states: "The law creates courts and defines their powers. Consent cannot authorize a judge to do what the law has not given him the power to do."; cf. Brown v. State, 37 N.E.2d 73, 77 (Ind. 1941); 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 339, p. 589, which states: "Jurisdiction of the subject matter is derived from the law. It can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. Objection to the court over the subject matter may be argued at any stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such an objection is never waived."; cf. Harris v. State, 82 A.2d 387, 389, 46 Del. 111 (1950); Matter of Green, 313 S.E.2d 193, 195 (N.C.App. 1984), which states: "It is elementary that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter of the action is the most critical aspect of the court's authority to act. Without it, the court lacks any power to proceed; therefore, a defense based upon this lack cannot be waived and may be asserted at any time. Accordingly, the appellant may raise the issue of jurisdiction over the matter for the first time on appeal although they initially failed to raise the issue before the trial court."; cf. Monaco v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 514 F.Supp. 357 (D.C. PA 1981); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531 (1970); Athens Community Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker, 686 F.2d 989 (1982); Edwards on Behalf of Nagel v. Department of the Army, 545 F.Supp. 328 (1982); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd., 494 F.Supp. 1161 (D.C.PA 1980); Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 494 F.2d 906, 910; Hill Top Developers v. Holiday Pines Service Corp., 478 So.2d 368 (Fla.2d DCA 1985); People v. McCarty, 445 N.E.2d 298, 304, 94 Ill.2d 28 (1983), (cases cited), which states: "Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by a guilty plea if it does not otherwise exist.... The guilty plea or verdict must confess some punishable offense to form the basis of a sentence. The effect of a plea or verdict of guilty is a record admission of whatever is well alleged in the indictment. If the latter is insufficient the plea or verdict confesses nothing."]
53. [See: State v. Dungan, 718 P.2d 1010, 1014, 149 Ariz. 357 (1985), which states: "When a criminal defendant is indicted under a not-yet-effective statute, the charging document is void."; cf. 42 C.J.S., Indictments and Information, § 1, p. 833; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 324, p. 390, which states: "The want of a sufficient affidavit, complaint, or information goes to the jurisdiction of the court, ...and renders all proceedings prior to filing of a proper instrument void ab initio."; Ex parte Waldo, 286 P. 765, 766 (Okla. 1930), which states: "The allegations in the instrument or information determines the jurisdiction of the court."; People v. Hardiman, 347 N.W.2d 460, 462, 132 Mich. App. 382 (1984); 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 157, p. 188, citing: People v. McCarty, 445 N.E.2d 298, 94 Ill.2d 28, which states: "Where an information charges no crime, the court lacks jurisdiction to try the accused, and a motion to quash the information or charge is always timely."; Honomichi V. State, 333 N.W.2d 797, 798 (S.D. 1983), which states: "Without a formal and sufficient indictment or information, a court does not acquire subject matter jurisdiction and thus an accused may not be punished for a crime."]
54. [See: Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Ed. (1968), p. 1131 at "MAY," case cites given.]
55. [See: Hooker v. Boles, 345 F.2d 285, 286 (1965), which states: "[N]o authority needs to be cited for the proposition that, when a court lacks jurisdiction, any judgment rendered by it is void and unenforceable, ...and without any force and effect whatever."; cf. Honomichi v. State, 333 N.W.2d 797, 799 (S.D. 1983); 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 18, p. 25, which states: "Where judicial tribunals have no jurisdiction of subject matter, the proceedings are void."; cf. People v. McKinnon, 326 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Mich. App. 1985); Elna Pfeffer, et al v. Alvin Meissner, et al., 286 S.W.2d 241 (1955); State ex rel. Latty, 907 S.W.2d 486; United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc. 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990); Puphal v. Puphal, 105 Ida. 647; Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990); Wahl v. Round Valley Bank, 38 Ariz. 411, 300 P. 955 (1931); Tube City Mining & Milling Co. v. Otterson, 16 Ariz. 305, 146 P. 203 (1914); Milliken v. Mayer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1940); Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A.7 Ill. 1999); Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell, 110 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); F.R.Civ.P., Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.; Klugh v. U.S., 620 F.Supp. 892 (D.S.C. 1985) City of Los Angeles v. Morgan, 234 P.2d 319 (Cal.App. 1951); Ward v. Terrier, 386 P.2d 350 (Colo. 1963); Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 330 P.2d 116, cert. den. 79 S.Ct. 609, 359 U.S. 926, 3 L.Ed.2d 629 (Colo. 1958); People v. Wade, 506 N.W.2d 954 (Ill. 1987). Eckel v. MacNeal, 628 N.E.2d 741 (Ill.App. 1993); People v. Sales, 551 N.E.2d 1359 (Ill.App. 1990); Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 452 N.E.2d 1383: (Ill.App. 1983); Matter of Marriage of Welliver, 869 P.2d 653 (Kan 1994); In re Estate of Wells, 983 P.2d 279 (Kan 1999); Lange v. Johnson, 204 N.W.2d 205 (Minn. 1973); Mills v. Richardson, 81 S.E.2d (N.C. 1954); State v. Blankenship, 675 N.E.2d 1303 (Ohio App. 1996); State v. Richie, 20 S.W.2d 624 (Tenn.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

2000); State ex rel. Dawson v. Bomar, 354 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. 1962); Underwood v. Brown, 214 S.W.2d 168 (Tenn. 1951); Richardson v. Mitchell, 237 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. App. 1950); State ex rel. Turner v. Briggs, 971 P.2d 581 (Wash. 1999); In re Adoption of E.L., 733 N.E.2d 846 (Ill. App. 2000); B & C Investments, Inc. v. F & M Nat. Bank & Trust, 903 P.2d 339 (Okla. 1995); People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 664 N.E.2d 66 (Ill. App. 1994)]

56. [See: Fewell v. Fewell, 23 Cal.2d 431, 144 P.2d 592, 594] [See: State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484 486 (Tex 1995); Mapco, Inc. v. Forest, 795 S.W.2 700, 703 (Tex. 1990); Elna Pfeffer et al. v. Alvin Meissner, et al. 286 S.W.2d 241 (1955); Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A.7 (Ill) 1999); People v. Wade, 506 N.W.2d 954 (Ill. 1987); People v. Sales, 551 N.E.2d 1359 (Ill.App. 1959); People v. Rolland, 581 N.E.2d 907 (Ill. App. 1991); State v. Richie, 20 S.W.2d 624 (Tenn. 2000); Rook v. Rook, 353 S.E.2d 756 (Va. 1987); State ex rel. Turner v. Briggs, 971 P.2d 581 (Wash. 2000); In re Adoption of E.L., 733 N.E.2d 846 (Ill. 2000); Irving v. Rodriguez, 169 N.E.2d 145 (Ill. App 1960); B & C Investments, Inc. v. F & M Nat. Bank & Trust, 903 P.2d 339 (Okla. 1995); People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 664 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 1994); Williamson v. Berry, 8 How 945, 12 L.Ed. 1170, 1189 (1850)]

57. [See: Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Ed. (1968), p. 723 at "FALSE PERSONATION" and "FALSE PRETENSES," pp. 788-789 at "FRAUD," p. 1713 at "USURPATION"; Pa.C.S.A. Title 18, Crimes Code," §4107; 4 Steph.Comm. 181, 290; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 150, p. 183; Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 99 N.W. 909, 934, 121 Wis. 127 (1904)]

58. [See: Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Steckel, 216 Ia. 1189 250 N.W. 476; Herbert v. Langhoff, La.App., 164 So. 262, 266]

59. [See: Joiner v. Joiner (Tex.Civ.App.) 87 S.W.2d 903, 914-915; Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A.7 (Ill.) 1999); Rook v. Rook, 353 S.E.2d 756 (Va. 1987); Irving v. Rodriguez, 169 N.E.2d 145 (Ill. 1960); People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill. 1994)]

61. [See: Ex parte Seidel, 39 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Tex. 2001); Ex parte Williams, No. 73,845 (Tex. 2001); Ex parte Spaulding, 687 S.W.2d 745; Ex parte Myers, 121 Neb. 56, 236 N.W. 143, 144; Billy Dunklin v. A.J. Land, et ux., 297 S.W.2d 360 (1956); Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 945, 12 L. Ed. 1170, 1189, (1850); Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008 (Tex.Civ.App. 1938); Maury v. Turner, 244 S.W. 809 (Tex.Civ.App. 1922); Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 80 S.W.2d 1087, 1092 (Tex.Civ.App. 1935); Gentry v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 379 S.W.2d 114, 119, (Tex.Civ.App. 1964); Luben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27 et al., 453 F.2d 645, 649, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 298; 15 Fed.R.Serv.2d 865 (C.A. (Miss.) 1972); Hobbs v. US Office of Personal Management, F.Supp. 205, recons. den. 149 F.R.D. 147, afmd. 29 F.2d 1145 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Ruben v. Johns, 109 F.R.D. 174 (D. Virgin Islands 1985); Loyd v. Director, Dept. of Public Safety, 480 So.2d 577 (Ala.Civ.App. 1985); Allcock v. Allcock, 437 N.E.2d 392 (Ill.App. 1982); In re Marriage of Parks, 630 N.E.2d 509 (Ill.App. 1994); Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152 (Ind. 1998); City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Civ.App. 1973); Thompson v. Thompson, 238 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.Civ.App. 1951); In re Marriage of Hampshire, 261 Kan. 854, 862, 934 P.2d 58 (1997); Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Ed. (1968), p. 1745 at "VOID JUDGMENT"]

62. [See: Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008 (Tex.Civ.App 1938); Maury v. Turner, 244 S.W. 809 (Tex.Civ.App. 1922); Garcia v. Garcia 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986); Lucas v. Estate of Stavos, 609 N.E.2d 1114 (Ind.App. 1993); Commonwealth v. Miller, 150 A.2d 585 (Pa.Super. 1959); Ex parte Meyers, 121 Neb. 56]

63. [See: 3 Bl. Comm. 38] [See: Ex parte Williams, No. 73,845 (Tex.Civ.App. 2001); Ex parte Shields, 550 S.W.2d 675; Glunz v. Hernandez, 908 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex.App. 1995); Tidwell v. Tidwell, 604 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980); Billy Dunklin v. A.J. Land, et ux., 297 S.W.2d 360 (1956); Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 80 S.W. 2d 1087 (Tex.Civ.App. 1935); Gentry v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 379 S.W.2d 114, 119 (Tex.Civ.App. 1965); Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (C.A. 7 Ill. 1999); People v. Wade, 506 N.W.2d 954 (Ill. 1987); People v. Sales, 551 N.E.2d 1359 (Ill.App. 1990); People v. Rolland, 581 N.E.2d 907 (Ill.App 1991); City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Civ.App. 1973); Irving v. Rodriguez, 169 N.E.2d 145 (Ill.App 1960); In re Estate of Steinfield, 630 N.E.2d 801; People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill. App. 1994); Sanchez v. Hester, 911 S.W.2d 173 (Tex.App. 1995); 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §25, pp. 388-389; John M. VanFleet, The Law of Collateral Attack on Judicial Proceedings, Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1892, p.25]

64. [See: Glunz v. Hernandez, 908 S.W.2d 253, 255, and see fn. 1 therein (Tex.Civ. App. 1995); Davis v. Boone, 786 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.App. 1990)]

65. [See: Greenidge, The Legal Procedures of Cicero's Time, Intro, 1 (Oxford 1901); Poyser v. Minors, 7 Q.B.Div. 329, 333 (1881); Maine, Ancient Law, ch. V; Roman Private Law. Founded on the Institutes of Gaius and Justin, 2nd Ed. 1930, Macmillan & Co., Ltd., St. Martin's Street, London, wherein it states: "This is what Sir Henry Maine means by saying that the progress of society is from status to contract...Wherein a modern society ...the ordinary citizen is free to alter his legal position by express contract."]

66. [See: Glunz v. Hernandez, 908 S.W.2d 253, 255, fn. 1 (Tex.App. 1995); F.R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b) re "independent action"]

68. [See: Melo v. U.S., 505 F.2d 1026; Joyce v. U.S., 474 F.2d 215; Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F.2d 416; Lantana v. Hopper, 102 F.2d 188; Chicago v. New York, 37 F.Supp. 150; Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca.2d 751, 211 P.2d 389; Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S.Ct. 250; Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533]

69. [See: Thomas, 906 S.W.2d 262; Harrison v. Whiteley, 6 S.W.2d 89 (Tex.Civ.App.); Neugent v. Neugent, 270 S.W.2d 223; Bridgham v. Moore, 143 Tex. 250, 183 S.W.2d 705, 707; Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (C.A. 10 (Colo.) 1994), quoting V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224, n. 8 (C.A. 10 (Colo.) 1994); Athens Community Hospital, Inc. v. Schweiker, 686 F.2d 989 (1982), F.R.Civ.P., Rule 12(h); Hobbs v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 485 F.Supp. 456 (M.D.Fla. 1980); Rubin v. Jones, 109 F.R.D. 174 (D. Virgin Islands 1985); Loyd v. Director, Dept. of Public Safety, 480 So.2d 577 (Ala.Civ.App. 1985); Allcock v. Allcock, 437 N.E.2d 392 (Ill.App. 1982); In re Marriage of Parks, 630 N.E.2d 509, 122 Ill.App.3d 905, 909 (1984); Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152 (Ind.1998); Graff v. Kelly, 814 P.2d 489 (Okla. 1991); In re Marriage of Hampshire, 261 Kan. 854, 862, 934 P.2d 50 (1997)]

70. [See: Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.Civ.App. 1965)]

71. [See: Kocher v. Dow Chemical Co., 132 F.2d 1225, 1230-1231; 39 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1148 (C.A. 8 (Minn. 1997)]

73. [See: United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 24 F.Supp. 961, 966 (1938), which states: "The test of jurisdiction is the right to decide, not right decision. Judgments of courts, which at the time the judgments were rendered had no jurisdiction, ...are absolutely void, and may be attacked and defeated collaterally."; cf. 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §916]

74. [See: Ralph v. Police Court of City of El Cerrito, 190 P.2d 632, 634, 84 Ca.App.2d 257 (1948)]

75. [See: Garcia v. Dial, 596 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980), which states: "Lack of jurisdiction and the improper exercise of jurisdiction are vitally different concepts. ...Where the court is without jurisdiction it has no authority to render any judgment other than one of dismissal."; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 150, p.183, which states: "Jurisdiction is a fundamental prerequisite to a valid prosecution and conviction, and a usurpation thereof is a nullity."; Harriigan v. Gilchrist, 99 N.W. 909, 934, 121 Wis. 127 (1904), which states: "If [excessive exercise of authority] has reference to want of power over the subject matter, the judgment is void when challenged directly or collaterally. If it has reference merely to the judicial method of the exercise of power, the result is binding upon the parties to the litigation until reversed ... The former is usurpation; the latter error in judgment."; Voorhees v. The Bank of the United States, 35 U.S. 449, 474 (1836), which states: "The line which separates error in judgment from the usurpation of power is very definite."]

77. [See: Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1935), which states: "The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of."; Silver v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1908), which states: "Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued."; cf. Light v. United States, 222 U.S. 523, 538 (1910); Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390 (1928), which states: "A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score."; cf. United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U.S. 210, 220 (1919); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533, 547 (1973), which states: "[The ordinary rule [is] that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive un/non-constitutional ground is available."; Kurtz v. Erie, 389 pa. 557, 565, 133 A.2d 172, 176 (1957); Fortson v. Commonwealth, Crime Victim's Compensation Board, 512 A.2d 734, 738 (Pa.Comm. 1986)]



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

79. [See: H.R. 3190 (80th Congress, 1947-1948). Pub.L. 80-772; specifically April 24, 1947, H.R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 100 app. (1947); 93 Cong. Rec. 5048-49, 5121; May 12, 1947, 93 Cong. Rec. 5049 (no quorum present, cf. U.S. Cons. Art. I, § 5, cl. 1, Art. I, § 7, cl. 2); S. Con. Res. 33, 93 Cong. Rec. 10522, 10439, July 26, 1947; 94 Cong. Rec. 8075, June 14, 1948; S. Rep. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2430, June 18, 1948; 94 Cong. Rec. 8864; Daily Digest, 94 Cong. Rec. D556-557, 80th Congress, June 18, 1948; 94 Cong. Rec. 8864-65; see S. Rept. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2430 (1948); 94 Cong. Rec. 9158; 94 Cong. Rec. 9354, 9363, 9365, June 19, 1948; and 94 Cong. Rec. 9367, June 25, 1947.]

87. [See: 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedures, § 10, p. 372, citing: *Parker v. Unemployment Compensation Commission*, 214 S.W.2d 529, 358 Mo. 365, which states: "The powers granted to an administrative body may be such as to establish it as a legal entity, and, although not expressly declared to be a corporation, it may be considered a public quasi corporation."; *Texas & Pacific Railway v. Interstate Commerce Commission*, 162 U.S. 197 (1895), which states: "The Interstate Commerce Commission is a body corporate, with legal capacity to be a party plaintiff or defendant in the Federal courts."; 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 32, p.56, which states: "Some administrative agencies are corporate bodies with legal capacity to sue and be sued."]

93. [See: *Frisbe v. United States*, 157 U.S. 160, 165; 39 L.Ed. 657 (U.S.La. 1895), which states: "The very act of pleading to it [an indictment] admits its genuineness as a record."; *Koscielski v. State*, 158 N.E. 902, 903 (Ind. 1927), which states: "The plea forms the issue to be tried, without which there is nothing before the court or jury for trial."; cf. *Andrews v. State*, 146 N.E. 817, 196 Ind. 12 (1925); *State v. Acton*, 160 A. 217, 218 (N.J. 1932); *United States v. Aurandt*, 107 P. 1064, 1065 (N.M. 1910)]

97. [See: Constitution of the United States of America (1789, as amended 1791) Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 and 18; accord specifically THE ACT OF MARCH 9th, 1933 AND Titles 4, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 28 and 42 USC; Title 27 CFR § 72.11; and *United States v. Volungus*, 595 F.3d 1-4-5 (1st Cir. 2010); *United States v. Pierson*, 139 F.3d 501, 503 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 US 896, 142 L Ed 2d 181, 119 S Ct 220, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 5985 (1998).]

99. [See: *In re Self v. Rhay*, 61 Wash.2d 261, 264, 265, 377 P.2d 885 (1963); cf. *Oakley v. Aspinwall*, 3 N.Y. 547, 568; *Village of Ridgefield Park v. Bergen Co. Bd. of Tax*, 162 A.2d 132, 134, 135, 65 N.J.Super. 133 (1960), citing: *State v. Burrow*, 104 S.W. 526, 527, 119 Tenn. 376 (1907)]

102. [See: *State v. Doherty*, 60 Maine 504, 509 (1872), which states: "The expressions 'due process of law' and 'law of the land' have the same meaning... The 'law' intended by the constitution is the common law that was handed down to us from our forefathers, as it existed and was understood and administered when that instrument was framed and adopted."]

103. [See: U.S. Const. 4th Amendment; *Walter Anderson, A Treatise on the Law of Sheriffs, Coroners, and Constables*, vol. I, § 166, p. 160 (1941), which states: "Heed should ever be paid to the voice of common law as it has echoed down through the ages, loudly proclaiming in the interests of the rights of the citizen, that it must not be forgotten that there can be no arrests without due process of law..."]

104. [See: 6 R.C.L., § 434, which states: "...it is clear that the common law is the foundation of which is designated as due process of law."]

105. [See: Constitution of the United States of America (1789, as amended 1791) article in amendment V; *Thomas Cooley, Constitutional Limitations*, 364 and notes]

106. [See: *Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Imp. Co.*, 18 How (U.S.) 272, 276 (1855), which states: "It is manifest it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be devised. The [due process] article is a restraint on the legislative as well as the executive and judicial powers of Government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any process 'due process,' by its mere will."; *State ex rel. v. Billings*, 55 Minn. 466, 474 (1893)]

108. [See: *Twining v. New Jersey*, 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908)]

112. [See: 4 Bl. Comm. 292]

113. [See: 2 R.C.L., Constitutional Requirements as to Warrants, § 21, p. 463, which states: "[T]he fundamental constitutional guarantees of personal liberty protect private individuals in the right of enjoyment of personal freedom without unlawful restraint, and it is universally recognized that no one may be arrested except by due process of law."]

115. [See: *Testolin v. State*, 205 N.H. 825 (Wis. 1925)]

116. [See: *Alexander v. Lindsey*, 230 N.C. 663, 55 S.E.2d 470, 474 (1949), which states: "In 6 C.J.S., Arrest, § 4, p. 576 et seq., we find the general rule stated as follows: 'The warrant must at the time of arrest be in the possession of and with the person purporting to act there under or of one with whom he is acting in conjunction... Accordingly, where the warrant is at the officer's house some distance from the scene of arrest, or in the hands of another who is not at the scene of arrest, or in the central office of a city detective bureau, the arrest is unlawful.'"]

117. [See: *State v. Shaw*, 104 S.C. 359, 89 S.E. 322, 323 (1916); *O'Halloran v. M'Guirk*, 167 F. 493, 495, 93 C.C.A. 129 (1909); *People v. Fischetti*, 273 Ill.App. 215 (1933); *Crosswhite v. Barnes*, 139 Va. 471, 124 S.E. 242, 245 (1924), which states: "The text-books generally state, and many cases hold, that it is necessary not only that a warrant of arrest should have been issued, but that the officer making the arrest shall have it with him and show it on request... In 1 Bish. New Crim. Proc. § 190, it is said, 'To justify an arrest under a warrant, the officer must have it in possession; and, if though delivered to him, he leaves it at his office or station house, it will not protect him.'", NOTE: This court in deciding the matter of *Crosswhite v. Barnes*, also referred to, and relied upon, a previous case in Virginia; i.e. *Muscoe v. Commonwealth*, 86 Va. 443, 10 S. 534 (1890), wherein a policeman undertook to arrest *Muscoe* for a past misdemeanor, without warrant, and was shot and killed by *Muscoe*. *Muscoe* was convicted of murder and in the appeal; the court reversed the conviction stating: "Indeed, not only must there be a warrant in the class of cases last mentioned [misdemeanors], but, to justify the arrest, the officer must have the warrant with him at the time."]

118. [See: *Smith v. State*, 208 So.2d 746, 747 (Miss. 1968)]


119. [See: *Walter H. Anderson, A Treatise on the Law of Sheriffs, Coroners, and Constables*, vol. I, § 133, p. 128 (1941), which states: "Where arrest is being made under the authority of a warrant, the officer attempting to execute same, and arrest the party named therein, must be in possession of said warrant or it affords him no protection. The necessity for the possession of the warrant is not relaxed by reason of the fact the party to be arrested knows of the issuance and existence of such warrant for his arrest."]

120. [See: *Smith v. State*, 208 So.2d 746, 747 (Miss. 1968) wherein the Supreme Court of Mississippi stated that the warrant must be in the actual possession of the officer; and: "...he must show it to the accused, if requested to do so."; *State v. Shaw*, 104 S.C. 359, 89 S.E. 322 (1916), wherein the court stated the reason the warrant is to be in the actual possession of the arresting party is that: "... if demanded, he produce the warrant and read it to the accused, that he may know by what authority and for what cause he is deprived of his liberty."; *Crosswhite v. Barnes*, 139 Va. 471, 124 S.E. 242, 245 (1924), wherein a number of authorities in support are cited; e.g., "In the annotator's summary of the note in 42 A.L.R. at page 682, it is said: 'An accused person, if he demands it, is entitled to have the warrant for his arrest shown to him at the time of arrest. (See also 51 A.L.R. 211)'; *Frost v. Thomas*, 24 Wend. 418, 419 (1840), which states: "A special deputy is bound to show his warrant if requested to do so, and if he omit, the party against who the warrant is may resist an arrest, and the warrant under such circumstances is no protection against an action for assault, battery and false imprisonment."; *People v. Shanley*, 40 Hun. 477, 478 (1886), which states: "[I]f the officer must show the warrant, if required, then it is plain that it must be in his actual possession. It would be absurd to construe this to mean that after making the arrest the officer must, if required, take the defendant to some other place and there show him the warrant."; *State v. Phinney*, 42 Me. 384 (1856), wherein it was stated that it is very important in all cases where an arrest has been made by virtue of a warrant that: "...the warrant should be produced if demanded."; *Shovlin v. Commonwealth*, 106 Pa. 369, 5 Am.Cr.Rep. 41 (1884), which states: "It is doubtless the duty of an officer who executes a warrant of arrest to state the nature and substance of the process which gives him the authority he professes to exercise, and, if it is demanded, to exhibit his warrant, that the party arrested may have no excuse for resistance."; *Jones v. State*, 114 Ga. 79, 39 S.E. 861 (1901), wherein it was held by the court that a constable was not justified in attempting to arrest the defendant under a warrant which was in the sheriff's hands. The court stated: "... it was the duty of an officer who attempts to make an arrest to exhibit the warrant if he has one."]



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

121. [See: *Adams v. State*, 121 Ga. 163, 48 S.E. 910, 911 (1904), which states: "In *Gaillard v. Laxton*, 2 Best & S. 363, 9 Cox C.C. 127, it was held that in a case in which a lawful arrest could not be made except under a warrant the arresting officers were bound to have the warrant ready to be produced if required; that an arrest in such a case by police officers who did not have the warrant in the possession at the time was illegal."]
122. [See: *Cabell v. Arnold*, 86 Tex. 102, 23 S.W. 645, 646 (1893), which states: "It ought not to be denied that the law contemplates that the warrant directing the arrest of a person charged with a crime will be in the possession of the officer when he makes the arrest under it, for if he is required to exhibit it, if called upon to do so; and this is based on a wise public policy, one purpose of which is that the officer may have to exhibit such evidence of his authority to make the arrest as will be deemed sufficient to take from the person whose arrest is commanded all right to question the authority of the officer."]
123. [See: *Smith v. Clark*, 53 N.J.L. 197, 21 A. 491 (1891), citing: *Webb v. State*, 51 N.J.L. 189, 17 A. 113, which states: "We think the authorities ...are all to the effect that the officer making the arrest must be in a situation to show, if required, the authority under which he is acting. It is the legal right of the citizen when arrested that such shall be the situation; and, therefore, when such situation does not exist that arrest is a legal wrong."; 2 R.C.L., Arrest, § 23, pp. 465-466, which states: "Every person relying upon a warrant in making an arrest should read it if requested so to do,... Where a warrant is necessary but the person making the arrest refuses to exhibit it when called upon to do so ...he may forfeit the protection which it otherwise would afford him."; 40 A.L.R., Annotated, p. 66, which states: "The weight of authority now, however, seems to support the proposition that an officer making an arrest under a warrant should show the warrant, if requested to do so, and in some jurisdictions he is expressly required by statute to do so."]
125. [See: *Commonwealth v. Cooley*, 6 Gray 350 (1856); *Shovlin v. Commonwealth*, 106 Pa. 369, 5 Am.Cr.Rep. 41 (1884), which states: "It is doubtless the duty of an officer who executes a warrant of arrest to state the nature and substance of the process which gives him the authority he professes to exercise, and, if it is demanded, to exhibit his warrant, that the party arrested may have no excuse for resistance."]
126. [See: 70 Am.Jur.2d, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables, § 165, pp. 353-354, which states: "Process that is void on its face is no protection to the officer who executes it. If a warrant, order, or writ of possession shows lack of jurisdiction of the court, the officer is not protected in serving it. In fact, in so doing he becomes a trespasser."; *Lawyers Reports Annotated*, vol. 51, p. 197, citing: *Poult v. Slocum*, 3 Black (Ind.) 421]
128. [See: 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 7, p. 700]
129. [See: 51 L.R.A. 197, citing: *Frazier v. Turner*, 76 Wis. 562, 45 N.W. 411; *Carratt v. Morley*, 1 Q.B. 18, 1 Gale & Dav. 45]
131. [See: *Liberis v. Harper*, 89 Fla. 477, 104 So. 853, 855, which states: "An affidavit that does not appear to have been sworn before any judicial officer, and a warrant signed only by the officer who made the arrest and not dated or authenticated, afford no lawful authority for the arrest and detention of an accused."; cf. 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 12, p. 705]
132. [See: *State v. Paulick*, 277 Minn. 140, 151 N.W.2d 591, 596 (1967), which states: "The United States Supreme Court has considered and disposed of a related problem in *Camara v. Municipal Court*, 387 U.S. 523, 541... The majority in *Camara* nevertheless stressed the need for 'individual review' by a 'neutral magistrate' to avoid the issuance of 'rubber stamp warrants.'; *Cox v. Perkins*, 107 S.E. 863, 865 (Ga. 1921)]
133. [See: *Wharton's Criminal Procedure*, 12th Ed., vol. I, § 54, p. 152 (1974), citing: *Go-Bart Imp. Co. v. United States*, 282 U.S. 344, 355 (1930); *Ex parte Burford*, 7 U.S. 448, 451 (1806); *Smith v. Clark*, 37 U. 116, 106 P. 653 (1910)]
134. [See: *Delk v. Commonwealth*, 166 Ky. 39, 178 S.W. 1129 (1915); *Moser v. Fulk*, 237 N.C. 302, 74 S.E.2d 729 (1953); 2 R.C.L., Arrest, § 17, p. 460, citing: *Brown v. Hadwin*, 182 Mich. 491, 148 N.W. 693 (1914), wherein the rule on sufficiency of a charge on which a warrant can issue is stated as follows: "The complaint or charge on which a warrant is issued must set forth the facts constituting the offense on the knowledge of the person making the complaint, and if he does not know them other witnesses must be examined who do know them; and no person can be arrested on the mere belief of the person making the complaint."]
135. [See: 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 8, p. 702]
136. [See: *Giordenello v. United States*, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245 (1957); *The State v. Gleason*, 32 Kan. 245, 251 (1884), which states: "If a warrant, in the first instance, may issue upon mere hearsay or belief, than all the guards of the common law and the bill of rights, to protect the liberty and property of the citizen against arbitrary power, are swept away."]
137. [See: 61 A.L.R., Annotated, pp. 377-379; *Housh v. People*, 75 Ill. 487 (1897)]
138. [See: *Tiedeman, Limitations of Police Power*, p. 83, citing: *Grumon v. Raymond*, 1 Conn. 39; *Clayton v. Scott*, 45 Vt. 386]
142. [See: 1 A.L.R., Annotated, 586; 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 2, p. 697]
146. [See: *Giddens v. State*, 154 Ga. 54, 113 S.E. 386, 388 (1922)]
147. [See: *McAleer v. Good*, 216 Pa. 473, 63 A. 934, 935 (1907)]
149. [See: *Johnson v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.*, 82 W.Va. 692, 97 S.E. 189, 191 (1918)]
150. [See: *Turney v. Rhodes*, 42 Ga.App. 104, 155 SE. 112 (1930), which states: "Any restraint, however slight, upon another's liberty to come and go as he pleases, constitutes an arrest."]
151. [See: *People v. McGrew*, 77 Cal. 570, 20 P. 92 (1888); *Knight v. Baker*, 117 Ore. 492, 244 P. 543, 544 (1926)]
152. [See: *Sergeant v. Watson Bros. Transp.*, 244 Ia. 185, 52 N.W.2d 86, 92, 93 (1952), citing: *Maxwell v. Maxwell*, 189 Ia. 7, 177 N.W. 541 (1920), which states: "False Imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of an individual's personal liberty or freedom of locomotion... The good faith of the actor is not justification, nor is the want of probable cause an essential element, as in the case of malicious prosecution."; *Bean v. Best*, 77 S.D. 433, 93 N.W.2d 403 (1958); *Carter v. Casey*, 153 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Mo. 1941), which states: "It is well settled law the want of reasonable or probable cause and the want of malice are elements not entering into the action of false imprisonment in so far as actual damages are concerned."; *Daniels v. Milstead*, 221 Ala. 353, 128 So. 447, 448 (1930), which states: "In false imprisonment, the essence of the tort is that the plaintiff is forcibly deprived of his liberty, and the good intent of the defendant, or the fact that he had probable cause for believing that an offense was committed, and acted in good faith will not justify or excuse the trespass."; cf. *De Armond v. Saunders*, 243 Ala. 263, 9 So.2d 747, 751 (1942); *Holland v. Lutz*, 194 Kan. 712, 401 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1965), which states: "The motive with which a restraint of liberty is accomplished, be it evil or good, is irrelevant to the question of whether or not an unlawful arrest has been established. The existence of actual malice is of consequence only as it may afford the basis for punitive damages. In *Garnier v. Squires*, 62 Kan. 321, 62 P. 1005, the court said: 'As will be seen, malice and willfulness are not essential elements of false imprisonment; and motives of the defendant, whatever they may have been, are not material to the case.'"; *Maha v. Adam*, 144 Md. 335, 124 A. 901, 905 (1924), which states: "In false imprisonment suits, ...the essence of the tort consists in depriving the plaintiff of his liberty without lawful justification, and the good or evil intention of the defendant does not excuse or create the tort. 11 R.C.L. 791 ...Any deprivation by one person of the liberty of another without his consent, constitutes an imprisonment, and if this is done unlawfully, it is false imprisonment, without regard to whether it is done with or without probable cause."; *Ehrhardt v. Wells Fargo & Co.*, 134 Minn. 58, 158 N.W. 721, 722 (1916); *Swafford v. Vermillion*, 261 P.2d 187 (Okla. 1953); 35 C.J.S., False Imprisonment, § 7, p. 631; 32 Am.Jur., False Imprisonment, § 6, p. 64, § 114, p. 178; *Hostettler v. Carter*, 175 P. 244, 246 (Okla. 1918); *Markey v. Griffin*, 109 Ill.App. 212 (1903); *Southern Ry. Co. in Kentucky v. Shirley*, 121 Ky. 863, 90 SW. 597, 599 (1906), which states: "In *Starkie's Evid.* 1112, it is said: 'No proof of malice or want of probable cause is necessary to make a case for false imprisonment.'"
153. [See: *Carter v. Casey*, 153 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Mo. 1941) (numerous cases cited); *Ehrhardt v. Wells Fargo & Co.*, 134 Minn. 58, 158 N.W. 721, 722 (1916); *Swafford v. Vermillion*, 261 P.2d 187 (Okla. 1953); 35 C.J.S., False Imprisonment, § 7, p. 631; 32 Am.Jur., False Imprisonment, § 6, p. 64, § 114, p. 178; *Hostettler v. Carter*, 175 p. 244, 246 (Okla. 1918)]



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

154. [See: *Markey v. Griffin*, 109 Ill.App. 212 (1903), which states: "In an action for trespass and false imprisonment, probable cause and the absence of malice constitute no defense... In this form of action belief in the guilt of the party arrested, no matter how strong or well founded in the mind of the officer or person making the arrest, will not justify the deprivation of another of his liberty; and it is unimportant whether the circumstances would lead a reasonable or prudent person to believe that the accused was actually guilty."]
155. [See: *Hill v. Wyrosdick*, 216 Ala. 235, 113 So. 49, 50 (1927)]
156. [See: *Kraft v. Montgomery Ward & Co.*, 348 P.2d 239, 243 (Ore. 1959)]
157. [See: *Sergeant v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co.*, 244 Ia. 185, 52 N.W.2d 86, 92, 93 (1952), citing: *Neves v. Costa*, 5 Cal.App. 111, 89 P. 860 (1907); *Halliburton - Abbott Co. v. Hodge*, 44 P.2d 122, 125 (Okl. 1935), which states: "The guilt of the plaintiff is not material."; *Michigan Law Review*, vol. 31, April, 1933, p. 750 (numerous cases cited), which states: "An arrest is unlawful, even though the arrestee be guilty of a felony, if the officer had not reasonable ground to believe him guilty. Thus, neither the guilt nor innocence of the person arrested has anything to do with the legality of the arrest; *Riegel v. Hygrade Seed Co.*, 47 F.Supp. 290, 293 (1942), wherein it was held that the termination of a prior proceeding in favor of the one deprived of his liberty is not material to his suit; cf. *Thompson v. Farmer's Exchange Bank*, 62 S.W.2d 803, 810 (Mo. 1933); 25 A.L.R., annotations, p. 1518]
158. [See: *Hotzel v. Simmons*, 258 W. 234, 45 N.W.2d 683, 687 (1951); *Anderson v. Foster*, 73 Ida. 340, 252 P.2d 199, 202 (1953); *Meints v. Huntington*, 276 Fed. 245, 250 (1921), which states: "We are of opinion that the law does not permit the citizen to consent to unlawful restraint, nor permit such a claim to be made upon the part of the defendants. In *Wharton on Criminal Law*, vol. 1, § 751e, it is said: 'No man has a right to take away another's liberty, even though with consent, except by process of law. And the reason is, that liberty is an unalienable prerogative of which no man can divest himself, and of which any divestiture is null.'"]
159. [See: *Town of Blacksburg v. Bean*, 104 S.C. 146, 88 S.E. 441 (1916), which states: "Common as the event may be, it is a serious thing to arrest a citizen, and it is a more serious thing to search his person; and he who accomplishes it, must do so in conformity to the laws of the land. There are two reasons for this; one to avoid bloodshed, and the other to preserve the liberty of the citizen. Obedience to law is the bond of society, and the officers set to enforce the law are not exempt from its mandates."; 6A C.J.S., *Arrest*, § 16, p. 30, which states: "A sheriff who acts without process, or under a process void on its face, in doing such act, he is not to be considered an officer but a personal trespasser."; *Roberts v. Dean*, 187 So. 571, 575 (Fla. 1939); *Allen v. State*, 197 N.W. 808, 810-811 (Wis. 1924); *Graham v. State*, 143 Ga. 440, 85 SE. 328, 331 (1915), which states: "A citizen arrested has a right to resist force in proportion to that being used to detain him. An unlawful arrest is an assault and battery or a graver offense."; *State v. Robinson*, 145 Me. 77, 72 A.2d 260, 262 (1950), which states: "An illegal arrest is an assault and battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of his liberty has the same right, and only the same right, to use force in defending himself as he would in repelling any other assault and battery."; *State v. Gum*, 68 W.Va. 105, 69 S.E. 463, 464 (1910), which states: "What rights then has a citizen in resisting an unlawful arrest? An arrest without warrant is a trespass, an unlawful assault upon the person, and how far one thus unlawfully assaulted may go in resistance is to be determined, as in other cases of assault. Life and liberty are regarded as standing substantially on one foundation; life being useless without liberty. And the authorities are uniform that where one is about to be unlawfully deprived of his liberty he may resist the aggressions of the offender, whether of a private citizen or a public officer, to the extent of taking the life of the assailant, if that be necessary to preserve his own life, or prevent infliction upon him of some great bodily harm."; *State v. Mobley*, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1954) (authorities cited therein), which states: "The offense of resisting arrest, both at common law and under statute, presupposes a lawful arrest. It is axiomatic that every person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest. In such case, the person attempting the arrest stands in the position of wrongdoer and may be resisted by the use of force, as in self-defense."; *Wilkinson v. State*, 143 Miss. 324, 108 So. 711, 712-713 (1926)]
160. [See: *City of Columbus v. Holmes*, 152 N.E.2d 301, 306 (Ohio App. 1958), which states: "What of the resistance to arrest? The authorities are in agreement that since the right of personal property is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, any unlawful interference with it may be resisted and every person has a right to resist an unlawful arrest."]
162. [See: *John Bad Elk v. United States*, 177 U.S. 529, 534-535 (1899); *Caperton v. Commonwealth*, 189 Ky. 652, 655, 225 S.W. 481, 483 (1920)]
163. [See: *People v. Bart*, 51 Mich. 199, 202, 16 N.W. 378 (1883), which states: "No one, whether private or officer, has any right to make an arrest without warrant in the absence of actual belief, based on actual facts creating probable cause of guilt. Suspicion without cause can never be an excuse for such action. The two must both exist, and be reasonably well founded."]
164. [See: *Snead v. Bonnoil*, 63 N.Y.Supp. 553, 555, 97 N.Y.St.Rep. (1900), which states: "[An officer] cannot arrest a man for one cause, and when that cause is exploded [defeated] justify for another. Such a doctrine would be incentive to the loosest practices on the part of police officers, and a dangerous extension of their sufficiently great powers. They cannot arrest without an apparent or disclosed cause, to be justified thereafter by whatever may turn up... You cannot arrest a man merely because, if all were known, he would be arrestable. You must arrest him for some specified cause, and you must justify for that cause."]
167. [See: *Henry v. United States*, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959), which states: "It is better, so the Fourth Amendment teaches, that the guilty sometimes go free than that citizens be subject to easy arrest."; NOTE: Sir William Blackstone stated: "It is better that ten guilty persons escape than one innocent suffer."; *Sarah Way's Case*, 41 Mich. 299, 305, 1 N.W. 1021 (1879), which states: "Official illegality is quite as reprehensible as private violations of the law. The law of the land must be accepted by every one as the only rule which can be allowed to govern the liberties of citizens, whatever may be their ill desert."]
168. [See: *Radloff v. National Food Stores, Inc.*, 20 Wis.2d 224, 121 N.W.2d 865, 867, which states: "In *Stittgen v. Rundell*, (1898), 99 Wis. 78, 80, 74 N.W. 536, this court established the principle that 'An arrest without a warrant has never been lawful except in those cases where the public security requires it; and this has only been recognized in felony, and in breaches of the peace committed in the presence of the officer.'" NOTE: This rule was reaffirmed in *Gunderson v. Stuebing*, 125 Wis. 173, 104 N.W. 149 (1905); A.L.R., Annotated, 585; *Ex parte Rhodes*, 202 Ala. 68, 79 So. 462, 464 (1918); *State v. Mobley*, 204 N.C. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1954), which states: "It has always been the general rule of the common law that ordinarily an arrest should not be made without warrant and that, subject to well-defined exceptions, an arrest without warrant is deemed unlawful. 4 Bl.Comm. 289 et seq.; 6 C.J.S., *Arrest*, § 5, p. 579. This foundational principle of the common law, designed and intended to protect the people against the abuses of arbitrary arrests, is of ancient origin. It derives from assurances of Magna Carta and harmonizes with the spirit of our constitutional precepts that the people should be secure in their persons. Nevertheless, to the general rule that no man should be taken into custody of the law without the sanction of a warrant or other judicial authority, the process of the early English common law, in deference to the requirements of public security, worked out a number of exceptions. These exceptions related in main to cases involving felonies and suspected felonies and to breaches of the peace." (Authorities cited)]
169. [See: *Muscoe v. Commonwealth*, 86 Va. 443, 447, 10 S.E. 534, 535 (1890)]
170. [See: 4 Bl.Comm., ch. 21, p. 292, which states: "A constable may, without warrant arrest any one for a breach of the peace committed in his view, and carry him before a justice of the peace."; *Mullins v. Sanders*, 189 Va. 624, 54 S.E.2d 116, 120 (1949), citing: 22 Am.Jur., *False Imprisonment*, §20, p. 366, which states: "It is the duty of an officer or other person making an arrest to take the prisoner before a magistrate with reasonable diligence and without unnecessary delay; and the rule is well settled that whether the arrest is made with or without a warrant, an action for false imprisonment may be predicated upon an unreasonable delay in taking the person arrested before a magistrate regardless of the lawfulness of the arrest in the first instance."; 35 C.J.S., *False Imprisonment*, §§30-31, pp. 545-547; *Peckham v. Warner Bros. Pictures*, 36 Cal.App.2d 214, 97 P.2d 472, 474 (1930); *Oxford v. Berry*, 204 Mich. 197, 170 N.W. 83, 83 (1918)]
171. [See: *Kleidon v. Glascock*, 215 Minn. 417, 10 N.W.2d 394, 397 (1943), which states: "Even though an arrest be lawful, a detention of the prisoner for an unreasonable time without taking him before a committing magistrate will constitute false imprisonment."; *Orick v. State*, 140 Miss. 184, 105 So. 465, 470 (1925),



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

citing: *Kurtz v. Moffitt*, 115 U.S. 487, 499 (1885), wherein it was stated by the court: "By the common law of England" an "arrest without warrant for a felony" can be made "only for the purpose of bringing the offender before a civil magistrate."

172. [See: *Garnier v. Squires*, 62 Kan. 321, 62 P. 1005, 1007 (1900), which states: "The law contemplates that an arrest either by an officer or a private person with or without warrant is a step in a public prosecution, and must be made with a view of taking the person before a magistrate or judicial tribunal for examination or trial; and an officer, even, subjects himself to liability if there is an unreasonable delay after an arrest in presenting the person for examination or trial."]

173. [See: *Kominsky v. Durand*, 64 R.I. 387, 12 A.2d 652, 655 (1940), which states: "When an officer makes an arrest, without warrant, it is his duty to take the person arrested, without unnecessary delay, before a magistrate or other proper judicial officer having jurisdiction, in order that he may be examined and held or dealt with as the case requires. But to detain the person arrested in custody for any purpose other than that of taking him before a magistrate is illegal."; *State v. Freeman*, 86 N.C. 683, 685-686 (1882), which states: "[T]he question occurs, what is the officer to do with the offender when he shall have been arrested without warrant. All the authorities agree that he should be carried, as soon as conveniently may be, before some justice of the peace." NOTE: Though this case involved an arrest without warrant, the court stated it is the duty of the arresting officer upon making an arrest, "whether with a warrant or without one," to carry the offender at once before a justice.]

174. [See: *Kirk v. Garrett*, 84 Md. 383, 406-407, 35 A. 1089, 1091 (1896), which states: "From the earliest dawn of common law, a constable could arrest without warrant when he had reasonable grounds to suspect that a felony had been committed; and he was authorized to detain the suspected party such a reasonable length of time as would enable him to carry the accused before a magistrate. And this is still the law of the land." NOTE: on p. 1092, *ibid.*, it states: "It cannot be questioned that, when a person is arrested, either with or without a warrant, it becomes the duty of the officer or the individual making the arrest to convey the prisoner in a reasonable time, and without unnecessary delay, before a magistrate, to be dealt with as the exigency of the case may require. The power to make the arrest does not include the power to unduly detain in custody; but, on the contrary, is coupled with a correlative duty, incumbent on the officer, to take the accused before a magistrate 'as soon as he reasonably can.' [Authorities cited]. If the officer fails to do this, and unreasonably detains the accused in custody, he will be guilty of a false imprisonment, no matter how lawful the original arrest may have been.", (citing: 1 Hil. Torts, § 9, pp. 213-214)]

175. [See: *Heath v. Boyd*, 175 S.W.2d 214 217 (Tex. 1943); *Bank v. Stimson*, 108 Mass. 520 (1871)]

176. [See: *Walter H. Anderson, A Treatise on the Law of Sheriffs, Coroners, and Constables*, vol. 1, §§ 179-180 (1941), which states: "It is the undoubted right on the part of a prisoner, on being arrested by a public officer or private citizen, and unquestionably a corresponding duty on the one making the arrest, to take the prisoner before a court or magistrate for a hearing or examination and this must be done without unnecessary delay. The object of this right and corresponding duty is that the prisoner may be examined, held, or dealt with as law directs and the facts of the case require... It is highly improper and an invasion of the lawful rights of the prisoner to take him to any other place than to a proper court or magistrate."]

177. [See: *Winston v. Commonwealth*, 188 Va. 386, 49 S.E.2d 611, 615 (1948), which states: "But even if the circumstances of the arrest were not within the purview of the particular statute, it was the duty of the arresting officer to have the defendant within a reasonable time, or without unnecessary delay, before a judicial officer in order that the latter might inquire into the matter and determine whether a warrant should be issued for the detention of the defendant, or whether he should be released."; NOTE: In speaking on what manner of arrests were lawful at common-law when an arrest is made, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in *Kominsky v. Durand*, 64 R.I. 387, 12 A.2d 652, 654 (1940) (authorities cited), stated: "Coupled with the authority to arrest went an imperative obligation on the officer to bring the arrested person before a magistrate without delay. Especially was this true where the arrest had been made without a warrant... When an officer makes an arrest, without warrant, it is his duty to take the person arrested, without unnecessary delay, before a magistrate or other judicial officer having jurisdiction, in order that he may be examined and held or dealt with as the case requires; but to detain the person arrested in custody for any purpose other than that of taking him before a magistrate is illegal."]

178. [See: 18 U.S.C.A., Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5, p. 28, which states: "An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint, or any person making an arrest without a warrant, shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate, or in the event that a federal magistrate is not reasonably available, before a state or local officer authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3041."; *Greenwell v. United States*, 336 F.2d 962, 965 (1964), wherein two F.B.I. agents assisted by two local policemen on an outstanding warrant for bank robbery arrested a man, placed him in a police vehicle, drove a few blocks, parked on the street under a street lamp and began to interview the man wherein an alleged confession was obtained and the Federal Court of Appeals held the confession was inadmissible and reversed the conviction as the momentary parking of the police vehicle en route from the place of arrest was a detour from the path toward a prompt presentment before a magistrate, further stating: "The law requires an arresting officer to bring an accused before a magistrate as quickly as possible."]

179. [See: *People v. Mummiani*, 258 N.Y. 394, 180 N.E. 94, 96 (1932); *Peckahani v. Warner Bros. Pictures*, 36 Cal.App.2d 214, 97 P.2d 472, 474 (1939); *Kindred v. Stitt*, 51 Ill. 401, 409 (1869), which states: "We are of opinion, the arrest of the plaintiff was illegal, and the verdict contrary to law and the evidence. And if the arrest was legal, they did not proceed according to law, and take him before a magistrate for examination, but conveyed him to another country, and there imprisoned him in the county jail, in a filthy cell, thus invading one of the dearest and most sacred rights of the citizen, secured to him by the great character of our land."]

180. [See: *Judson v. Reardon*, 16 Minn. 387 (1871); *Long v. The State*, 12 Ga. 293, 318 (1852); *Moses v. State*, 6 Ga.App. 251, 64 S.E. 699 (1909); *Hill v. Smith*, 59 S.E. 475 (Va. 1907); *Folson v. Piper*, 192 Ia. 1056, 186 N.W. 28, 29 (1922); *Edger v. Burke*, 96 Md. 715, 54 A. 986, 988 (1903); *Bryan v. Comstock*, 220 S.W. 475]

181. [See: *Leger v. Warren*, 62 Ohio St. 500, 57 N.E. 506, 508 (1900)]

182. [See: *Great American Indemnity Co. v. Beverly*, 150 F.Supp. 134, 140 (1956); *Thomas Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts*, vol. I, § 114, p. 374 (numerous authorities cited therein), which states: "An officer, who has lawfully arrested a prisoner, may be guilty of false imprisonment if he holds for an unreasonable length of time without presenting him for hearing or procuring a proper warrant for his detention."; *Farina v. Saratogo Harness Racing Ass'n*, 246 N.Y.S.2d 960, 961, which states: "...even though the arrest, when made, was legal and justified," the officers "became trespassers ab initio and so continued to the time of the plaintiff's release because of their failure to take him before a magistrate as required."; *Sequin v. Myers*, 108 N.Y.S.2d 28, 30 (1951); *Bass v. State*, 92 N.Y.S.2d 42, 46-47, 196 Miscel. 177 (1949), which states: "If there was an unnecessary delay [in arraigning the claimant before a Justice of the Peace], then the arrest itself became unlawful on the theory that the defendants were trespassers ab initio and so continued down to the time when the plaintiff was lawfully held under a warrant of commitment, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of any crime. [Numerous cases cited]. In *Pastor v. Regan*, supra, it is said that: 'The rule laid down in the *Six Carpenters' case*, 8 Coke 146, that if a man abuses an authority given him by the law he becomes a trespasser ab initio, has never been questioned."; *Ulvstad v. Dolphin, et al.*, 152 Wash. 580, 278 p. 681, 684 (1929), which states: "Nor is a police officer authorized to confine a person indefinitely whom he lawfully arrested. It is his duty to take him before some court having jurisdiction of the offense and make a complaint against him.... Any undue delay is unlawful and wrongful, and renders the officer himself and all persons aiding and abetting therein wrongdoers from the beginning."]

184. [See: *Brock v. Stimson*, 108 Mass. 520 (1871) (authorities cited); *Hefler v. Hunt*, 129 Me. 10, 112 A. 675, 676 (1921)]

185. [See: *State v. Schabert*, 15 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. 1944), which states: "We believe that fundamental fairness to the accused requires that he should with reasonable promptness be taken before a magistrate in order to prevent the application of methods approaching what is commonly called the 'third degree.' 'Fundamental fairness' prohibits the secret inquisition in order to obtain evidence."]

187. [See: *Keefe v. Hart*, 213 Mass. 476, 100 N.E. 558, 559 (1913), which states: "But having so arrested him, it is their [the officer's] duty to take him before a magistrate, who could determine whether or not there was ground to hold him. It was not for the arresting officers to settle that question (authorities cited)... The



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

arresting officer is in no sense his guardian, and can justify the arrest only by bringing the prisoner before the proper court, that either the prisoner may be liberated or that further proceedings may instituted against him.”; *Harness v. Steele*, 64 N.E. 875, 878 (Ind. 1902), which states: “[T]he power of detaining a person arrested, restraining him of his liberty, is not a matter within the discretion of the officer making the arrest.”; *Stromberg v. Hansen*, 177 Minn. 307, 325 N.W. 148, 149 (1929); *Madsen v. Hutchinson, Sheriff, et al.* 49 Ida. 358, 290 P. 208, 209 (1930) (numerous cases cited), which states: “The rule seems to be that an officer arresting a person on criminal process who omits to perform a duty required by law, such as taking the prisoner before a court, becomes liable for false imprisonment.”; *Simmons v. Vandyke*, 138 Ind. 380, 37 N.E. 973, 974 (1894), citing: *Ex parte Cubreth*, 49 Cal. 436 (1875), which states: “We have no doubt that the exercise of the power of detention does not rest wholly with the officer making the arrest, and that he should, within a reasonable time, take the prisoner before a circuit, criminal, or other judicial court... In a case where the arrest is made under a warrant, the officer must take the prisoner, without unnecessary delay, before the magistrate issuing it, in order that the party may have a speedy examination if he desires it; and in the case of an arrest without warrant the duty is equally plain, and for the same reason, to take the arrested before some officer who can take such proof as may be afforded.”; *Pratt v. Hill*, 16 Barb. 303, 307 (N.Y. 1853)]

188. [See: *Bryant v. City of Bisbee*, 28 Ariz. 278, 237 P. 380, 381 (1925); *State v. Miller*, 31 Tex. 564, 565 (1869) *Winston v. Commonwealth*, 188 Va. 386, 49 S.E.2d 611, 615 (1948), wherein an arresting officer delivered a man to the jailer at 4:30 p.m., with the instruction that said man be held there until 9:00 p.m., at which time he was to be brought before the judicial officer. The Supreme Court of Virginia condemned this act asserting the officer usurped the functions of a judicial officer stating: “But the actions of the arresting officer and the jailer in denying the defendant this opportunity [to judicial review] by confronting him in the jail because they concluded that he was not in such condition to be admitted to bail, had the effect of substituting their discretion in the matter for that of the judicial officer. Under the circumstances here, the defendant was clearly entitled to the judgment upon the question of his eligibility for bail. This right was arbitrarily denied him.”]

189. [See: *Bowles v. Creason, et al.*, 156 Ore. 278, 66 P.2d 1183, 1188 (1937); *Geldon v. Finnegan, et al.*, 213 Wis. 539, 252 N.W. 369, 372 (1934), which states: “If the plaintiff was being detained for the purpose of arrest it was the duty of the arresting officer to take him before an examining magistrate as soon as the nature of the circumstances would reasonably permit. The power to arrest does not confer upon the arresting officer the power to detain a prisoner for other purposes.”]

190. [See: 11 R.C.L., *False Imprisonment* § 15, pp. 801-802; *Williams v. Zelzah Warehouse*, 126 Cal.App. 28, 14 P.2d 177, 178 (1932)]

191. [See: *Moran v. City of Berkley*, 67 F.2d 161, 164 (1933), which states: “Orders from a superior do not excuse the arresting party from his duty [to bring the arrested party before a judicial officer], nor does delivery of the prisoner into the custody of another person; all those who take part in so detaining another person an unreasonable length of time are liable.”; *Leger v. Warren*, 62 Ohio St. 500, 57 N.W. 506 (1900), which states: “The delivery of the plaintiff, after his arrest, into custody of another person, to be by him taken to prison, could not, we think, absolve the arresting officers from the duty required of them to obtain the writ necessary to legalize his further imprisonment... If the arresting officers chose to rely on some other person to perform that required duty, they take upon themselves the risk of its being performed; and, unless it is done in proper time, their liability to the person imprisoned is in no wise lessened or effected.”]

192. [See: *Mullins v. Sanders*, 189 Va. 624, 54 S.E.2d 116, 120 (1949); *Brown v. Meir & Frank Co.* 86 P.2d 79, 83 (Ore. 1939)]

194. [See: *Gow v. Bingham*, 107 N.Y.Supp. 1011, 1014-1015, 1018, 57 Miscel. 66 (1908), which states: “To subject a citizen, never before accused, to such indignities, is certainly unnecessary in order to ‘detect and arrest’ him; for he must have been detected and arrested before he can be so dealt with. It is unnecessary to ‘prevent crime,’ for the acts for which indictment has been committed... The exercise of any such extreme police power as is here contended for is contrary to the spirit of Anglo-Saxon liberty... The acts of the police department here criticized were not only a gross outrage, not only perfectly lawless, but they were criminal in character. Every person concerned therein is not only liable to a civil action for damages, but to criminal prosecution for assault.” NOTE: The court in this case also made it known that it was “The duty of every member of the police force under penalty of fine or dismissal from the force, immediately upon arrest, to convey the offender, not to police headquarters to be photographed and measured, but ‘before the nearest sitting magistrate that he may be dealt with according to law.’”, p. 1016, *ibid.*; *Hawkins v. Kuhne*, 137 N.Y.Supp. 1090, 153 App.Div. 216 (1912), wherein the *Gow* case was upheld and it was acknowledged: “...that the taking of the plaintiff’s picture before conviction was an illegal act.”]

195. [See: *People v. Hevern*, 127 Miscel. Rep. 141, 215 N.Y.Supp. 412, 417-418 (1926), which states: “Article I, section 5 of the Constitution of New York, provides: ‘Excessive bail shall not be required.’ The prohibition against excessive bail necessarily includes the denial of bail... A defendant is arraigned, in fact innocent, and refuses to submit to a finger printing. A redolent from it is not unnatural. It cannot be said that the refusal is unreasonable or unjustified. Yet he is denied bail. The requirement for finger printing is oppressive and unreasonable. It contravenes article I, sec. 5, of the Constitution of the state of New York, and in my judgment is unconstitutional. There are other grounds upon which the unconstitutionality of the law must be declared. Article I, section 6 of the Constitution of the state of New York provides: ‘No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, or property without due process of law.’ Finger printing is an encroachment on the liberty of a person. It is justifiable, as is imprisonment, upon conviction for crime, in the exercise of the police powers of the state, for the purpose of facilitating future crime detection and punishment. What can be its justification when imposed before conviction? To charge that one’s fingerprint records have been taken would ordinarily convey an imputation of crime, and very probably support a complaint for libel per se. In my judgment, compulsory finger printing before conviction is an unlawful encroachment upon a person, in violation of the state Constitution. Lastly, finger printing before conviction involves prohibited compulsory self-incrimination.”; cf. *Constitution of/for the United States of America* articles to amendment V, VIII].

196. [See: *United States v. Kelly*, 51 F.2d 263, 266 (1931)]

198. [See: *Bednarick v. Bednarick*, 16 A.2d 80, 90, 18 N.J. Misc. 633 (1940), which states: “To subject a person against his will to a blood test is an assault and battery, and clearly an invasion of his personal privacy.”; *State v. Height*, 117 Ia. 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902); *People v. Corder*, 244 Mich. 274, 221 N.W. 309; *Boyd v. United States*, 116 U.S. 616 (1885); *State v. Newcomb*, 220 Mo. 54, 119 S.W. 405 (1909); cf. relevant articles and sections of both state and federal constitutions/charters as already cited above.]

206. [See: *Knight v. Baker*, 117 Ore. 492, 244 P 543, 544 (1926)]

207. [See: *Street’s Foundation of Legal Liability*, vol. I, p. 12, citing: *Bracton’s Note Book*, vol. II, p. 314 (1229), pl. 465, wherein Henry de Bracton (1200 - 1268) states: “Forcefully to deprive a man of freedom to go wheresoever he may is clearly a trespass. False imprisonment was indeed one of the first trespasses recognized by the Common Law.”]

208. [See: *Kroeger v. Passmore*, 36 Mont. 504, 93 P. 805, 807 (1908); *McBeth v. Campbell*, 12 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex. 1929)]

210. [Joseph Chitty, Esq., *The Practice of Law*, vol. I, ch. II, p. 47, London, 1837, wherein Mr. Chitty states: “The infraction of personal liberty has been regarded as one of the greatest injuries. The injuries to liberty are principally termed false imprisonments, or malicious prosecutions.”]

211. [See: *Hanser v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co.*, 244 Ia. 185, 52 N.W.2d 86, 93(1952); *Sinclair Refining Co. v. Meek*, 62 Ga.App. 850, 10 S.E.2d 76, 79(1940); *Southern Ry. Co. in Kentucky v. Shirley* 121 Ky. 863, 90 S.W. 597, 599 (1906)]

212. [See: *Thomas Cooley*, *Treatise on the Law of Torts*, vol. I, 4th ed., § 109, p. 345, wherein Mr. Cooley states: “False imprisonment is a wrong akin to the wrongs of assault and battery, and consists in imposing, by force or threats, and un-lawful restraint upon a man’s freedom of locomotion.”; *Meints v. Huntington*, 276 F.2d 245, 248 (1921)]

213. [See: 3 Bl. Comm. 127, which states: “Every confinement of the person is an imprisonment, whether it be in a common prison, or in a private house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets.”; *Sergeant v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co.*, 244 Ia. 185, 52 N.W.2d 86, 93 (1952)]

214. [See: *Mahan v. Adams*, 144 Md. 355, 124 A. 901, 904 (1924), which states: “False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another, and as here used the word ‘false’ seems to be synonymous with unlawful.”; *Riley v. Stone*, 174 N.C. 588, 94 S.E. 434, 440 (1917), which states: “False



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

imprisonment is the unlawful and total restraint of the liberty of the person. The imprisonment is false in the sense of being unlawful. The right violated by this tort is 'freedom of locomotion.' It belongs historically to the class of rights known as simple or primary rights... The theory of law is that one interferes with the freedom of locomotion of another at his own risk."

215. [See: *Garnier v. Squires*, 62 Kan. 321, 62 P. 1005, 1006 (1900), which states: "False imprisonment is necessarily a wrongful interference with the personal liberty of an individual. The wrong may be committed by words alone or by acts alone or by both, and by merely operating on the will of the individual, or by personal violence, or by both. It is not necessary that the wrongful act be committed with malice or ill will, or even with the slightest wrongful intention; nor is it necessary that the act be under color of any legal or judicial proceeding. All that is necessary is that the individual be restrained of his liberty without any sufficient legal cause therefore, and by words or acts which he fears to disregard." *Kroeger v. Passmore*, 36 Mont. 504, 93 p. 805, 807 (1908)]
216. [See: *Riegel v. Hygrade Seed Co.*, 47 F.Supp. 290, 294 (1942), which states: "False imprisonment has been well defined to be a trespass committed by one man against the person of another, by unlawfully arresting and detaining him without any legal authority."]
217. [See: *Noce v. Ritchie*, 155 S.E. 127, 128 (W.Va. 1930), which states: "False imprisonment is the unlawful arrest or detention of a person, without warrant or by an illegal warrant, or a warrant illegally executed."]
218. [See: *Sinclair Refining Co. v. Meek*, 62 Ga.App. 850, 10 S.E. 76, 79 (1940), which states: "False imprisonment at common law and elsewhere consists in the unlawful detention of the person by another for any length of time, whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty," citing: 3 Bl.Comm. 127; 12 Am.&Eng. Ency. Law 721; 19 Cyc 319; *Sergeant v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co.*, 244 Ia. 185, 52 N.W.2d 86, 92 (1952), which states: "False imprisonment is defined as an act which, directly or indirectly, is an illegal cause of confinement of another within boundaries fixed by the actor for any time, no matter how short in duration, makes the actor liable to the other."]
219. [See: *Knickerbockers Steamboat Co. v. Cusack*, 172 F. 358, 360-361 (1905), which states: "The general rule of damages in cases of false imprisonment is that the person causing a wrongful imprisonment is liable for all the natural and probable consequences thereof. The plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for what the party wrongfully did... In *Murphy v. Countiss*, 1 Harr. (Del.) 143, in an action for trespass, assault and battery, and false imprisonment, the court held that the plaintiff could recover, not merely for the time the constable was bringing him to jail, but for the whole period of his imprisonment. And in *Mandeville v. Guernsey*, 51 Barb. (N.Y.) 99 the court said: 'The arrest being wrongful, the defendant is liable for all the injurious consequences to the plaintiff which resulted directly from the wrongful act.'"; *Meints v. Huntington*, 276 F. 245, 248 (1921), citing *Adler v. Tenton*, 24 How. (U.S.) 407, 410 (1860)]
220. [See: *Black v. Clark's Greensboro, Inc.*, 263 N.C. 226, 139 S.E.2d 199, 201 (1964); *State v. Robinson*, 145 Me. 77, 72 A.2d 260, 262 (1950)]
223. [See: *Ross v. Leggett*, 61 Mich. 445, 28 N.W. 695, 697 (1886)]
224. [See: *Cook v. Hastings*, 150 Mich. 289, 114 N.W. 71, 72 (1907)]
225. [See: *Trezevant v. City of Tampa*, 741 F.2d 336 (1984), wherein damages were set as 25,000 dollars per twenty-three 23 minutes in a false imprisonment case.]
229. [See: *Roberts v. Thomas*, 135 Ky. 63, 121 S.W. 961, 96 (1909)]
230. [See: *Marks v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.*, 131 N.Y.S.2d 325, 327, 284 App.Div. 251 (1954), wherein Justice Hand states: "The law watches personal liberty with vigilance and jealousy; and whoever imprisons another, in this country, must do it for a lawful cause and in a legal manner."]
232. [See: *Earl of Halsbury, The Laws of England*, vol. 38, 3rd ed., pt. 4, § 1266, p. 765, London (1962), which states: "The Plaintiff need not prove that the imprisonment was unlawful or malicious, but establishes a prima facie case if he proves that he was imprisoned by the defendant; the onus then lies on the defendant of proving a justification."]
233. [See: *Burlington Transp. Co. v. Josephson*, 153 F.2d 372, 376 (1946)]
237. [See: *Southern Ry. Co. in Kentucky v. Shirley*, 121 Ky. 863, 90 S.W. 597, 599 (1906), citing: 12 Am.&Eng. Ency. Law, 2d ed., p. 733; *McAleer v. Good*, 216 Pa. 473, 65 A. 934, 935 (1907); *Mackie v. Ambassador Hotel & Inv. Co.*, 123 Cal. App. 215, 11 P.2d 3, 6 (1932); *Jackson v. Knowlton*, 173 Mass. 94, 53 N.E. 134 (1899), which states: "It was long ago said by Lord Mansfield: 'A gaoler, if he has a prisoner in custody, is prima facie guilty of an imprisonment; and therefore must justify.' *Badkin v. Powel*, Cowp. 476, 478. So, in *Halroyd v. Doncaster*, 11 Moore 440, it was said by Chief Justice Best: 'Where a man deprives another of his liberty, the injured party is entitled to maintain an action for false imprisonment, and it is for the defendant to justify his proceedings by showing that he had legal authority for doing that which he had done.'"; *Snyder v. Thompson*, 134 Ia. 725, 112 N.W. 239, 241 (1907), which states: "In 2 Bishop on Criminal Procedure, § 368, it is said, 'In matters of evidence, if the imprisonment is proved, its unlawfulness will be prima facie presumed; but authority may be shown by the defendant in justification.'"]
238. [See: *Sinclair Refining Co., v. Meek*, 62 Ga.App. 850, 10 S.E.2d 76, 79 (1940) (authorities cited therein); *Stallings v. Foster*, 119 Cal. App.2d 614, 259 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1953); *Thompson v. Farmer's Exchange Bank*, 333 Mo. 437, 62 S.W.2d 803, 811 (Mo. 1933), which states: "A lawful imprisonment does not become unlawful because of malicious motives nor does an unlawful detention become lawful because actuated by a laudable purpose or founded in good faith."; *McNeff v. Heider*, 337 P.2d 819, 821 (Ore. 1958), which states: "In an action for false imprisonment, neither actual malice nor want of probable cause is an essential element necessary to a recovery of general damages."]
239. [See: *Maxims of Law*, ed. C.A. Weismann, 57f; 1 Coke 177; 4 Bouvier's Institutes, n. 3828; 35 C.J.S., False Imprisonment, § 7, p. 630; *Stembridge v. Wright*, 32 Ga.App. 587, 124 S.E. 115 (1924), which states: "It is no defense that a person perpetrating an illegal arrest or imprisonment is ignorant of the legality of his acts."; *Kroeger v. Passmore*, 36 Mont. 504, 93 P. 805, 807 (1908), which states: "False imprisonment is treated as a tort, and also as a crime... If the conduct is unlawful, neither good faith, nor provocation, nor ignorance of the law is a defense to the person committing the wrong."; *Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley*, 217 Minn. 218, 231, 14 N.W.2d 400 (1944), which states: "As is the case of illegal arrests, the officer is bound to know these fundamental rights and privileges, and must keep within the law at his peril."]
241. [See: *Dunnell Minnesota Digest*, 3rd ed., vol. 84, False Imprisonment, §1.06(c), citing: *Wahl v. Walton*, 30 Minn. 506, 16 N.W. 397 (1883)]
242. [See: *Coverstone v. Davis*, 38 Cal.2d 315, 239 P.2d 876, 878 (1952), which states: "The finding of guilt in the subsequent criminal proceeding cannot legalize an arrest unlawful when made."; *Wilson v. Loustalot*, 85 Cal.App.2d 316, 193 P.2d 127, 132 (1948); *Stewart v. State*, 244 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Civ.App. 1951)]
243. [See: *Hopkins v. Clemson College*, 221 U.S. 636, 642-643 (1910), which states: "But immunity from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty a prerogative of the State itself - which cannot be availed of by public agents when sued for their own torts."; *Johnson v. Lankford*, 245 U.S. 541, 546 (1917)]
245. [See: *Rico v. State*, 472 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Minn. 1991)]
247. [See: *Muscoe v. Commonwealth*, 86 Va. 443, 10 S.E. 534, 536 (1890), which states: "Arrest without warrant, where a warrant is required, is not due process of law; and arbitrary or despotic power no man possesses under our system of Government."]
248. [See: *The State of Connecticut against Leach*, 7 Conn.Rep. 452 (1829), which states: "A void process is no process. The complainant, the justice of the peace who ordered him to be committed, the sheriff who executed the pretended warrant, and the jailer who held him under it, are all liable for false imprisonment. This is the undoubted doctrine of the common law from the time of the *Marshalsea* case, 10 Co. 68 to this day."]
264. [See: *State v. Brechler*, 185 Wis. 599, 202 N.W. 144, 148]
265. [See: *Ellis v. Jones*, 73 Colo. 516, 216 P. 257, 258]
271. [See: *Freichnecht v. Meyer*, 39 N.J.Eq. 551, 560]
274. [See: *Black's Law Dictionary*, Rev. 4th Ed., (1968), p. 1067 at LICENSE (cases cited); 168 A. 229; 114 N.J.Eq. 68]



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

276. [See: *Ream v. Commonwealth*, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 209; *Anderson v. Commonwealth*, 275 Ky. 232, 121 S.W.2d 46, 47; *Jones v. Jones*, 188 Mo.App. 220, 175 S.W. 227, 229; *Ex parte Gladhill*, 8 Metc., Mass. 171, per shaw, C.J.]
277. [See: 3 Bl. Comm. 24; 3 Steph. Comm. 383; *The Thomas Fletcher*, C.C.Ga. 24 F. 481; *Ex parte Thistleton*, 52 Cal. 225; *Erwin v. U.S.*, D.C.Ga. 37 F. 488, 2 L.R.A. 229; *Heininger v. Davis*, 96 Ohio St. 205, 117 N.E. 229, 231]
278. [See: 1 Bl. Judgm. §173; *In re Manning*, 139 U.S. 504, 11 S.Ct. 624, 35 L.Ed. 264; *Gildemeister v. Lindsey*, 212 Mich. 299, 189 NW. 633, 635]
280. [See: *State v. Delmonto*, 110 Conn. 298, 147 A. 825, 826]
281. [See: *Millar v. State*, 2 Kan. 175; *Bowers v. Bowers*, 114 Ohio St. 568, 151 N.E. 750, 751; *State v. Rardon*, 221 Ind. 154, 46 N.E.2d 605, 609]
291. [See: Title 28 U.S.C., § 3002(15), in para materia Title 11 U.S.C., §109(a); 534 F.Supp. 724; 1 Marsh Dec. 177, 181; *Bouvier's Law Dictionary*, 5th Ed.; *Black's Law Dictionary*, 6th Ed.; 19 C.J.S., § 884, *In re Merriam's Estate*, 36 N.Y. 505, 141 N.Y. 479, affirmed in *U.S. v. Perkins*, 163 U.S. 625]
292. [See: 16 Stat. 419, ch. 62, 41st Congress, 3rd Session, "An Act to Provide a Government for the District of Columbia"; 20 Stat. 102, ch. 180, 45th Congress, 2nd Session, "An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia"]
293. [See: House Joint Resolution 192 of June 5, 1933, Pub. R. 73-10; Executive Orders 6072, 6102, 6111, and 6246; Senate Report 93-549; Cong. Rec., March 17, 1993, vol. 33, speaker: James A. Traficant, Jr., which states in part: "Mr. Speaker. We are now here in Chapter 11. Members of Congress are official trustees presiding over the greatest reorganization in world history, the U.S. Government.... It is an established fact that the United States Federal Government has been dissolved by the Emergency Banking Act, March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1, Public Law 89-719, declared by President Roosevelt, being bankrupt and insolvent. H.J.R. 192, 73rd Congress in session June 5, 1933 - Joint Resolution to Suspend the Gold Standard and Abrogate the Gold Clause - dissolved the Sovereign Authority of all United States and the official capacities of all United States Government Offices, Officers, and Departments and is further evidence that the United States Federal Government exists today in name only..."]
294. [See: 41st Congress' Act(s), Session 3, ch. 62, p. 419, Sec. 34, February 21, 1871]
295. [See: UCC 9-307(h); which states: "Location of United States is located in the District of Columbia."; cf. Title 28 D. C. Code § 28.9-307(h)].
296. [See: U.S. Rev. Stat. 1 Supp. 22; 7 D.C. 178; 132 U.S. 1, which states: "The sovereign power is lodged in the Government of the United States, and not the corporation of the district."]
298. [See: UCC 9-102(a)(76); cf. Title 28 D.C. Code § 28.9-102(a)(76)]
299. [See: California Revenue & Taxation Code, §§ 6017, 11205, 17018, and 23034]
300. [See: 2 Cra. 445; 1 Wheat. 91; *Charl. R.M.* 374; 1 Kent, Com. 349, which states: "However extraordinary it might seem to be, that the courts of the United States, which were open to aliens, and to the citizens of every state, should be closed upon the inhabitants of those districts [territories and the District of Columbia], on the construction that they were not citizens of a state, yet as the court observed, this was a subject for legislative and not judicial consideration."; 182 U.S. 270; *Bouvier's Law Dictionary*, Baldwin's Student Edition, Banks - Baldwin Publishing Co. (1804), Cleveland, 1948), Complete Rev. Ed., p. 310]
301. [See: 74 F.R. 145, following 91 U.S. 398; *Swanson v. Fuline Corp.*, 248 F.Supp. 364, 369 (U.S.D.C. Ore. 1965); *Hart v. U.S.*, 95 U.S. 316, 24 L.Ed. 479; *U.S. v. Fulton Distillery, Inc.* 571 F.2d 923, 927 (C.A.5 1978)]
303. [See: Declaration of Interdependence, January 22, 1937, Book of the States, vol. II, p. 144]
307. [See: *Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co.*, 96 F.2d 693, 704 (C.C.A. Okl.); *National Bond Finance Co. v. General Motors Corp.*, 238 F. Supp. 248, 255 (D.C.Mo.); *Dyett v. Turner*, Warden Utah State, 439 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1967), which states: "The United States Supreme Court, as at present constituted, has departed from the Constitution as it has been interpreted from its inception and has followed the urgings of social reformers in foisting upon this Nation laws which even Congress could not constitutionally pass. It has amended the Constitution in a manner unknown to the document itself. While it take three fourths of the states of the Union to change the Constitution legally, yet as few as five men who have never been elected to office can by judicial fiat accomplish a change just as radical as could three fourths of the states of this Nation. As a result of the recent holdings of that Court, the sovereignty of the states is practically abolished, and the erstwhile free and independent states are in effect and purpose merely closely supervised units in the federal system."]
309. [See: 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §100, which states: "A judgment should identify the parties for and against whom it is rendered, with such certainty that it may be readily enforced, and judgment which does not do so may be regarded as void for uncertainty..."]
310. [See: *Black's Law Dictionary*, Rev. 4th Ed., p. 408 at CORPORATE FRANCHISE]
311. [See: *ibid.*, p. 880 at IDEM SONANS]
312. [See: *ibid.*, p. 1040 at LEGAL NAME]
315. [See: *Black's Law Dictionary*, 7th Ed. at PERSON, sub-head ARTIFICIAL PERSON]
318. [See: *Black's Law Dictionary*, Rev. 4th Ed. (1968), p. 591 at DUMMY]
319. [See: *Black's Law Dictionary*, 6th Ed. at DUMMY CORPORATION; UCC 3-419, cf. Title 13, Pa.C.S., §3419; also see: SURETY, VOLUNTARY SURETY, CO-SURETIES, CO-SURETY, SURETY SHIP, BAIL, GUARANTOR, NOVATION, IN SOLIDIO (SOLIDIUM), INVOLUNTARY SURETY SHIP, SURETY SHIP BY OPERATION OF LAW, VOLUNTARY SURETY SHIP in any Law Dictionary of your choosing; UCC 1-201(40), cf. Title 28 D.C. Code § 28.1-201(40)]
320. [See: *Black's Law Dictionary* Rev. 4th Ed., (1968), p. 624 at ENS LEGIS]
321. [See: *ibid.*, p. 751 at FICTITIOUS NAME]
323. [See: Title 5 U.S.C., § 552(a)(2)]
327. [See: *Black' Law Dictionary*, Rev. 4th Ed., p. 1737 at PUBLIC VESSEL]
332. [See: *Calison v. Dean*, C.C.A.Okl., 70 F.2d 55, 58]
333. [See: Rob. Pat. § 339; *Gibbs v. Hoefner*, 19 F. 323]
336. [See: *Church of Scientology v. U.S. Dept. of Justice*, 612 F.2d 417, 425 (1970); cf. Title 1, U.S.C., § 1]
337. [See: 2A C. Sands, *Sutherlands Statutes and Statutory Construction* ss 47.16, 4th ed., 1973; *Lenhoff v. Birch Bay Real Estate, Inc.*, 587 P.2d 1087 (1978)]
338. [See: *State v. Western Union Telegraph Co.*, 196 Ala. 570, 72 So. 99, 100]
339. [See: *Black, Interp. of Laws*, 141; *Goldsmith v. U.S.*, C.C.A.N.Y., 42 F.2d 133, 137; *Aleksich v. Industrial Accident Fund*, 116 Mont. 69, 151 P.2d 1016, 1021; *King County Water Dist.* 68 v. Tax Commission, 58 N.W.2d 282, 284 (1951); *Dean v. McFarland*, 81 Wash.2d 215, 221, 500 P.2d 1244 (1972)]
340. [See: *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, Tenth Edition, 1999, p. 867 (etymology), which states: "ME, fr. O.F. persone, fr. L. persona actor's mask, character in a play, person, prob. fr. Etruscan phersu mask, fr. Gk prosopa, pl. of prosopon face, mask more at PROSOPOPOEIA"]
341. [See: Co. Litt. 210a; *Burgin v. Forbes*, 293 Ky. 456, 169 S. W. 2d 321, 325; *Little v. Town of Conway*, 171 S. C. 27, 170 S. E. 447, 448; cf. "Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius," *Burgin v. Forbes*, supra]
349. [See: *Genesis*, Ch. 1, vss. 26-27; *Genesis*, ch. 2, vss. 21-25; John 4:24; Q. 15:28-29, Q. 19:67; Q. 22:5, Q. 23:12-14, Q. 32:7-9, Q. 38:71-72, Q. 51:56]
354. [See: *Riegel v. Hygrade Seed Co.*, 47 F.Supp. 290, 294 (1942), which states: "False imprisonment has been well defined to be a trespass committed by one man against the person of another,..."]
369. [See: *Reese v. Reese*, 179 Misc. 665, 40 N.Y.S. 2d 468, 472; *Zimmer v. Zimmerman*, 175 Or. 535, 155 P. 2d 293, 295; *In re Campbell Guardianship*, 216 Minn. 113, 11 N.W. 2d 786, 789]



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

370. [See: Warnock v. Kraft, 30 Cal App. 2d 1, 85 P. 2d 505, 506]
371. [See: The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition, 1982, p. 1169]
372. [See: Ex parte Shaw 12 S. Ct. 935, 145 U.S. 444, 36 L. Ed. 768; The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 245, 4 L. Ed. 226]
378. [See: State ex rel. v. Houston Trust Co., 168 Tenn. 546, 79 S.W. 2d 1012, 1016; State ex rel. Supreme Temple of Pythian Sisters v. Cook, 234 Mo. App. 898, 136 S.W. 142, 146; Community Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Independence, Mo. v. Fields, C.C.A. Mo., 128 F. 2d 705, 708; In re Grand Union Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 219 F. 353, 363; Staake v. Routledge, 111 Tex. 489, 241 S.W. 994, 998; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Minis, 120 Md. 461, 496, 87 A. 1062, 1072]
379. [See: Wilkins v. U.S. C.C.A.Pa., 96 F. 837, 37 C.C.A. 588; People v. Williams, 24 Mich. 163, 9 Am. Rep. 119]
380. [See: 1 Bish.Crim.Law, §43; In re Jacoby, 74 Ohio App. 147, 57 N.E.2d 932, 934, 935]
387. [See: Wilson v. Omaha Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979), quoting: United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941); United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947)]
388. [See: The People v. Herkeimer, Gentle, One &c, 4 Cowen 345, 1825 N.Y. LEXIS 80]
389. [See: Restatement (Second) of Torts 895B, comment at 400 (1979)]
390. [See: Chisholm v. Georgia (February Term, 1793), 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440, which states: "I shall have occasion incidentally to evince, how true it is, that states and Governments were made for man; and same time how true it is, that his creatures and servants have first deceived, next vilified, and at last oppressed their master and maker... A state, useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity derives all its acquired importance... Let a political state be considered as subordinate to people; but let everything else be subordinate to the state... As the state has claimed precedence of the people; so, in the same inverted course of things, the Government has often claimed precedence of the state; and to this perversion in the second degree, many of the volumes of confusion concerning Sovereignty owe their existence... This second degree of perversion is confined to the old world,... but the first degree is still too prevalent even in the several states, of which our union is composed. By state I mean, a complete body of free persons united together for their common benefit, to enjoy peaceably what is their own, and to do justice to others. It is an artificial person. It has its affairs and its interests; It has its rules; It has its rights; and it has its obligations. It may acquire property distinct from that of its members. It may incur debts to be discharged out of the public stock, not out of the private fortunes of individuals. It may be bound by contracts; and for damages arising from the breach of those contracts. In all our contemplations, however, concerning this feigned and artificial person, we should never forget, that, in truth and nature, those who think and speak and act, are men. Is the foregoing description of a state a true description? It will not be questioned, but it is... It will be sufficient to observe briefly that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in England, exist on feudal principles... The same feudal ideas run through their jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the distinction between the prince and the subject. No such ideas obtain here [speaking of America]; at the revolution, the Sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the Sovereigns of the country, but they are Sovereigns without subjects... and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the Sovereignty."]
392. [See: Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 47 (1905)]
395. [See: Wills v. Michigan State Police, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)]
397. [See: 73 C.J.S., Property, § 10; 63A Am.Jur.2d, Property, § 2]
398. [See: 7 C.J.S., § 4; Virgin Islands Bar Assoc. v. Dench, D.C. Virgin Islands, 124 F.Supp. 257]
401. [See: 7 C.J.S., § 4]
402. [See: 7 C.J.S., § 43]
403. [See: 7 C.J.S., § 4]
410. [See: Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio P.R. (1853), 16 How. (U.S.) 314; Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepard (1857), 20 How (U.S.) 227; U.S. v. One 1966 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 56 F.R.D. 450 (1972); U.S. of A. v. \$3,976.62 in Currency, One 1960 Ford Station Wagon, 37 F.R.D. 564; U.S. v. Slater, 82-2 U.S.T.C. 9571; Rachel Templeton v. Internal Revenue Service, 86-1363 on appeal from 85 C. 457]
413. [See: Title 31, U.S.C., § 321(d) (2); Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Ed., 1968, p. 1669 at TRANSFER]
414. [See: Rules Against Perpetuities; Use; Null Charter; and, The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (Principal Provisions), Section 4, MT 57 (16) 0-2, Internal Revenue Manual - Administration, 392 2-87, Exhibit 800-1, p. 8051, which states: "Every conveyance or transfer made or executed without a fair or valuable consideration is void ab initio."; see also: GRANT, GRANTOR; and, GRANTOR TRUSTS in any Law Dictionary of Respondent's(s') choice]
416. [See: Title 12, U.S.C., § 411; Title 18, U.S.C., § 3613(c) - 49 Stat. 620, § 207; Title 31, U.S.C., § 321 (d) (2); Title 15, U.S.C., §§ 1 et seq. 17]
417. [See: Title 28 D.C. Code §§ 28.3-201(1) and 28.7-504(1); Scheid v. Shields, 269 Ore. 236, 524 P.2d 1209, 1210; Hayter v. Fern Lake Fishing Club, 318 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.)]
419. [See: Title 11, U.S.C., § 101 - Bankruptcy Code]
420. [See: Unification Act of 1964, 4 F.R.D. 325; Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Stewart & Son's, 336 U.S. 386, 403, 69 S.Ct. 622, 93 L.Ed.2d 754; Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co. (1959), 358 U.S. 354, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368; In re Alexander McNeil, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236, 20 L.Ed. 624]
421. [See: U.S. v. Kirkpatrick, 186 F.2d 3931]
422. [See: National Sea Clammers Assoc. v. New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (C.A.3 N.J. 1980), vacated on grounds, 453 U.S. 1, 69 L.Ed.2d 435, 101 S.Ct. 2615]
423. [See: O v. Johns - Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224 (C.A.4 Va. 1985), cert. den. 88 L.Ed.2d 319, 106 S.Ct. 351; U.C.C. Article 9 - Secured Transactions, cf. Title 28 D.C. Code: Article 9 - Secured Transactions]
424. [See: The Glide, 167 U.S. 606; The Corsair, 145 U.S. 342; American Ins. Co. v. Cantor, 1 Pet. (U.S.) 511, 545 (1828)]
425. [See: American Ins. Co. v. Cantor, 1 Pet. (U.S.) 511, 545 (1828)]
426. [See: Rabinowitz, The Story of the Mortgage Retold (1945), 94 U.Pa.L.R. 94; The Common Law Mortgage and the Conditional Bond (1943), 92 U.Pa.L.R. 179; Kamberg, Commercial Law According to the Talmud (1933), 38 Commercial Law Journal 239; 3 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd Ed., 2373-2743]
427. [See: 17 How. (U.S.) 478; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (1852), 54 U.S. 518, 14 L.Ed. 249]
428. [See: 2 Sumn. 401; 3 Wheat. 211; 2 McLean 568; 15 Pet. 9; 11 How. 669]
430. [See: 1 Greenl. Ev., § 525; 541 Bro.Civ. and Adm. Law, 98; 2 Gall.R. 200; 3 T.R. 269, 270; Tetley, Int'l C. of L., 1994, p. 795; Judiciary Act of 1789, Sec. 9, 1 Stat. 77; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 411, 431 (1866); see also: "QUASI IN REM"]
431. [See: Norback v. Bd. of Dir. of Church Ext. Soc., 84 Utah, 37 P.2d 339; 129 U.S. 45, 46]
432. [See: United States v. \$5,372.85, 283 F.Supp. 904 (1968)]
433. [See: Robinson v. Campbell (1818), 16 U.S. 212, 4 L.Ed. 372; Bennett v. Butterworth (1851), 52 U.S. 669, 13 L.Ed. 859; Thompson v. Railroad Cos. (1868), 73 U.S. 134, 18 L.Ed. 765; Ellis v. Davis (1883), 109 U.S. 485, 27 L.Ed. 1006, 3 S.Ct. 327; La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. U.S. (1899), 175 U.S. 423, 20 S.Ct. 168, 44 L.Ed. 223; Commercial National Bank v. Parsons, 144 F.2d 231 (C.A.5 La. 1944), reh. den. (C.A.5 La.) 145 F.2d 191, cert. den. 323 U.S. 796, 65 S.Ct. 440, 89 L.Ed. 635; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson (C.A.5 Tx. 1946), 155 F.2d 185, cert. den., 329 U.S. 730, 67 S.Ct. 87, 91 L.Ed. 632]
434. [See: The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885); The Rio Grande, 4 Wash.C.C. 53, 30 Fed. Case No. 17804 (1821); Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. (U.S.) 308 (1870); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (no attachment); Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 7 S.Ct. 165, 30 L.Ed. 372 (1886); Starkey v. Lunz, 57 Ore. 147, 110 P. 702



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

(1910) (attachment void); but see under "Privilegia Londini" or "Custom of London," 1 Bl.Com. 75; 3 Steph.Comm. 588; and, the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, §§ 60-67 to effect the conclusive presumption that "the situs of every debts is at the domicile of the creditor." Waring v. Clark, 46 How. (U.S.) 441 (1847)]

435. [See: Megee v. Beirne, 39 Pa. 50; Bray v. McClurry, 55 Mo. 128; Raiguel v. McConnell, 25 Pa. 362, 363; Welsh v. Blackwell, 14 N.J.Law 346]

438. [See: Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Ed (1968), pp. 1299 - 1300 at "PERSON"]

439. [See: Maynard Mehl v. John H. Norton, No. 31,338, 201 Minn. 203, 275 NW. 843, 1937; W.H. Shearon v. Travis Henderson, Guardian, etc., 38 Tex. 245 (1873); Jo Elaine Bailey Woodland v. Shirley Wisdom, No. 06-97-00083-CV, 975 S.W. 2d 712 (1998); Charles L. Black Aycocock et al. v. F.H. Pannhill, Sr. et al., 853 S.W.2d 161 (1993); F.M. Smith v. Texas Commerce Bank - Corpus Christi, NA., et al., 822 S.W.2d 812 (1992); Frances Jackson Rogers v. David Orman Rogers, Jr. 806 S.W.2d 886 (1991)]

444. [See: Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (Principal Provisions) (IRM 822), 392 2-87 Legal Reference Guide, p. 8051, § 4, which states: "Sec. 4. Conveyances By Insolvent - Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without fair consideration."]

450. [See: Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, etc. R.Co., 175 U.S. 91, which states: "The term 'policy' as applied to statute, regulation, rule of law, course of action, or the like, refers to its probable effect, tendency, or object considered with reference to the social or political well being of the state. Thus, certain classes of acts are said to be against 'public policy' when the law refuses to enforce or recognize them, on the grounds that they have a mischievous tendency, so as to be injurious to the interests of the state, apart from illegality or immorality."; Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42; "Public Policy is a variable quantity; it must and does vary, with the habits, capacities, and opportunities of the public.", 36 CH.Div. 539; Chaffee v. Farmer's Co-Op Elevator Co., 39 N.D. 585]

453. [See: Aden v. Dalton, 341 Mo. 454, 107 S.W.2d 1070, 1073; Aust. Jur., § 308; Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Ed., p. 394, at "CONTRACT"]

455. [See: Brasswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988), which states: "But individuals, when acting as representatives of a collective group, cannot be said to be exercising their personal rights and duties, not to be entitled to their purely personal privileges. Rather they assume the rights, duties, and privileges of the artificial entity or association of which they are agents or officers and they are bound by its own obligations."; United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. U.S., 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Wheeler v. U.S., 226 U.S. 478, 489, 490; Grant v. U.S., 227 U.S. 74, 80 (1913)]

456. [See: Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 229, 32 L.Ed. 637, which states: "...the term 'religion' in this Amendment refers exclusively to a person's views of his relations to his Creator, though often confused with some particular form of worship, from which it must be distinguished; Thomas v. Collins (1945), 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430, which states: "First Amendment gives freedom of mind same security as freedom of conscience."]

457. [See: Robin v. Hardaway (1772), 1 Jefferson 109; 1 Am.Jur.2d, § 14]

462. [See: Hanson v. Deckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)]

463. [See: Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371; Hanson v. Deckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)]

464. [See: Baker v. City of Milwaukee, 271 Ore. 500, 552 P.3rd 772]

467. [See: John Barron v. The Mayor and City of Baltimore, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 240; Spies v. Illinois (1887), 123 U.S. 131, 31 L.Ed. 80]

468. [See: Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 575 S.Ct. 883 (May 24, 1937); La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392, 41 S.Ct. 528, 532; Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24, 36 S.Ct. 236, L.R.A. 1917D, 414, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713; Curtiss v. Loether (1974), 415 U.S. 189, 192, n. 6, wherein the court ruled that the "common law" (Bill of Rights) is not incorporated into the XIVth Amendment; Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis (1916), 241 U.S. 211; Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry (1990), 110 S.Ct. 1339, 1344; Delima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901)]

471. [See: H. Liebes & Co. v. Klengenber, 23 F.2d 611, 612 (C.C.A.Cal)]

472. [See: H. Liebes & Co. v. Klengenber, supra]

473. [See: Corbin, Contracts, 1 vol. ed., 1952]

474. [See: 1 Story, Eq.Jur., § 222; Lervick v. White Tops Cabs, 10 So.2d 67, 73, (la.App.)]

476. [See: 9 Car. & P. 722]

479. [See: 37 Am.Jur.2d, Fraud, § 8]

480. [See: Joiner v. Joiner, 87 S.W.2d 903, 915 (Tex.Civ.App.)]

481. [See: Maher v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 292; Alexander v. Church, 53 Conn. 561, 4 A. 103; Studer v. Bleistein, 115 N.Y. 316, 7 L.R.A. 702; McNair v. Southern States Finance Co., 191 N.C. 710, 133 S.E. 85, 88]

482. [See: 1 Story, Eq. Jur., § 187; Howard v. West Jersey & S.S.R. Co., 102 N.J.Eq. 517, 141 A. 755, 757]

483. [See: Padelford, Fay & Co. v. The Mayor and Alder of the City of Savannah, 14 Ga. 438 (1854), which states: "But indeed, no private person has a right to complain, by suit in court, on the grounds of a breach of the Constitution. The Constitution, it is true, is a compact (contract), but he is not a party to it. The States are a party to it..."]

All of the aforementioned are hereby restated in their entirety, and incorporated herein, as if set forth in full as an integral part of these instant matters and Creation-Wide Record.

Remedies Demanded, Required and Necessary being Duly perfected, due and owing

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to effectuate the release and/or discharge of the Undersigned's physical, spirit(s) and/or soul being(s) and representation(s) from illegal and unlawful warehousing, control, custody and/or confinement of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, without further hinder and/or delay;

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to effectuate the removal, voiding, extinguishing and/or canceling of any and all unlawful actual, assumed and/or presumed character(s), condition(s), capacity(ies), status, standings(s) and/or agreement(s), contract(s), lien(s), liability(ies), claim(s), et cetera, that permit the illegal and unlawful enslavement, detainment, custody and/or confinement of any form and format of the Undersigned in any and all nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format and/or the illegal and unlawful conversion(s), transfer(s) and/or utilization(s) of any and all of our assets Creation-Wide;

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to declare and publish that the Undersigned are not acceptors, accommodating parties, guarantors, sureties, debtors, trustee and/or any other term of art describing, demonstrating and/or utilized to mean the same, to and/or for anything and/or any real-man Creation-Wide;

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to carry out the full intent of this document and other Will and Words of the Undersigned, and any and all other equitable, lawful, legal, Talmudic, Babylonian, political, social, civil, commercial, statutory, administrative, ecclesiastical, personal, private, public, quasi-public, military, corporate, international, universal, quantum, spiritual, beneficial, pecuniary, managerial, regulatory and other remedy, relief, audit, accounting, reconciliation, discharging, payment, settlement, closure, dissolving, transfer and forgiveness, and the upholding of plenary truth, plenary justice, the Laws of the Creator of all that always was, is and shall be, the Laws of Creation and plenary freedom.



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to secure the immediate and absolute compliance to each and every clause of the alleged Original Contracts, the Declaration of Independence c1776 and the Constitution for the United States of America c1819, by and through any and all real-men and fictions of law previously, and now presently, causing irreparable harm and injury to ourselves and to prevent any and/or all interactions of any form and format in the future;

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to secure an audit, accounting, reconciliation, dissolving, transfer, discharging, payment, settlement, and/or closure of the following, without limitation to wit:

cestui que vie trust(s), estate(s), any and all other trusts and other types of limits and constructs of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all combinations and variations of all of the aforementioned, aka THOMAS DAVID DEEGAN, PHILLIP JOHN HUDOK, LYNN GENE STALNAKER and/or [REDACTED] aka UNKNOWN, and all derivatives, aka various identifiers, abbreviations, numbers and their combinations, letters and their combinations, idem sonans, res identifier and/or other legal, financial, and managerial forms and formats of any nature, shape, cause, kind, and any and all variations and combinations and variations of all of the aforementioned, in any way and cause related to, pertaining to, relevant to and/or emanating from ourselves and/or our share of Creation, as Heirs and Beneficiaries, and any and all combinations and variations of all aforementioned, without limitation, any and all of which may include, but are not limited to, any and all legal, lawful, commercial and other debt or equity security(ies) in any form or format, credit and debit account(s) and balance(s), beneficial interest (divided and undivided), debenture(s), account(s), pledge(s), covenant(s), contract(s), signature(s), hypothecation(s), property(ies) inclusive of all chattel(s), secured account(s), mirrored account(s), trade account(s) and/or the like, any and all other controlling, insurable, lawful, legal, private, public, quasi-public, equitable, political, commercial, social, civil, corporate, international, universal, quantum, spiritual, administrative, Talmudic, Babylonian, ecclesiastical, military, beneficial, admiralty/maritime, statutory, pecuniary, managerial, regulatory and/or any and all other interest, share, title, authority, jurisdiction, venue and law form, as Heirs and Beneficiaries of the Creator, in all things and matters within the Creator's Creation, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, without limitation, any and all open financial and/or other account(s) of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all combinations and variations thereof, any and all financial and/or other instrument(s), document(s), tangible item(s) and/or tangible medium(s) of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all unfinished transaction(s) of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all claim(s), title(s), share(s) and interest(s) including, but not limited to, registered, unregistered, recorded, unrecorded, legal, lawful, equitable, Talmudic, Babylonian, political, private, public, quasi-public, military, corporate, social, international, universal, quantum, spiritual, beneficial, pecuniary, managerial, regulatory, unknown and/or any other forum state and/or any and all issues governed by admiralty/maritime jurisprudence and jurisdiction, causing fine, penalty and/or forfeiture, all of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all other assets of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format Creation-Wide, any and all other lien(s), liability(ies), debt(s), et cetera of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, against and/or arising from the Undersigned's assets, share of Creation and/or real-man Living Soul physical, spirit(s) and/or soul being(s) and representation(s) thereof, without limitation, and other identifiers, abbreviations, derivatives, numbers and their combinations, letters and their combinations, idem sonans, res identifiers and/or any equivalent of the foregoing, and/or any and all other legal, financial and managerial forms and formats of any nature, shape, cause and kind, and any and all variations and combinations of the aforementioned trusts, all other limits and any and all things and matters in any way, shape, cause, form and format relating to, pertaining to, relevant to and/or emanating from all of the foregoing and aforementioned, all of the aforementioned both known and unknown, all of the aforementioned both perceived and unperceived, and any and all variations and combinations of all of the aforementioned, without limitation;

An appointment of an independent and bonded trustee to oversee and effectuate, without hinder of delay, all of the aforementioned, as well as the closing and dissolving of the cestui que vie trust (s), estate (s), and any and all other trusts, limits and constructs, and the reverting and transfer of any and all assets thereof, without limitation, to the care, custody and control of the Lawful Holders-in-Due-Course, Real-Parties-in-Interest, Secured Parties, Grantors, Bailors, Administrators, Original Creditors, Custodians, Beneficiaries and Heirs of the Creator Thomas David house of Deegan, Phillip John Hudok and Lynn Gene Stalnaker; The aforementioned are all pre-approved, pre-paid and pre-authorized by the Creator and the Undersigned;

Further, demanded and required is any tangible medium necessary for the plenary removal, voiding, extinguishing, and/or cancelling of any actual, assumed and/or presumed character(s), conditions(s), capacity(ies), nature(s), status, standing(s), and/or agreement(s), contract(s), lien(s), liability(ies), claim(s), et cetera, that allow the unlawful enslavement of the Undersigned in any nature, way, shape, cause, kind and form and/or the unlawful conversion(s), transfer(s) and/or utilization(s) of any and all of our assets, Creation-Wide, without limitation;

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to Declare that the STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA possess absolutely no document(s), paper(s), digital data, tangible medium(s), and/or tangible item(s), nor did any ever exist, which demonstrate and prove that the Undersigned, real-men Living Souls, are/were a willing, knowing, intelligent and intentional party and/or signatory to any social, public, private, commercial, ecclesiastical, military, universal and/or other compact, agreement, covenant, contract, et cetera, any and all combinations and variations of the aforementioned, which can be demonstrated to operate to confer any actual and factual controlling, insurable, lawful, legal, private, public, quasi-public, equitable, political, commercial, social, civil, corporate, international, universal, quantum, spiritual, administrative, Talmudic, Babylonian, ecclesiastical, military, beneficial, admiralty/maritime, statutory, pecuniary, managerial, regulatory and/or any and all other interest, share, title, authority, relationship, jurisdiction, venue, et cetera, of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all possible variations and combinations of all of the aforementioned, without limitation, in and/or over our physical, spirit and soul being(s) and representation(s) thereof, of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, without limitations, our cestui que vie trusts, estates, any and all other trusts and constructs, and any and all sub and/or constructive trusts and constructs thereof, any and all thereto, therefrom, therewith and thereof the Undersigned, without limitation, any and all property and assets of any nature, kind, and form, and our share, as Heirs of the Creator, of the Creator's Creation, without limitation, in any way, nature, cause, kind, shape, form and format to the benefit of the defaulted and dishonored STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to Declare that the STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA have, possess nor can exercise and/or utilize authority and/or jurisdiction, et cetera, of any nature, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, without limitation, over and/or against the real-men Living Soul Undersigned at any place and at any time within the Creator's Creation, ab initio, nunc pro tunc, in perpetuity;

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to Declare that the Undersigned never knowingly, willingly, intelligently and intentionally possessed, nor acquired, representation and/or membership of any nature, kind, form and format within the fictions of law, creatures of the mind defendants private corporate,



By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

commercial, military, processes, systems, networks and any and all other limits and constructs, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, without limitation;

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to Declare that "Whereas, Long time and use, which exceeds the memory of man, suffices in law, and A custom of the trust antiquity is to be retained, and the Law of God and the law of the land are all one, and custom is law, and on the soil of earth and what some call the United States of America, Christianity is, and has been, custom; Therefore, the Laws of the Creator are thereby the laws of the land; Further, for the real-men Living Souls who claim the Creator's Law, Jurisdiction, Venue and Law Form, they are hereby declared to be Superior Laws, Venue, Jurisdiction and Superior Law Form to all others imagined, created and implemented on earth and throughout His Creation; Furthermore, the Undersigned, real-men Living Soul Heirs of the Creator, do hereby accept, claim and continue the Creator's Laws, Jurisdiction, Venue and Law Form, and the same is hereby recognized and adhered to by the STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ab initio, nunc pro tunc, in perpetuity, without recourse, without prejudice."

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to Declare that "Whereas, ALL law is contract, all contract is law; Therefore to move against in any way, cause, shape, form and format against, or require of or from, the Undersigned, requires a lawful contract or agreement in hand or a real-man Living Soul injured party making a lawful claim and/or complaint, under Oath, penalties of false witness and full liability, ab initio, nunc pro tunc, in perpetuity, without recourse, without prejudice."

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to Declare that each and every real-man receiving compensation of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format from, and/or having taken and subscribed any Oath(s), Affirmation(s) and/or signed any other contract(s) and/or agreements with the STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA at any time and at any place, prove by first-hand fact evidence their Original Contracts Authorities, Procedures, Processes and others including, but not limited to, the following, to wit:

alter, change, repeal, ignore and/or violate the Original Contracts.

violate their respective Original Contracts complaint authority(ies), office(s), title(s) and other claims to, and possession of, any and all authorities, prerogatives and/or procedures and the equivalent thereof.

sustain that each and every action and inaction is absolutely Original Contracts compliant.

sustain that their respective employment, and the terms thereof, are absolutely Original Contracts compliant.

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to expunge and destroy each and every record, regardless of form and format, of the Undersigned in any way maintained and stored in the care, custody and control of the STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Demanded and Required is any tangible medium necessary to Declare that the Undersigned are absolutely and unconditionally Immune and indemnified in any and all ways, causes and kinds in regards to the STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and their processes, procedures, jurisdictions, venues and law forms at any and all places and any and all times, without limitation.

MONETARY DAMAGES DEMANDED AND REQUIRED being Duly Perfected, Due and Owing

For time lost and never recoverable and theft of the most basic freedoms, pursuant to your own construct's estimation, at a reduced rate of \$1,500,000 per diem starting on the thirtieth day of July, in the Year of my Creator two thousand fourteen up to the fourteenth day of January, in the Year of my Creator two thousand nineteen, continuing until full payment, settlement and closure of the duly perfected, due and owing charge. As of the fourteenth day of January, in the Year of my Creator two thousand nineteen there are one thousand six hundred twenty seven days of unlawful custody and/or confinement. Total duly perfected, due and owing is \$2,440,500,000 (two billion four hundred forty million five hundred thousand Dollars) due and payable immediately. Reservation is hereby explicitly maintained for the demand of punitive, exemplary and other damages for any failure to make myself as whole as possible for the egregious crimes committed and maintained through fraud and deceit. Thomas David house of Deegan.

For travel, paper, ink, filing fees and certified mail fees in assisting in the offense/defense against the fraud and egregious of/in case #'s 15-0491, 11-F-101, 15-M54F-00463, 15-B-328, 16-F-25 paid by Phillip John Hudok, duly perfected due and owing is \$8012.89 (eight thousand twelve Dollars and eighty nine cents) due and payable immediately. The breakdown is as follows, to wit:

Date	Mileage Data Description	Mileage
2/24/2015	To Charleston for Petition of Redress of Grievances	322
5/22/2015	To Charleston Served Tomblin, Morrissey and Legislature	322
6/12/2015	Multiple mailings from Mill Creek	15
? To Elkins Inter-Mountain for Supreme Court Case Article		48
6/30/2015	Multiple mailings from Elkins	48
7/14/2015	Mailing from Mill Creek	15
7/27/2015	Multiple mailings from Mill Creek	15
7/28/2015	Multiple mailings from Mill Creek	15
7/8/2015	Multiple mailings from Mill Creek	15
7/14/2015	Mailing from Mill Creek	15
7/24/2015	To Mineral wells/Live Streamed Testimony by Thomas, Gene, & Phil	326
8/28/2015	Multiple mailings from Mill Creek	15
9/4/2015	To Charleston filing amended complaint made video	322
9/25/2015	Served Habeas Corpus North Central Regional Jail	223
? 2015	To Elkins Inter-Mountain for Interview of Amended Case Article	48
10/5/2015	To Parkersburg for Magistrate Court	317



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10/29/2015	Multiple mailings from Mill Creek	48
12/14/2015	To Doddridge Co Courthouse	223
12/15/2015	To Doddridge Co Courthouse	223
12/30/2015	Multiple mailings Huttonsville	10
1/11/2016	Multiple mailings Mill Creek	15
1/27/2016	Multiple mailings Mill Creek	15
1/29/2016	Mailing Mill Creek	15
2/08/2016	Multiple Mailings Elkins	48
2/10/2016	Multiple Mailings Mill Creek	15
2/16/2016	Multiple mailings Elkins	48
2/19/2016	To Parkersburg for Bond Revocation turned Motions hearing	317
2/26/2016	To Parkersburg to Serve Documents	317
3/9/2016	Multiple mailings Elkins	48
3/16/2016	To Parkersburg for Trial& Testimony (Stayed in Hotel)	317
3/19/2016	Parkersburg Trial ends	317
4/14/2016	To Parkersburg for Sentencing	317
6/10/2016	Mailing J. Seivert Elkins	48
? 2016	Park. Pick up Cookie went to Mount Olive for Parole Hearing	538
1/19/2017	Multiple mailings Elkins	48
6/14/2017	Multiple mailings Beverly	35
? 2017	Pick Up Thomas in Welch	466
? 2018	To Elkins I-M for 10/15/2018 Case of the Missing Case Article	48
9/1/2018	Multiple mailings Beverly	35
9/27/2018	Mailing Elkins	48
10/1/2018	To Charleston to serve the Clerk of Impeachment Court	322
10/3/2018	Mailing Mill Creek	15
10/15/2018	To Charleston to address Mitch Carmichael	322
10/19/2018	Multiple mailings Mill Creek	15
11/15/2018	Mailing Mill Creek	15

Total 6329 miles x .545

Document Name	Date	Pgs#	Copies	Pgs Tot.	Certified Mail # (example)	# of Cert.	\$ of Cert. Mail	CD/DVDs	
Petitioning Legislators	2/24/15	43	10	430					
Petitioning Governor	3/27/15	5	1	5	7012 0470 0000 7194 9474	1	\$8.45		
Petitioning Supreme Ct.	3/27/15	5	1	5	7012 0470 0000 7194 9467	1	\$8.45		
Refusal SC Order	5/09/15	9	5	45					
Sup. Ct Filing 15-0491	5/22/15	36	7	252	7014 1820 0000 7067 4410	2	\$30.40	117	
Notice of Default	5/25/15	3	6	18					
Emer. Decl. Jdgt Dem.	6/29/15	5	5	25					
2 nd & Final Not. Dflt	7/08/15	9	5	45					
Corr. Of Def. Resp.	7/15/15	12	1	12					
Refusal of Request	7/28/15	6	2	12					
Not. Decl. Ord. Military	8/28/15	2	2	4					
Amended 15-0491	9/04/15	6	1	6					
Amend. 15-0491 + CD	9/05/15	6	1	6	7015 0640 0007 1418 3238	1	\$12.20	1	
Gene Refusal of Dismiss	9/15/15	7	2	14					
Writ of Habeas Corpus	10/02/15	6	1	6					
Thomas Notice	10/29/15	6	5	30	7015 0640 0007 1418 3900	5	\$48.72		
Thomas Filings	10/30/15	46	5	230	7015 0640 0007 1418 3955	5	\$44.95		
FOIA Requests	11/05/15	1	4	4	7015 0640 0007 1418 3986	4	\$27.72		
Thomas Filings	11/09/15	46	7	322	7015 0640 0007 1592 5028	7	\$61.39		
Thomas Filings	11/12/15	1	3	3	7015 0640 0007 1592 5592	3	\$22.35		
Thomas Writ Habeas	12/14/15	Filed Doddridge Co Circuit Clerk			\$200.00				
Service Writ Habeas	12/15/15	Served by Doddridge Co. 6 Recipients			\$120.00				
Thomas Filings	12/30/15	16	3	48	7015 0640 0007 1592 5745	3	\$24.33		
Thomas Filings	1/11/16	51	2	102	7015 0640 0007 1592 5769	2	\$24.40		
Thomas Filings	1/26/16	50	4	200	7015 0640 0007 1592 5790	4	\$33.16		
Thomas Filings	1/26/16	47	9	423	(In conjunction with the above)				
Indictment Refusal	1/29/16	2	1	2	7015 0640 0007 1592 5851	1	?		
Thomas Filings	2/08/16	31	8	248	7015 0640 0007 1592 5875	4	\$35.96		
Thomas Filings	2/10/16	51	10	510	7015 0640 0007 1592 5943	4	\$40.57		
Thomas Filings (Wood)	2/16/16	47	7	329	7015 0640 0007 1592 5974	4	\$40.57		
Thomas Filings (Dodd)	2/16/16	6	2	12	7015 0640 0007 1592 6018	2	\$14.90		
Thomas Filings	2/19/16	34	5	170	(In Hand)				
Document Name	Date	Pgs	#	Copies	Pgs Tot.	Certified Mail # (example)	# of Cert.	\$ of Cert. Mail	CD/DVDs
Thomas Filings	2/26/16	134	6	804 (In Hand)					
Thomas Filings	2/26/16	49	6	294 (In Hand)					
Thomas Filings	2/28/16	17	1	17 (Pages Faxed)					



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Thomas Filings	3/09/16	36	4 (1 Fax)	144	7015 0640 0007 1592 5066	3	\$26.31	
Thomas Filings	3/09/16	7	1		7015 0640 0007 1592 5059	1	\$7.23	
Thomas Filings	3/09/16	3	1	3	7015 0640 0007 1592 5073	1	\$6.74	
Thomas Filings	3/10/16	18	4 (1 fax)	72	7015 0640 0007 1592 5097	3	\$29.37	12
Thomas Filings	3/11/16	20	1	20	7015 0640 0007 1592 5110	1	\$7.89	
Thomas Filings	4/15/16	63	4	252	7015 0640 0007 1592 7343	3	\$30.88	
Thomas Filings	4/22/16	11	(All Faxed)	11				
Thomas Filings	4/25/16	3	fax	3				
Thomas Filings	4/27/16	3	fax	3				
Thomas Filings	4/28/16	5	(mail/fax/emaile)	5	7015 0640 0007 1592 5158	1	\$6.47	
Thomas Filings	6/10/16	49	1	49	7015 0640 0007 1592 5165	1	\$8.83	
Thomas Filings	8/16/16	2	fax	2				
Thomas Filings	1/19/17	57	6	342	7015 0640 0007 1589 5048	6	\$53.61	
Thomas Filings	1/25/17	149	7	1043	7015 0640 0007 1589 5147	7	\$93.10	
Thomas Filings	6/14/17	2	8	16	7016 3010 0000 1880 3103	8	\$52.72	
My service/15-0491	9/1/18	4	2	8	7015 0640 0007 1589 5178	2	\$13.40	
My service/15-0491	9/27/18	9	1	9	7015 0640 0007 1589 5192	1	\$7.62	
My service/15-0491	10/3/18	10	1	10	7015 0640 0007 1589 5208	1	\$7.62	
My service/15-0491	10/19/18	32	4	128	7015 0640 0007 1589 5222	4	\$33.84	
My service/15-0491	11/15/18	3	1	3	7015 0640 0007 1589 5260	1	\$7.41	
				6793x.50			\$847.08	

Any and all documents, papers, writings, digital data, tangible mediums and tangible items made and executed by the Undersigned are hereby restated in their entirety, and incorporated herein, as if set forth in full as an integral part of these matters and Creation Wide Public Record for all of Creation to rely upon;

Any and all digital data discs and/or other tangible mediums and items, whether filed now or in the future, are hereby restated in their entirety, and incorporated herein, as if set forth in full as an integral part of these matters and Creation-Wide Public Record for all of Creation to rely upon;

The Undersigned do hereby give present, past and future notice of corrections of any manual and/or automated filing systems and procedures which alter, or attempt to alter, unlawfully or not, our real-man Living Soul Heir and Beneficiary capacities, conditions, characters, status, standings and/or our Lawful Jurisdiction, Venue and Law Form, without limitation, ab initio, nunc pro tunc, in perpetuity, without recourse, without prejudice;

The Undersigned do hereby give present, past and future notifications of corrections of any manual and/or automated filing systems and procedures which alter, or attempt to alter, unlawfully or not, the STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and/or their status, standings, capacities, characters, conditions in any way, shape, form and/or facet, without limitation, ab initio, nunc pro tunc, in perpetuity, without recourse;

- In all instances of the use of the letter combinations "THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES, Defendants" it shall mean the following, to wit: United States of America aka/dba THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA aka/dba UNITED STATES aka/dba United States aka/dba UNKNOWN, foreign entity, trustee, any and all derivatives, appellations, identifiers, numbers and their combinations, letters and their combinations, abbreviations, idem sonans and/or all other legal, financial and managerial forms and formats of any nature, shape, cause and kind, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all corporate, military, commercial, civil, political, social, ecclesiastical and other entities of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all creations and liabilities by, of, through and from of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all political subdivisions and instrumentalities of any nature, shape, cause kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all capacities, characters, conditions, status, standings, jurisdictions, venues and law forms of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all agents, assigns, successors, principals, beneficiaries, employees, officers, contractors, franchisees, licensees, members of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all trusts, structures, hierarchies, systems, networks, regimes and any and all other limits and constructs of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all political subdivisions and instrumentalities of any nature, shape, cause kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all capacities, characters, conditions, status, standings, jurisdictions, venues and law forms of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all agents, assigns, successors, principals, beneficiaries, employees, officers, contractors, franchisees, licensees, members of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all trusts, structures, hierarchies, systems, networks, regimes and any and all other limits and constructs of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all of the aforementioned both known and unknown, any and all of the aforementioned both perceived and unperceived, and any and all variations and combinations of the aforementioned, without limitation, private for profit entities providing quasi-governmental and other goods and services purporting to be lawful government, also referred to as defendant.

- In all instances of the use of the letter combinations "STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA and STATE OF ..., Defendants" it shall mean the following, to wit: State of West Virginia aka/dba STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA aka/dba West Virginia aka/dba WEST VIRGINIA aka/dba UNKNOWN, foreign entity, trustee, any and all derivatives, appellations, identifiers, numbers and their combinations, letters and their combinations, abbreviations, idem sonans and/or all other legal, financial and managerial forms and formats of any nature, shape, cause and kind, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all corporate, military, commercial, civil, political, social, ecclesiastical and other entities of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all creations and liabilities by, of, through and from of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all political subdivisions and instrumentalities of any nature, shape, cause kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all capacities, characters, conditions, status, standings, jurisdictions, venues and law forms of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all agents, assigns, successors, principals, beneficiaries, employees, officers, contractors, franchisees, licensees, members of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all trusts, structures, hierarchies, systems, networks, regimes and any and all other limits and constructs of any nature, shape, cause, kind, form and format, and any and all variations and combinations thereof, any and all of the aforementioned both known and unknown, any and all of the aforementioned both perceived and unperceived, and any and all variations and combinations of the aforementioned, without limitation, private for profit entities providing quasi-governmental and other goods and services purporting to be lawful government, also referred to as defendant.

By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice

In all instances of the use of the letter combinations "Original Contract(s)" it shall mean the Constitution for the United States of America c1819 and/or the Declaration of Independence c1776.

Any omission of any possible issue, matter, right, defense, process and/or procedure, or any other term of art describing, demonstrating and/or utilized to mean the same, is explicitly reserved.

Any omission is not a waiver thereof.

A copy, facsimile and digital scan are lawfully declared to be, and has the same force, affect and effect as, the Original.

The Undersigned are not a guarantors, acceptors, accommodating parties, debtors, sureties or any other term of art describing, demonstrating and/or utilized to mean the same, to and/or for anything Creation-Wide, by the explicit notice.

The Undersigned reserve the right to amend, enhance and/or delete from this document and writing at any time and any place the need arises, by explicit reservation.

The Undersigned reserve the right to define all words and letter combinations contained herein; and further, reserve the right to interpret and construct the intent thereof, will full finality, by explicit reservation.

The Undersigned do hereby knowingly, willingly, intelligently and intentionally declare and affirm that the foregoing is true, accurate and complete, the truth, whole truth and nothing but the truth, to the best of our knowledge and ability, so help us Creator.

The Undersigned, under full liability and complete transparency, do hereby knowingly, willingly, intelligently and intentionally Affirm, Declare, Proclaim and Publish that this set of documents and tangible mediums are hereby absolutely and duly affirmed, authorized, declared, stated, made, issued, certified, confirmed, ratified, verified, executed, noticed, re-affirmed, re-authorized, re-declared, re-stated, re-issued, re-certified, re-confirmed, re-ratified, re-verified and re-noticed, absolutely and duly perfected, protected and secured in their entirety for all of Creation to rely upon, without limitation, in perpetuity, without recourse, without prejudice, under the penalties of false witness, to the best of our knowledge and ability, governed by, and under, the Laws of the Creator, under the Laws of Creation.

Hereunto we have set our Hands and knowingly, willingly, intelligently and intentionally caused our autographs to become affixed hereto.

Executed in Creation, by, under and pursuant to the Laws of the Creator and the Laws of Creation.


On the fourth day of February, in the Year of our Creator two thousand nineteen.

NON-TRANSFERABLE


Heir of the Creator, Real-man Living Soul, Secured Party, Holder-in-Due-Course, Real-Party-in-Interest, Grantor, Bailor, Administrator, Creditor, Custodian, Beneficiary; All rights, privileges, freedoms and immunities are hereby claimed, reserved and exercised, without limitation, without prejudice, without recourse.



Heir of the Creator, Real-man Living Soul, Secured Party, Holder-in-Due-Course, Real-Party-in-Interest, Grantor, Bailor, Administrator, Creditor, Custodian, Beneficiary; All rights, privileges, freedoms and immunities are hereby claimed, reserved and exercised, without limitation, without prejudice, without recourse.



Heir of the Creator, Real-man Living Soul, Secured Party, Holder-in-Due-Course, Real-Party-in-Interest, Grantor, Bailor, Administrator, Creditor, Custodian, Beneficiary; All rights, privileges, freedoms and immunities are hereby claimed, reserved and exercised, without limitation, without prejudice, without recourse.





By, Under and Through Plenary Immunity and Plenary Indemnity, Without Recourse, Without Prejudice



Declaration and Notice of Service

I, Phillip Hudok, under full liability and complete transparency, do by these Presents Declare and Aver that I, on the fourth day of February, in the Year of our Creator two thousand nineteen, caused to be served by USPS postage pre-paid certified mail, a true, accurate and complete copy of the following tangible item, to wit:

- Bill of Petition and Grievance

to, and upon, the following, at the following corporate locations, to wit:

Shelley Wellons Moore Capito aka/dba SHELLEY WELLONS MOORE CAPITO aka/dba SENATOR SHELLEY CAPITO aka/dba UNITED STATES SENATE aka/dba
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
172 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
c.m. # 7016 2070 0000 3541 3069

I, Phillip Hudok, under full liability and complete transparency, do knowingly, willingly, intelligently and intentionally hereby Declare that the foregoing is true, accurate and complete, the truth, whole truth and nothing but the truth, to the best of my knowledge and ability, so help me Creator.

I, Phillip Hudok, sui juris, under full liability and complete transparency, being of plenary capacity, character, condition, status, standing and responsibility, under the penalty of false witness, under the Laws of the Creator, under the Laws of Creation, do by these Presents, knowingly, willingly, intelligently and intentionally Affirm, Declare, Proclaim and Publish that this document is hereby absolutely and duly affirmed, authorized, declared, stated, made, issued, certified, confirmed, ratified, verified, executed, noticed, re-affirmed, re-authorized, re-declared, re-stated, re-issued, re-certified, re-confirmed, re-ratified, re-verified and re-noticed, absolutely and duly perfected, protected and secured in its entirety for all of Creation to rely upon, without limitation, in perpetuity, without recourse, without prejudice.

I reserve the right to amend, enhance and/or delete from this document and tangible medium at anytime, by explicit reservation.

Any omission is not a waiver thereof.

A copy, facsimile and digital scan are lawfully declared to be, and has the same force, affect and effect as, the Original.


I reserve the right to define all words and letter combinations contained herein; and further, reserve the right to interpret and construct the intent thereof, with plenary finality, by explicit reservation.

Hereunto I have set my Hand and knowingly, willingly, intelligently and intentionally caused my autograph to become affixed hereto.

Executed in Creation, by, under and pursuant to the Laws of the Creator and the Laws of Creation.

On the fourth day of February, in the Year of our Creator two thousand nineteen.

Heir of the Creator, Real-man Living Soul, Secured Party, Holder-in-Due-Course, Real-Party-in-Interest, Grantor, Bailor, Administrator, Creditor, Custodian, Beneficiary; All rights, privileges, freedoms and immunities are hereby claimed, reserved and exercised, without limitation, without prejudice, without recourse.



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☐ Adult Signature Required \$0.00

☐ Adult Signature Restricted Delivery \$0.00

Postage \$2.50

Total Postage and Fees \$8.80

0625

03

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